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Kristina Stoeckl
Introduction:  
What Are Postsecular Conflicts? 
Every human society is heterogeneous and characterized by internal diver-
sity. This truism is particularly evident when we think about religious 
diversity in modern societies. Secularization has changed the social posi-
tion of religion. Modern societies no longer conceive of human coexistence 
as regulated by divine commands, but as the result of autonomous collec-
tive self-determination. The “sacred canopy,” which according to Peter 
Berger once enveloped the entire social and temporal order, has ceased 
to exist. 1 In the secular age in which we live, multiple religious creeds 
are on offer and unbelief has become, for many, the default option. 2 And 
yet, religious pluralism was, for centuries, the cause for wars. In Europe, 
kings and rulers tried to curb the explosive power of religious plural-
ism within state borders: religious homogeneity was imposed on terri-
tories in the Peace of Westphalia (1684), and non-conforming heretics 
were exiled. As José Casanova points out in his book Europas Angst vor 
der Religion (Europe’s fear of religion), the settlement of the newly dis-
covered Americas by groups of Europeans escaping the religious wars in 
their home countries enabled European societies to preserve an artificial 
religious uniformity that did not correspond to the actual state of diver-
1 Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy (New York: Doubleday, 1967).
2 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).
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sity. 3 Today religious diversity exists even within relatively homogenous 
European societies through the rise of numbers of non-believers, through 
new religious movements, and through migration. The societal changes 
usually subsumed under the label “1968” have likewise furthered diver-
sity through greater individualism and the diversification of the politi-
cal spectrum. European societies today are internally highly diverse in 
terms of worldviews, religions, and everyday ways of life. From the point 
of view of sociology, this pluralism is inevitable and cannot be reversed. 
It is the defining feature of modern societies. 
If the pluralism of modern societies is the result of their history, what 
attitude can individuals as historical agents develop in this regard? This 
is, in the broadest sense of the term, a political question. Political philo-
sophy distinguishes two trends in the attitudes of people vis-à-vis the 
pluralism of their societies. The first is a conservative stance that views 
changes in society with suspicion and sees old, predefined structures as 
guarantors of social unity. The second is a progressive stance, which wel-
comes change and would like to throw the burden of what is old over-
board in favor of diversity. 
This edited volume gathers materials and debates that are located 
in the first, in the conservative, and also in the second, the progressive 
camp. Some of the presented material is anti-liberal, even on the extreme 
right of the political spectrum; it praises “tradition” as a bulwark against 
diversity. Other texts are closer to the progressive side; they engage in 
the difficult task of evaluating what “tradition” can mean under condi-
tions of diversity. 
The progressive stance is often called liberalism, but in this intro-
duction I would like to reserve the term for an analytical position from 
which to evaluate the two camps (and the authors presented in this vol-
ume): postsecular political liberalism as represented by John Rawls and – 
in German speaking countries – by Jürgen Habermas. 4 Postsecular political 
liberalism operates under the assumption that pluralism is not a (deplora-
3 José Casanova, Europas Angst vor der Religion (Berlin: Berlin University Press, 2009).
4 For a definition, see: Kristina Stoeckl and Dmitry Uzlaner, “Four Genealogies  
of Postsecularity,” in Routledge Handbook of Postsecularity, ed. Justin Beaumont  
(New York: Routledge, 2019).
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ble or commendable) state of affairs, but a norm. It is the norm of the pol-
ity that we call liberal democracy. 5 The main representative of this idea 
of postsecular political liberalism, John Rawls, says that the framework 
of norms in a polity is the result of an overlapping consensus. 6 By this, he 
means that the citizens of a state should be capable of finding a consen-
sus about basic laws even if the reasons why they think that these laws 
are good are not the same. Rawls does not assume that those who give 
one reason know the reasons of other people or even value them. They 
might despise them, but as long as the outcome is the same, the overlap-
ping consensus is real. Jürgen Habermas expresses a similar view using 
the concept of deliberative democracy, but the implications are different. 7 
He formulates a more demanding concept of the mutual understanding 
of citizens. Habermas imagines that citizens should be able to explain to 
each other the reasons why they support a given understanding of good 
political order over another. When Habermas talks about a postsecular 
society, he intends a pluralist society that is no longer governed by just 
one worldview that is always right and determines the political and social 
horizon, but one that must bring diverse ideas about what a “good life” is 
actively into accord. 8
How realistic, how viable is this vision of postsecular society? Haber-
mas reminds the participants in public discourse of the need for “mutual 
translation.” He advocates a “complementary learning process” based on 
the readiness of religious citizens to translate their views into a language 
comprehensible to non-religious people and on the willingness of secular 
citizens to really pay attention to what their religious co-citizens have to 
say. 9 Habermas assumes that more “translation” between religious and 
5 Alessandro Ferrara, The Democratic Horizon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014).
6 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993).
7 Jürgen Habermas, “Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John 
Rawls’ Political Liberalism,” Journal of Philosophy 92 (1995), 109–131.
8 J ürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere,” European Journal of Philosophy 14,  
no. 1 (2006), 1–25.
9 Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in Der Öffentlichkeit: Kognitive Voraussetzungen  
für den ‘Öffentlichen Vernunftgebrauch’ religiöser und säkularer Bürger,”  
in Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2005).
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non-religious people could lead to better mutual understanding and thus 
to a better quality of the democratic process. 
Against Habermas, one could argue that there already exists a soci-
ological model that conceptualizes the moral and religious diversity of 
modern societies, only in less consensual terms: the model of culture wars 
described by James D. Hunter. 10 In the United States this concept denotes 
the conflict between representatives of a culture holding on to traditional 
teachings, values, and life plans on the one hand, and the representatives 
of a culture of change and individual freedom on the other. Where Haber-
mas’s idea of postsecular society highlights consensus, the culture wars 
model highlights conflict. Both operate under the assumption that plu-
ralism is the default condition of modern societies, but they come to dif-
ferent conclusions. Habermas’s conclusion is optimistic, Hunter’s is pes-
simistic. Culture wars, Hunter writes, precede shooting wars. 11
This introduction is not the place to settle the question whether con-
flicts over values in modern pluralistic societies always take the form of 
a postsecular consensus or a culture war. Instead, what this introduction, 
this edited volume, and in general the whole Postsecular Conflicts research 
project 12 tries to do, is to define in greater detail the conditions of these 
conflicts. By “conditions” we mean what actors, what political dynamics, 
and what ideas and intellectual genealogies are at play in today’s post-
secular conflicts? 13 
10 James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America  
(New York: Basic Books, 1991).
11 James Davison Hunter, Before the Shooting Begins: Searching for Democracy  
in America’s Culture War (New York: Free Press, 1994).
12 The Postsecular Conflicts (POSEC) research project is a research project and group 
active at the University of Innsbruck from 2016 to 2021. It is funded by the European 
Research Council under the Horizon 2020 framework (ERC-STG-2015-676804). 
13 The handshake between two figures, one symbolizing the United States and the 
other Russia, on the cover of this edited volume is a reference to James D. Hunter’s 
book Culture Wars. The cover of Culture Wars (1991) showed an arm-wrestle between 
stars and stripes, symbolizing an American society in conflict. Twenty years later, the 
conservative side in this conflict is in friendly relations with Russia. The handshake 
on the cover symbolizes the transnational moral conservative alliances and the global 
dynamics of postsecular conflicts studied in this volume.
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Postsecular Conflicts
Postsecular conflicts are conflicts over values in modern pluralistic soci-
eties. We propose the term as a neutral, descriptive category; one that 
allows us to analyze constellations of conflict without seeing them, a pri-
ori, as grounds for postsecular consensus (the optimistic outcome) or for 
culture wars (the pessimistic outcome). The following four features are 
characteristic of postsecular conflicts:
First Defining Feature: Postsecular Conflicts Revolve around  
the Definition of Explicit and Implicit Norms. 
The first feature of postsecular conflicts is that they arise when it comes 
to codifying norms into laws. In modern pluralistic societies, explicit and 
implicit norms of living together are being called into question. One exam-
ple that illustrates this fact very well is the question of “marriage for all”: 
In 2017, the German parliament passed a law that gave heterosexual mar-
riages and homosexual partnerships (legal in Germany since 2001) equal 
status. All the parliament did was to change the wording of article 1353 of 
the German Civil Code from “marriage is entered into for life. The spouses 
have a mutual duty of conjugal community” to “marriage is entered into 
by two people of different or the same sex for life.” Representatives of the 
Christliche Demokratische Union and the Christlich-Soziale Union in par-
ticular voiced concerns before the vote that the change might be uncon-
stitutional. They argued that marriage for all would be possible only by 
changing the constitution (Grundgesetz). Article 6 of the German Grund­
gesetz grants marriage and the family special protection by the state. It 
does not mention explicitly that only a man and a woman can marry, but 
when the Grundgesetz came into force in 1949, this was self-evident. The 
question whether social change should result in a change of the constitu-
tion led to controversy among German legal experts. They had to answer 
the following question: What was the deeper, implicit meaning of the 
article of the German constitution that grants special protection to mar-
riage and the family: a heterosexual relationship, the procreation of off-
spring, or simply mutual solidarity? The German example goes to show 
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that often it is not the rights granted by the law that are questioned, but 
their interpretation. Either an interpretation of the law that has its roots 
in history is challenged or underdetermined concepts in the law result in 
new interpretations – for instance in the idea that “marriage for life” can 
also be entered into by same-sex partners. 
During the last few decades the legal systems of Europe have moved 
in the direction of an increasingly inclusive pluralist social model. This 
involves the complete equality of religious, cultural, and sexual minorities. 
Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights prohibits discrimination, 
many countries have changed their laws to do away with unequal treat-
ment. The drivers of these changes are frequently the European Court of 
Human Rights, the European Union, or the United Nations treaty frame-
work. The process, which is called norm diffusion in the scientific liter-
ature, 14 can either take place “top-down” or “bottom-up,” depending on 
whether lawmakers react to existing discrimination by changing the laws or 
whether an affected individual reminds his or her government of its duty 
(e. g., by taking a case to the European Court of Human Rights) to observe 
the international anti-discrimination regulations it signed. In short, the 
explicit and implicit norms of living together in society, which reflect a 
largely unquestioned status quo rooted in history, are being challenged. 
These explicit and implicit norms in many cases involve the domains of 
public or even private morals as well as religion and culture. 
Second Defining Feature:  
There Is No Clear Solution to Postsecular Conflicts
The second feature of postsecular conflicts is that there are no obvious or 
direct ways of resolving them. This is also why in the theoretical litera-
ture consensus is either envisioned as indirect (“overlapping”) or absent 
(“culture wars”). In situations where a generally valid solution to moral or 
religious conflicts is not possible, the commonly applied political answer 
14 Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human 
Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction,” in The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change, ed. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and 
Kathryn Sikkink (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
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is exemptions. The best known type of exemption is the right to refuse an 
action on grounds of conscience, for example, conscientious objection to 
military service. In contemporary postsecular conflicts, the instrument of 
“exemptions” encounters two kinds of limits. 15 The first limit is set by those 
who are supposed to profit from the exemptions. This is the case when 
actors refuse the benefit of exemptions because they want to give shape 
to the political and legal system as such, as would be the case of claims to 
outlaw abortions in a country where medical personnel have the right to 
refuse to conduct abortions on grounds of conscience. 16 The second limit 
to exemptions, however, is nowadays set by the majority as well, who are 
less and less prepared to accept exemptions. It takes a certain amount of 
tolerance among members of the majority to accept that people in their 
midst may refuse to perform certain acts or activities for conscientious 
reasons. This tolerance is dwindling, as, for example, attempts to change 
the law on conscientious objection in Italy demonstrate. 
Third Defining Feature: Postsecular Conflicts Are Transnational
The third feature of postsecular conflicts is that they are transnational. 
Even though conflicts normally arise in national contexts, transnational 
dynamics may come into play and change the conflict on a national level. 
This transnational aspect of postsecular conflicts is one of the main top-
ics studied by the Postsecular Conflicts project, which has investigated the 
role of transnational norm entrepreneurs in areas such as family values, 
anti-abortion mobilization, or homeschooling. “Transnational” means 
that controversies that mobilize only small minorities in a national con-
text can create political leverage on the international level through the 
work of transnational advocacy groups and non-governmental organiza-
tions. Transnational actors that appeal to international courts, like the 
15 Kristina Stoeckl, “Political Liberalism and Religious Claims: Four Blind Spots,” 
Philosophy & Social Criticism 43 (2017), 34–50.
16 Susanna Mancini and Kristina Stoeckl, “Transatlantic Conversations: The Emergence of 
Society-Protective Anti-Abortion Arguments in the United States, Europe and Russia,” in 
The Conscience Wars: Rethinking the Balance between Religion and Equality, ed. Susanna 
Mancini and Michel Rosenfeld (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 220–257.
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European Court of Human Rights, influence domestic politics, including 
causes on both the progressive and the conservative agenda. 
The following example clarifies this third, transnational feature of 
postsecular conflicts. Homeschooling is forbidden in Germany and only 
a small group of people in Germany have challenged the legal situation, 
mostly for religious reasons. One was the Wunderlich family, a strictly 
observant Christian family that refused to comply with the German law 
on compulsory schooling. The parents were faced with penalties, includ-
ing temporary loss of custody of their children. The Wunderlich family 
found legal support with two US-based advocacy groups that are active 
on a transnational level, the Alliance Defending Freedom and the Home 
School Legal Defense Association, which took the case to the European 
Court of Human Rights. The advocates contended, among other things, 
that the fact that homeschooling is formally recognized as a right in the 
vast majority of countries that are party to the European Convention of 
Human Rights means that this right should exist in Germany also. 17 The 
example makes clear, first, that religious and moral conflicts that concern 
only small minorities in domestic contexts can acquire international sig-
nificance through the work of transnational advocacy groups and, sec-
ond, that norm diffusion mechanisms like strategic litigation, commonly 
associated with the American culture wars and the court system in the 
United States, have become a global strategy. 
Fourth Defining Feature: Postsecular Conflicts Do Not Evolve along  
Religious­Secular, but along Conservative­Liberal Fault Lines
The fourth point to be made about postsecular conflicts is that they are 
not conflicts between secular and religious worldviews, but between lib-
eral-progressive positions and conservative-traditionalist positions. When 
Habermas coined the term “postsecular society,” he had in mind debates 
between religious and secularist actors. In some difficult moral debates, 
he contended, religious actors may have sensibilities that secularists do 
not share. Habermas also assumed, however, that the religious actors 
17 Roger Kiska and Michael P. Donnelly, “Application to the European Court of Human 
Rights,” Case of Wunderlich v. Germany, Application no. 18925/15, 2015, 8.
uibk_kern_stoeckl_postsecular-conflicts_170x220mm_1.4.indd   14 25.05.20   09:18
15Kristina Stoeckl — Introduction: What are Postsecular Conflicts?
engaged in public debate would already have come to terms with the chal-
lenges of modern consciousness, such as religious freedom or the priority 
of profane science. He thereby set a high threshold for religious actors 
to enter the public sphere, which is also the point he has been most crit-
icized for. 18 As a matter of fact, religious arguments in the public sphere 
range from liberal-progressive to conservative-traditionalist positions. 
On some issues, for example, social justice, liberal-progressive religious 
actors will have more in common with secular liberals than with conserv-
ative-traditionalist religious actors. 
To summarize: Postsecular conflicts revolve around the definition 
of explicit and implicit norms, they have no clear solutions, are trans-
national, and evolve along the conservative-liberal fault line. Postsecu­
lar conflicts is the term we use, in the context of this research project, to 
define in greater detail the conditions of these conflicts over values in 
modern pluralistic societies – without, a priori, seeing them as grounds 
for postsecular consensus or for culture wars. By asking what type of 
actors, what political dynamics, and what ideas and intellectual geneal-
ogies are at play in such conflicts, we hope to identify conditions unter 
which conflicts over values develop into one or the other; in other words, 
when such conflicts may actually lead to democratic consensus or, instead, 
to polarization and culture wars.
Shifting Coordinates  
of the Conservative Worldview 
In the first part of this edited volume, we publish four interviews con-
ducted in the context of the Postsecular Conflicts research project. The 
four interviews – with Allan C. Carlson, Rod Dreher, R. R. Reno and Alex-
18 Cristina Lafont, “Religion and the Public Sphere,” Philosophy and Public Criticism 35,  
nos. 1–2 (2009), 127–150; Maeve Cooke, “Salvaging and Secularizing the Semantic 
Contents of Religion: The Limitations of Habermas’s Postmetaphysical Proposal,”  
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 60, no. 1/3 (2006), 187–207.
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ander Dugin – are selected as representative of the conservative political 
vision implicated in today’s postsecular conflicts. They define the con-
tours of a coherent worldview on the political right in the twenty-first 
century – in the case of Dugin even on the extreme right. In the inter-
views, we asked our interlocutors to define their attitude with regard to 
liberalism, Russia, the concept of the culture wars, and religion. What we 
gather from their answers is that the coordinate system of the “conserv-
ative mind” has changed since the time of the Cold War.
The coordinates have, firstly, shifted from left to liberal. While the 
main antagonist for a thinker in the politically right and conservative camp 
during the Cold War was the leftist (Marxist, Communist), it is now the 
“liberal.” In an ideological framing deeply rooted in the political panorama 
of the United States, for our conservative American interlocutors Marx-
ism and liberalism represent the same thing. Sometimes they use the term 
“left-liberalism” to draw a more subtle distinction, given that conserva-
tives, on the whole, endorse liberal economic ideas. This wholesale iden-
tification of Marxism and liberalism also existed in the European context, 
but it was never as mainstream as in the United States; instead, in Europe, 
the identification of Marxism and liberalism belonged to the ideology of 
the Far Right. It owes more to Carl Schmitt and Martin Heidegger than to 
concrete struggles between social conservatives and social progressives 
on questions of public morality in the post–World War II years. In fact, 
a Russian thinker like Dugin had to learn – to his amazement – from his 
interlocutors of the French Nouvelle Droit “why I hated Communism. But 
I also understood why the West was not an alternative” (p. 62).
The coordinates have, secondly, shifted from the West to the East, 
to Russia. Whereas the main antagonist for a conservative thinker dur-
ing the Cold War was the Communist East, the new antagonist is now 
inside the West. It is the “dying West,” as the American conservative Pat 
Buchanan wrote in 2001, and by which he means contemporary secular 
and liberal society. 19 Conservatives interpret political correctness not as 
a way to manage radical pluralism in the public sphere, but, as Rod Dre-
her puts it, as “a threat” (p. 26). American conservatives’ fascination with 
19 Patrick J. Buchanan, The Death of the West: How Dying Populations and Immigrant 
Invasions Imperil Our Culture and Civilization (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2001).
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Russia is based on admiration for the unbridled Russian disdain for polit-
ical correctness and the robust defense of Orthodox privileges inside the 
Russian state over and against minority rights. The admiration for Rus-
sia is paradoxical, because the country restricts not only the freedoms of 
LGBTQ+ people, but also of minority faiths. This contradiction notwith-
standing, one of our interviewees, R. R. Reno, concludes that American 
social conservatives “have become kind of pro-Putin” (p. 55).
The coordinates have, thirdly, shifted from religion to tradition. 
Whereas the main conflict line for conservatives during the Cold War 
was between religious and secular (especially atheist) worldviews, the 
new front line is now between traditionalist religious views and liberal 
religious views. Religious teachings are evaluated on their conservative 
and traditionalist and not evangelical or theological credentials. This idea 
is exemplified by Carlson, who welcomes the leadership of the Patriarch 
of Moscow because he considers Pope Francis of the Catholic Church “as 
kind of pulling back on these social issues” (p. 48). The exact meaning of 
“tradition” and “traditional values,” however, is only vaguely defined by 
the people interviewed in this volume. It comprises a heterosexual family 
model, patriarchy, conservative social mores, and anti-modernist content 
from Christian teaching. This limited understanding of tradition is crit-
icized by the authors included in the second part of the volume, who all 
object – from within Orthodox theology – to the identification of Ortho-
doxy with conservative traditionalism.
The coordinates have, fourthly, shifted from democracy to authority. 
While conservatives during the Cold War defended democracy over and 
against autocracy, which was associated with the USSR (and also against 
critics from the left who saw in Western democracy a hegemonic project), 
the conservatives of the twenty-first century no longer trust democracy. 
They ask, in the words of Reno, for “strong gods,” for authority. 20 
The four interviews presented here are first-hand material for an 
analysis of the ideas and intellectual genealogies at play on the politi-
cal right. Anti-liberalism, Russia, tradition, and authority emerge from 
this material as the four angles of the conservative coordinate system. 
20 R. R. Reno, Return of the Strong Gods: Nationalism, Populism, and the Future of the West 
(Washington, DC: Gateway Editions, 2019).
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To some extent, the conservatism of the beginning of the twenty-first 
century brings us back full circle to the continental European conserva-
tism of the 1920s and 30s, which was just as anti-liberal, fascinated with 
the East, traditionalist, and authoritarian. But it also adds some new ele-
ments that need to be weighed carefully in future analysis, like the nar-
row focus on questions of private morality (sexuality, family, abortion). 21 
It should be added that these four interviews constitute only a small 
part of a large body of interview data compiled in the context of the Post­
secular Conflicts project. They stand out because they represent in a par-
ticularly clear manner the problematics addressed in that project. The 
interviews are also special because the interviewees agreed to waive con-
fidentiality and to see their conversation published. Sociologists do not 
often give authentic “voice” to the subjects of their research and rarely 
publish interviews at full length. Instead, they anonymize their interviews, 
they code and analyze them and feed the data into a scholarly argument 
that is different from the story told by the interviewed persons. As schol-
ars we do not share and we may not like the intellectual positions that we 
encounter during our fieldwork and that constitute the material for our 
analysis and publications in the Postsecular Conflicts project. 22 As part 
of our publication strategy, in this edited volume we lay open some of the 
data collected in this project, in order to encourage scholars to engage 
firsthand with the overall historical, political, sociological and intellec-
tual picture that emerges from this material. The analysis of the dynamics 
that determine today’s postsecular conflicts requires the critical study of 
ideas on the political and Christian right and the tracing of the intellec-
tual genealogies at play in the transnational connections between moral 
conservatives. 
21 Katharina Bluhm and Mihai Varga, eds., New Conservatives in Russia and East Central 
Europe (New York: Routledge, 2018).
22 See the publications of the project here: https://zenodo.org/communities/
postsecularconflicts/.
uibk_kern_stoeckl_postsecular-conflicts_170x220mm_1.4.indd   18 25.05.20   09:18
19Kristina Stoeckl — Introduction: What are Postsecular Conflicts?
Orthodox Critiques of  
Traditional Values Conservatism 
The second set of texts in this edited volume represents viewpoints and 
debates that are closer to the progressive side in postsecular conflicts. 
They are not mirror images of the conservative camp; they do not rep-
resent the conservative’s imagined liberal, Western, secular, and demo-
cratic antagonist. Instead, our intention with this selection of one inter-
view and four essays is to offer an insight into attempts to critique and 
contextualize the conservatives’ predilection for traditionalism, Russia, 
and Orthodox Christianity “from within.” All of the authors in this second 
part are Orthodox Christians; they come from Russia, Ukraine, and the 
United States. In their texts, they engage in the difficult task of evaluat-
ing what “tradition” can mean under conditions of modernity and in the 
face of attempts to claim tradition exclusively for the conservative cause. 
For Alexander Filonenko, the conservative fascination with Russia, 
with Putin, and with Orthodoxy is a sign of the failure of the Orthodox 
Church. Politicization of Orthodoxy, he says in his interview, is the oppo-
site of bearing witness to one’s faith. His view is echoed by Sergey Horujy, 
who writes about the need to “protect Tradition from the Traditionalists.” 
Horujy scrutinizes the ideas expressed by Dugin critically and in detail. 
For this prominent and authoritative scholar of the Orthodox theological 
tradition, traditionalists like Dugin “steal the past and hijack the future.” 
Andrey Shishkov adds analytical clarity to the debate by offering a brief 
genealogy of two understandings of tradition in Orthodox theology, one 
liberal, one conservative. For Aristotle Papanikolaou, following Alasdair 
MacIntyre, “the viability of a tradition depends on how well it can answer 
the challenges and questions of a particular era.” Tradition understood 
in this way presupposes the willingness for debate and mutual recogni-
tion of divergent positions. Tradition, he argues, must not be used as a 
“conversation stopper” between progressive and conservative views, but 
as the shared basis for conversation. Sergey Chapnin, finally, engages in 
the work of terminological archeology to find out when the concept of 
“traditional values” entered the Russian Orthodox discourse and became 
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dominant. His analysis brings to the fore contradictions in the Russian 
traditional values discourse which those who propagate this discourse 
tend to ignore or gloss over. 
What unites the authors in this section is not only their underlying 
intention to challenge the conservative discourse on traditional values. 
They also share a specific method for developing their criticism, namely 
genealogy: in order to understand what concepts mean today, one needs 
to understand where they come from and in which context they operate 
and unfold. The epistemic stance of self-reflexivity prohibits them from 
identifying with the conservative fascination with Russia and tradition-
alism that we find expressed in the interviews in the first section. 
Mapping Postsecular Conflicts
Postsecular conflicts, as explained above, revolve around the definition 
of explicit and implicit norms, they have no clear solutions, are transna-
tional, and evolve along the conservative-liberal fault line. Defining the 
conditions of such conflicts in detail means diving into the empirical real-
ity of the type of actors, the political dynamics, and the ideas and intel-
lectual genealogies that are at play. This edited volume presents firsthand 
material and debates that offer a glimpse into this vast empirical reality: 
the actors are intellectuals, activists, politicians, and church leaders; the 
political dynamics are struggles over the values and norms that inform 
political community; and the ideas and intellectual genealogies put at 
stake the meaning of tradition. 
Postsecular conflicts can be “mapped” in two different ways. The 
first intellectual map is the one behind the concept of the culture wars. 
It is a map in black and white, which traces an unbridgeable antagonism 
between a conservative coordinate system of anti-liberalism, the East, 
authority, and tradition, and a liberal coordinate system of liberalism, the 
West, democracy, and secularism. It expresses an antagonism between 
two public moralities, between two social “sacreds” that cannot be rec-
onciled and that are bound to clash. The second intellectual map is the 
one behind Habermas’s concept of postsecular society. This map is dif-
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ferent, it comes in a varied range of colors and shades and it outlines the 
different areas of possible overlaps between these two coordinate sys-
tems. 23 The former map is not wrong; it can explain many of the dynam-
ics that the first part of this edited volume documents (see the epilogue 
by Dmitry Uzlaner). But it is not exhaustive. We also need the second map 
in order to explain phenomena like the defense of tradition from within 
tradition, as exemplified by the authors in the second part of this volume. 
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“All the great  
renewal movements  
came from below…”
Interview with Rod Dreher  
(in Bratislava, Slovakia)
In 2017 you published your bestselling book The Benedict Option, in which you argue 
that conservatives in the United States have lost the culture wars. What is your vision 
of the culture war battlefield in America two years later? Has anything changed since 
you published The Benedict Option? 
I am still absolutely sure conservatives lost. When I published The Bene­
dict Option, it was shortly after Donald Trump was inaugurated as pres-
ident [of the United States]. In fact, when I finished the manuscript for 
the book just before the election, I wrote it as if Hillary would win. After 
Trump’s election to president, my hope was that he would appoint some 
judges to the United States Supreme Court who had a much stronger 
view of religious freedom and free speech. Judges aren’t religious lead-
ers, they’re cultural leaders, and I wanted them to be able to preserve 
the space for traditional groups, religious and political, to act. Trump has 
done that, but he has been such a disaster on many other levels. He has 
discredited a lot of religious conservatives who supported him. And so 
when Trump leaves office, there will be a tremendous, serious backlash 
against conservatives.
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So you are saying that American society is today even more polarized than it was two 
years ago? 
Yes. Back in 2015, before I wrote The Benedict Option, and as I was start-
ing to work on it, I got a phone call from an American doctor. His mother 
was an immigrant from Czechoslovakia. She spent six years in a Czech 
prison as a political prisoner when she was young. She’s very old now and 
lives with him. The doctor called me and said, “I have to tell you, my mom 
says to me, ‘I’m starting to see signs in this country, the United States, that 
remind me of when Communism came to Czechoslovakia.’” And I thought, 
“That’s crazy!” I mean, maybe she’s an old woman, maybe she’s exagger-
ating, so I contacted an old friend who is a mathematician at the Univer-
sity of Cambridge. He and his wife defected from Hungary in the 1960s. 
So I wrote to him, because I knew I could trust him. I told him what the 
Czech woman had said and I asked, “Is that true?” He said, “Absolutely, 
yes. My wife and I are sitting here in Cambridge” – he’s retired – “we’re 
watching TV every day. We’re reading the newspapers and we’re think-
ing, ‘This is like when Communism first came to Hungary.’” And I said, 
“But can you explain why?” He said, “It’s mostly the absolute refusal of the 
Left to allow dissent. If you get on the wrong side of them, they will stop 
at nothing – even telling lies – to destroy you professionally and person-
ally.” He said, “That’s what Communists did.” And that stayed in my mind. 
After that, every time I would meet somebody in the US or the UK who 
grew up in the Soviet Union or in Eastern Europe, I would ask them the 
same question. I would tell them what the Czech woman said and would 
ask, “Do you see this too?” Every one of them says, “Yes, absolutely.” My 
new book will be about this. 
In fact, we are conducting this interview in Bratislava, where you are collecting 
material for your new book. What do you take away from this trip?
I feel, more strongly than ever, that people who are political, cultural, 
and religious conservatives need to organize in a deeper, cultural way to 
prepare for much more difficult times. Here in Bratislava this morning, I 
went to a house out in the suburbs where during Communism there was 
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a samizdat 1 printing press in the basement. You had to go through an 
underground, concrete tunnel, to come up the other side. I interviewed 
the people who did that. They were telling me that the thing that gave 
them the most courage during those years was friendship. Their faith, 
yes. But also friendship in small groups. Because that way, you knew that 
you weren’t alone. So that is something I’m focusing on a lot right now. 
You are comparing today’s political, cultural, and religious conservatives with dissi-
dents during the Cold War. But dissidents against who and what? 
Against the liberal mainstream. A few years ago, the issue that divided 
was same-sex marriage, now it is transgender. The US Supreme Court has 
agreed this year to hear a case – three cases combined into one – that will 
decide whether LGBT individuals will be included under federal civil 
rights law, which abolished race discrimination. What will happen if the 
court decides yes? It will mean that every church, every religious school, 
every institution that follows traditional Christian teaching on sexuality, 
will be considered by the law as if they were run by the Ku Klux Klan! 
And what that means, strictly speaking, is that they could have their spe-
cial tax status taken away from them. Now, that doesn’t sound like a big 
punishment, but so many churches and religious schools operate on such 
a low budget, that if they were to lose their tax status, they would have 
to close. Religious conservatives have to prepare for this. Since The Ben­
edict Option came out, it has sold well. It has sold about 64,000 copies 
in the US, and it’s been translated into ten languages, but I’m still having 
trouble convincing American conservatives that they are under threat. 
Solzhenitsyn said in the introduction to a 1983 English-language edition 
of The Gulag Archipelago, that there is always this “fallacious belief” that 
what happened to Russia under the Soviets could not happen to people 
like us. “Alas,” he wrote, “all the evil of the twentieth century is possible 
1 Samizdat was a form of dissident activity across the Eastern Bloc in which individuals 
reproduced censored and underground publications by hand and passed the documents 
from reader to reader (Wikipedia).
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everywhere on earth.” 2 Americans don’t know that. They just think that 
everything is going to continue like this forever. 
This is a dramatic comparison. Can you explain your vision of today’s culture war battle-
field in more detail? 
I get e-mails all the time from Christians and conservatives who work in 
Silicon Valley and who tell me what’s happening at their company. But 
they say, “Please don’t publish this. If they found out, I would be fired.” 
But it’s not just there. It’s in big companies like Apple and Facebook that 
have a national reach. They are forcing changes in laws around the country. 
This is the new trend. It’s also coming down to the level of local schools. 
I live in a small southern city – Baton Rouge, Louisiana. A Baptist pastor 
there – it’s a conservative place, Trump country – a Baptist pastor at a 
big church told me last year, “I had a woman in my congregation come to 
me and say, ‘I need your help. My daughter goes to a public school in the 
city. She’s thirteen. She came home from school and said, ‘I’m a boy.’ And 
I went to see the counselor at the school to say, ‘What is going on here?’ 
The counselor said, ‘Ma’am, you need to accept your son as he is.’” This 
is happening at a level that most Americans who are my age or so – I’m 
52 – don’t even see. But the kids, they completely believe in this, so it’s 
just a matter of time. There doesn’t seem to be any stopping point. After 
transgender – what then? I have a friend who finished high school, and 
she had a girl in her class who said she was a wolf. A transspecies. She 
wasn’t kidding. And if you didn’t call her a wolf, you could get in trouble. 
This is not in New York, this is in Louisiana. It is happening, I believe, 
because there has been a massive change in how ordinary people think 
about their own identity – that their bodies and their selves are noth-
ing but expressions of will – and because the Internet has destroyed all 
hierarchies of thought and information. This is a modern version of the 
ancient heresy of Gnosticism, and it spreads with the speed of lightning. 
2 Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary 
Investigation (Harper & Row, 1985).
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According to the All-Russian Census, there are several hundred elves in Russia. 3 
Oh! Good to know. I think that one of the most frightening things is that 
everything is changing so fast. I was reading some dissident literature from 
the Communist period, and people didn’t think that what the intellectu-
als said would matter. But then, suddenly it mattered very much. Czesław 
Miłosz, the Polish writer, said in his book The Captive Mind, and I’m par-
aphrasing this, “In the twentieth century, people in Eastern Europe found 
out that the obscure writings of intellectuals could matter very much in 
their everyday life.” 4 In the same way, if you read this postmodern aca-
demic stuff, you can’t make sense of it, but it is changing the elites. And 
the elites are the ones that are controlling the future. When I look at the 
US now, I think about Spain in 1931, when the trouble started there that 
eventually led to a civil war. I don’t think that we will pull guns against 
each other in the US, but the polarization is so great now and there’s no 
center left. I don’t know where the limit is. 
Social scientists argue that the middle is vanishing and extreme opinions on the left 
and right spectrum are increasing. Do you agree that the middle is disappearing? 
Yes, absolutely. And this is what makes me think of Spain. When the Span-
ish Republic was declared in 1931, the Left took power and immediately 
began to burn churches. Well, at the next election, there was a backlash 
from the Right, who began to persecute the Left. And so, what eventu-
ally happened over the next couple of years was that everybody lost faith 
in democracy, because democracy was a system that could allow their 
enemies to take power. And the middle vanished by 1934. By 1936, they 
were shooting at each other. Well, I don’t want to be too alarmist but 
you’re right, there is no middle. I’m a conservative, but I don’t think I’m 
an extremist. I end up voting for whoever the Republicans put up, not 
3 Itogi Vserossijskoj perepisi naselenija 2010 goda: bol’she jel’fov i men’she hobbitov 
[Results of the Russian Census 2010: the number of elves increases, the number of 
hobbits decreases], Taday. 20 December 2011 [http://www.taday.ru/text/1365028.html].
4 Czesław Miłosz, The Captive Mind. (Vintage Books, 1953), 3.
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because I believe in them necessarily, but because I’m so anxious about 
what the Democrats would do to religious liberty and free speech, which 
are my most important issues. And I feel like I can’t take the chance to 
vote for them. Even though, on their foreign policy, I’m more likely to be 
Democratic. On economic policy, I’m more likely to support the Demo-
crats. Culture is the scary thing. It’s not even that I don’t like what they 
would do, it’s that I have absolutely no trust in them, and I’m afraid of 
them. They consider traditional Christians to be bigots, no better than 
racists. In a famous speech in 2015 at the United Nations, Hillary Clinton  
said that religions must be made to change, to liberalize on abortion and 
things. I don’t want a liberal telling conservative religion to change. Reli-
gious liberty is a sacred value in America. 
Do you see signs of culture wars also in Europe? 
Yes, definitely. And American conservatives like me have looked at the 
Visegrád countries as maybe a third way, but being in Slovakia I realize 
that they are not doing well… 
What do you mean by third way? 
A third way between Western neoliberalism and the Russian model. Maybe 
countries in Central Eastern Europe can hold on to traditional values, 
pro-family values. At least they don’t have the same sort of collapse of 
moral values that we’re seeing in the West, over abortion, gender ideol-
ogy, and so forth. But from what I’m learning in this new round of inter-
views – and I’ve talked to some people in Hungary too – is that the young 
see the material prosperity of Western Europe, and they want that more 
than anything else. So we’ll see. But I do have so much hope when I come 
here and meet individual Europeans, young people, forty and under. To 
see how undeceived they are about things. And how happy they are. They 
know that they’re minorities as conservatives and as religious people, 
but they’re not despairing. I was in Spain earlier this year, presenting 
the Spanish translation of The Benedict Option. I visited the cathedral in 
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Valencia, where I saw a relic of a hand and part of an arm. It was a relic of 
Saint Vincent of Saragossa, the first martyr of Spain, killed in the perse-
cution of the Roman emperor Diocletian in the year 304. And there was 
his hand there, at the cathedral. And you could see it and you could pray 
there, in front of it. And I thought, this is something that Europe has that 
we don’t have. They still have the architecture of Christian culture. They 
have the cathedrals. Maybe people don’t go there like they used to, but it’s 
still there as a sign. People saw the burning of Notre Dame in Paris, and 
it worried them. I think it was a sign to them, like, this could go away if 
you don’t love it. But they have the relics of the saints. They have so much 
architecture. It’s not the same thing as having an active religious faith, 
but in the US, if people stop going to a church, they tear it down and put 
a shopping mall there. That doesn’t happen in Europe so much. I think 
a lot about something that Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeyev of the Russian 
Orthodox Church has said on a number of occasions. He said that prac-
ticing Christians – Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant – have to come 
together. The things that divided us in the past, they’re important, we 
can’t ignore them completely. But the challenge from post-Christianity 
and a hostile post-Christian culture is so great that we need to try to help 
each other. So that’s kind of what I do in my travels in Europe. 
In Europe there are strong institutional churches, which frequently have state privi-
leges and certain access to powerful elites. You instead have argued that Christians 
should refrain from political power and concentrate on their own small communities. 
Do you think that a Benedict Option for Europe will work? 
It has to, because the institutional church leaders are so weak. Look at 
the Catholic Church in Germany. It’s so weak; it so desperately wants to 
compromise with the world. When I spoke in Rome last fall at the pres-
entation of the Italian translation of The Benedict Option, I met a well-con-
nected German Catholic. He told me, “You know, we Germans know that 
in twenty or thirty years the institutional church will collapse, because 
there won’t be enough Catholics left even for the church tax.” The Bene-
dict Option encourages people to plan for that time. People like me, we’re 
building networks of families. We’re raising our kids in the faith, in a seri-
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ous way. And we want to help them to marry each other, because we know 
that it will be our responsibility to carry on the faith, even as the institu-
tion is collapsing. I think that’s true everywhere. 
If I understood your position correctly, you don’t believe in the strong, institutional 
European churches, as you think that they are already corrupted by the system. But 
you believe in small new communities of believers that, on the grassroots level, will 
develop some kind of alternative. 
Yes. Well, actually, I should make it clear – I’m not a Protestant. I believe in 
the episcopacy, in the structure, it is something that we have to have. But I 
think that if you’re looking to the institution itself for renewal, you’re not 
going to find it. Catholics have told me that in the history of the Catholic 
Church, all the great renewal movements came from below. And I think 
that there’s no reason to think it will be any different this time. If you look 
at the things that the bishops say – in the US or even in Europe – there’s 
nothing inspiring in most of it. But when you go meet the local people, 
at the ground level, and meet some priest who really has the faith, they 
know what they have to do. 
You mean, they have the faith in the sense that they defend this conservative tradi-
tional vision of family? 
Yes. And they live by it. 
How has your experience of conversion to Catholicism and then to Orthodoxy shaped 
your vision of the institutional church?
I was maybe twenty-five when I became a Catholic, and I became very 
tribal. I was in Washington at the time, working there, and I was so proud 
to be Catholic. My identity was in Catholicism, and I thought it was so 
strong. In fact, it was weak, because I was so convinced up here, in my 
head, but had not done the deep work of conversion. I made a classic 
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intellectual error: believing that being intellectually convinced was suf-
ficient. And God allowed me [to fall]; it was a merciful fall. By writing for 
years about the sexual abuse crisis, I had my ability to believe in Cathol-
icism taken from me, bit by bit, with great pain. Later, I came to under-
stand that I was paying the price for my spiritual and intellectual pride. 
When I became Orthodox, I said, “Don’t be the kind of Orthodox [Chris-
tian] as you were a Catholic.” Let me be clear: this was not the Catholic 
Church’s fault; this was my fault. But it really appealed to me, the idea of 
this strong, triumphalist church, the bishops taking a stand, and all that. 
In fact, as the abuse scandal showed, for many of these guys, their words 
were false. My most shameful moment as a Catholic came in the year 
2000. I was a columnist for the New York Post. The New York Post sent me 
to the Holy Land to cover the pilgrimage of Pope John Paul II. You can 
imagine, to be a faithful Catholic and to be standing at the Sea of Galilee, 
with the successor of Peter – it was incredible. And on one of the days, I 
was standing with other journalists in the courtyard of the Patriarchate 
of Jerusalem, the Latin Patriarchate, the headquarters of the Catholic 
Church. We were waiting for the Pope’s car to come in from Bethlehem. 
We were standing and waiting and waiting. I saw, on the other side of the 
courtyard, an American cardinal. I said, “Oh, it’s him! And he’s one of the 
good ones; he’s a good conservative and I’m going to go over there and 
kiss his ring and kneel down, because I’m a good conservative Catholic. 
I’m not like those liberal Catholics who won’t kiss the cardinal’s ring.” So, 
I went over there; I made a big show of kissing his ring. Well, this was 
Cardinal Bernard Law of Boston. Within two years, he was exposed as 
being completely corrupt with the abuse scandal. And I was so ashamed 
of myself. There’s nothing wrong with kissing a cardinal’s ring. But there 
is everything wrong with doing it for the reason that I did it, you know. I 
did it in bad faith, I did it out of pride, and I did it out of triumphalism. I 
think that Orthodox people who are like that, too, can set themselves up 
for a very big fall. Protestants as well. 
Also in the United States some religious leaders, especially Evangelicals, are close to 
political power and the present government.
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When Trump goes, the Evangelicals are going to be devastated, because 
so many of them have placed so much value on him, and they are trying 
to keep alive or resurrect this old nationalistic idea. If you go on YouTube 
and look at First Baptist Church in Dallas, Robert Jeffress, the pastor there, 
is one of Trump’s biggest supporters. They have flags in the church. They 
have “Salute to America Sunday.” You can’t believe it! But the young peo-
ple involved there, they see that and think, “This is hypocrisy.” My Evan-
gelical friends are really worried about what’s going to happen, because 
the nationalism and hypocrisy of the older generation has burned them 
out. Now, I didn’t vote for Trump the first time. I may vote for him in 2020, 
simply because of religious liberty, but I’m trying not to convince myself 
or rationalize it by saying he’s a good guy. I think he’s the less bad choice. 
From reading your book, I got the impression that you think that there’s an imminent 
decline of Western civilization, and that’s why you have to retreat. It’s not about tac-
tics or the strategy of politicians; it’s more about certain historical changes. 
Yes, that’s true. I’m not an American TV evangelist; I’m not saying the 
end of the world is here. But the end of a world is here, and I don’t know 
how much longer liberal democracy will last. I think that we have lost the 
transcendent moral and metaphysical basis that made liberal democracy 
work. When you run out of gas in your car, and the gauge says “empty,” your 
car will still move a little further, we say you are “driving on fumes.” Well, 
I think that we are, in that sense, driving on fumes in the West. Whether 
it goes to the Far Left or the Far Right, I don’t know. The most important 
thing to conserve is the ability to see a transcendent realm. Augusto Del 
Noce is an Italian political theorist whom I discovered recently. 5 He died 
in 1989, but he was writing brilliant things in the late 1960s. He said that 
Marxism in the West changed in the 1960s to focus on culture, because it 
knew that economic Marxism was finished. In 1968, he said that what’s 
happening is if these people continue to have success, then they will elim-
5 See more: Rod Dreher, “Do You Know Del Noce?”, The American Conservative Blog.  
9 January, 2018 [https://www.theamericanconservative.com/dreher/do-you-know-del-
noce/].
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inate the possibility of transcendence and that people will lose a sense 
that there is a transcendent realm or that we can have access to it. I think 
that was prophetic. I think that has happened, and it’s happening even 
more. Well, I think the chief political project – if it can be described as a 
political project – has to be trying to keep a space open, however small, 
where people can see beyond this life. 
I want to ask you about your view of Russia. I understand that you’ve never been to 
Russia, but there is this image of Russia as a country of traditional moral values, and 
I know that some American conservatives admire Putin, because they see him as the 
guarantor of this traditional morality. What is your vision? 
I’ve never been to Russia, but I have some Russian Orthodox friends. This 
past Sunday, on Pascha, we had a party at our parish in the afternoon. 
We had RT showing live from Moscow, from Christ the Savior Cathe-
dral. We were watching it on YouTube, and it was so beautiful. And I said 
a little prayer to thank God that this can happen in Russia again. At the 
same time, I also know this is theatre, and to have the church in a posi-
tion of power again is not the same thing as converting Russia. You know 
from my publications that I lost my Catholic faith. And I lost it because, 
in part, I had so much faith in the institution. So when I became Ortho-
dox, I made a vow to myself and to God never to get involved in thinking 
about the church as a political animal or as a political institution, even 
though that aspect unavoidably exists. It is very easy not to be confused 
about the relationship between the Orthodox Church and the state in 
America, because there are so few Orthodox believers, and we have no 
power at all in the public square. Maybe that is a kind of blessing. At the 
same time, we American Orthodox have no way to conceive of the rela-
tionship between the Orthodox Church and the state in Russia. So that’s 
a roundabout way of saying that I don’t think much about the relation-
ship of church and state in Russia. I trust my friends there who are very 
critical of it, but they’re also men who go to church, who go to the lit-
urgy, who pray and try to do good works and live a holy life and not get 
involved there. One thing I noticed is that in the US, we like to project 
ideals onto what we don’t know. So other conservatives look at Putin, and 
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they think he’s strong. Look, he’s standing up for traditional values. And 
hey, I’m generally grateful for that, but at the same time, if you try to say 
critical things to certain Americans about Putin, they don’t want to hear 
it. Similarly, here in Europe, I found – in Slovakia, and everywhere I go –  
conservatives don’t want to hear anything negative about Trump; they 
just don’t. It is somehow important for them to believe that Trump is a 
better man than he is.
When was the first time Russia appeared on your radar as a stronghold of traditional 
values? Do you remember this moment? 
Do I remember the moment? Pussy Riot, that’s when. It became huge 
news in America, and all decent Americans thought that the musicians 
were being persecuted by Putin, never thinking, “Wait a minute, they had 
no right to do what they did!” If they had gone into a mosque or a syna-
gogue and done that, there would be a different story here. Part of that is 
my Orthodoxy, but if I was a Catholic, I would feel the same way. It made 
me realize that Russia is a place that has more respect for these values 
than the United States. 
But if in America somebody goes to the altar and tries to do something similar, I think 
he’ll also be arrested, no? 
He may be arrested, but it won’t be seen as a great sacrilege. And if he did it 
to a well-known conservative church, he would be cheered for it by many 
liberals in the media. It would be seen as a sign of standing up for what’s 
right, of “speaking truth to power,” to use a phrase favored by liberals. If 
he did it to a black church, that would be a different story, it would be 
seen by the media and by the mainstream commentators as a racial thing. 
But again, that’s because the media are secular, and they interpret church 
only through politics. To get back to your question – probably Pussy Riot 
is when I started paying attention, because it was so unusual. And because 
the way the Russian government reacted to that drew such a strong crit-
icism from American liberals. Nobody – not even conservatives – were 
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defending the Russian government. But for me, as an Orthodox Christian 
who used to be Catholic, there are some things that are absolutely sacred. 
And to be a good liberal should not require you to think that if someone 
profanes an altar in a cathedral, that it’s okay. You’re supposed to be okay 
with that, because “we’re all good liberals here.” 
From a Russian perspective, I would say that we have the opposite side of the same 
problem: in Russia there is a conservative ideological dictate. So the problem is not 
liberal ideology as such, but this general trend toward suppressing basic human rights 
and freedoms for the sake of ideological reflections.
We conservatives in the West need to understand this better, because 
it is so opposite to our experience. As I said before, I think that what 
we’re seeing now is a transition to a new paradigm where the far-left 
progressives are setting the tone for the society. And traditional Christi-
anity, which used to be in that place, has lost. And it’s going to continue, 
I would say. Perhaps the unpleasant truth that is now emerging is that 
there is no space, and no constituency, for authentic liberalism. You know, 
even though I am a conservative, I do not want to live in an authoritar-
ian state, and generally do not want to force my convictions on my fellow 
citizens. But maybe it’s the case that under liberalism, and in the absence 
of a basically shared sense of transcendent order allowing for diversity in 
unity, either left-wing authoritarianism or right-wing authoritarianism 
will govern our societies. Perhaps it will not be possible to govern other-
wise. One way or the other, the future is not bright. 
Interviewed by Dmitry Uzlaner on 2 May 2019
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“The great battles lie ahead”
Interview with Allan Carlson  
(in Moscow, Russia and in Verona, Italy)
The first question is about the history of the World Congress of Families. The story 
of your encounter with Anatoly Antonov and Viktor Medkov in Moscow 1995 is well-
known. 1 But what happened next? Can we say that Russian participation in the World 
Congress of Families was basically absent for many years after this first meeting? 
That really wasn’t true. I went to Prague after I came to Moscow, where 
I attended a conference held by the Civic Institute. The Civic Institute 
was one of the anti-Communist groups that emerged during the Velvet 
Revolution there, and they went on to become a think tank and tied to a 
political party. They put on a small conference, it was not a major con-
ference, it was kind of an experts’ conference, but they had a number of 
politicians and judges on family issues and family policy. That was in 
1995. When I was there, I proposed this idea of a world congress meeting. 
And I talked to the fellow who ran the Civic Institute and asked whether 
he and his group would be willing to work on such a meeting, maybe 
Prague would be a good place to hold this. And he said yes. So, we put it 
together and the first World Congress of Families was held in Prague in 
1997. Antonov helped me plan the speakers’ list. We had about 700 peo-
ple come. A large number of that were Russians. I would guess about 100 
1 Kristina Stoeckl, The Rise of the Russian Christian Right: the Case of the World Congress 
of Families. Religion, State and Society, forthcoming.
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people. So, they were a very visible part of the thing. There were at least 
half a dozen Russian groups who came and set up panels. Some had to do 
with teaching Russian children folklore, and what Russia was like before 
the Communists came and suppressed all that. One was teaching Russian 
history through puppets, family values through puppets. So, there was a 
large Russian presence at that event. And that continued, the next con-
gress was held in Geneva in November of 1999. And, again, Antonov was 
part of the planning committee. We had friendly countries. The Organiza-
tion of Islamic Cooperation became a partner. We had a number of Mus-
lims involved, strangely, several Iranians, you know, Americans hardly 
ever talk to Iranians.
But where are the Muslim participants now? One can no longer see them at the 
Congresses …
They’re not here anymore. But they were, they were very prominent in 
Prague, and there were quite a few in Geneva. A fair number of Muslims 
were in Geneva. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation, their ambassador 
to the United Nations was involved in all these meetings. The third Con-
gress, we had plans, ambitious plans, to hold it in two cities at once. And 
we liked the tie to Islam. Partly because of the voting bloc, the pro-fam-
ily, pro-life voting bloc at the United Nations, with the Muslim countries, 
the Vatican, the Holy See, and occasionally some other countries which 
had a conservative, usually a Catholic government, some in Latin America, 
some in Eastern Europe, like Slovakia and Slovenia. So we were going to 
hold a two-city meeting. Dubai, the Muslim connection, and Mexico City. 
Hold them simultaneously, and there would be joint sessions through TV 
connections and so on. I had a sense that the Muslims were looking at a 
different way to relate to the West, and they thought maybe shared val-
ues, shared traditional values was the way to go at that. And we’d raised 
some money, we even had American Evangelicals on board, which was 
astonishing, because they’re the ones who are seen as the most hostile to 
dealing with Islam other than to convert them. 
But then 9/11 happened, and it’s hard to explain to somebody else, 
it had a peculiar effect in the United States. But when I heard what was 
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happening, when I saw the pictures of the buildings falling down, I just 
knew in an instant that our dealings with the Muslims were over. Not so 
much legally but culturally and otherwise, we were not going to be able 
to do this two-city thing. So we just put it on the shelf. I had other things 
I was getting involved in. So the World Congress was put on the shelf for 
about a year and a half. I stopped pushing it, we just waited. 
And what happened next?
Mexicans came to me, a group of prominent Mexicans, I didn’t realize 
until later how prominent they were. But people who’d visited, had been 
to the Geneva event, and wanted to do something similar in Mexico. So 
they came to Rockford, and they were very well-connected people, par-
ticularly to Catholic groups, and lay Catholic organizations, and to the 
Catholic Church. Among them was a member of the Pontifical Council for 
the Family, at the time directed by the cardinal archbishop who ran that, 
Lopez Trujillo, who had spoken in Prague and spoken in Geneva. And so 
we just went ahead and did one in Mexico City (2004). And again, they 
raised most of the money there and it was a very good event. 
The Russian presence there was much more modest, was less than it 
had been at the other two events. Antonov and Viktor Medkov were there. 
A large number of Russians came to the Congress in Poland in 2007. So, 
it is true that an event was not held in Moscow till 2011, which was the 
demographic summit, and things kind of ramped up again to a different 
level with that. But no, Russia was heavily involved, particularly in the 
first two Congresses.
Do you see a shift in the WCF? I mean, initially the key participants were scholars, 
demographers. Now we see more religious participation, for example, representa-
tives of different churches. Can we say that the World Congress of Families is moving 
from an academic to a more religious format? 
Yes, partly I agree, but there were religious people all along. Again, the 
first two Congresses had strong support from the Pontifical Council for 
Interview with Allan Carlson
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the Family. Cardinal Alfonso Lopez Trujillo was a great friend. The Mor-
mons have always been involved, to a greater or a lesser degree. They were 
heavily involved in Salt Lake City, but even more so in Geneva. Brigham 
Young University paid half the bills. So, it’s always been there. When we 
held the demographic summit in Moscow in 2011, the opening session was 
like it used to be in the United States, whenever you had a public event 
in the fifties, sixties, you’d have a Protestant, a Catholic, and Jew. It was 
like that in Russia at the opening of the demographic summit, but it was 
a bit more diverse. You had the Orthodox, you had a Jew, you had a Prot-
estant, you had a Muslim, and somebody else, I can’t remember who it 
was. What I remember and what I find so funny is that everyone had really 
great hats, the religious hats, and I thought these are great hats, because 
in America people don’t wear hats. The Muslims had hats, the Orthodox 
had hats, the Catholic had hats, really great hats. You may be right, there 
may be somewhat more emphasis about it, but even this event 2 is kind of 
a grandchild of the first World Congress. 
But even here you still see the religious element is intermingled with 
the research side, and the two have always been in my mind, as a Chris-
tian but also as someone who’s done the academic side of things. The two 
are not in conflict. I’m a natural law person, and investigations of social 
phenomena using quantitative methods are going to tell you pretty much 
what you would know if you read natural law theory about certain things. 
Children do best when they grow up with both of their natural parents, 
the safest way to avoid sexual disease is to marry someone and be faithful, 
a whole lot of things like that which honest science tells us, is also what 
conventional Christian ethics tell you. I’ve never seen a conflict between 
the two. At least not on anything deeply important. 
Compared to the beginnings of the World Congress of Families, the first meeting with 
Antonov in 1995 Moscow, the event in 1997 Prague, where do you see the World Congress 
of Families now? Do you consider this a success story? Could you have ever planned 
on that? 
2 Carlson refers to the Global Home Education Conference (GHEC) held in Russia (Moscow 
and Saint Petersburg) on 15th–19th May, 2018.
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That’s a good question. Actually, at the beginning, I didn’t expect it to be 
any more than one time. I expected the session in Prague would be a sort 
of a free-standing event. I didn’t anticipate having them more frequently 
or having more of them or certainly not having one every year, which is 
what we have been doing in the last five years. So in that sense it was a suc-
cess. But it was not one that was planned. It caught some sparks, hit the 
grass, and things started to go. And it moved in some directions I didn’t 
anticipate at the beginning but were related to what we did. Is it a suc-
cess? Well, what’s changed now? I think the most significant change has 
been that early on, we worked on a really tight budget, we did not have 
government sponsorship officially or otherwise or even indirectly until 
the meeting in 2007 in Warsaw where the Law and Justice Party was. 
This was their first time around and they helped. At the World Congress 
of Families in Verona in 2019 we had the support of the League Party. In 
Moldova in 2018 the Moldovan president was our host. And in Hungary 
in 2017, the Fidesz Party was our host and cosponsor. That’s different. So 
something has changed. 
The World Congress of Families has succeeded in getting the support of the European 
populist Right, which didn’t exist in in the 1990s. Back in the 1990s, what was your 
political vision? Did you aspire to reach out to the political center with your message 
on family values? How do you evaluate the fact that you are now closely connected to 
the political Right in a political situation that is increasingly polarized? 
Well, polarization’s taking place all over. Certainly, in the United States 
we know polarization really well now. This is what happened. We’re deal-
ing with a conflict of values that I think is much more fundamental than 
other post–World War II conflicts over values, for example the conflict 
between Communism and liberal democracy. The current conflict is over 
the most fundamental things: What is a human being? What is marriage? 
I mean, that’s not an incidental question. It’s perhaps one of the most 
fundamental questions. What is the purpose of life? Do we exist so that 
we carry on from our ancestors to our posterity, are we a link in a chain? 
That’s a very fundamental thing. I think that conflict is there. 
Interview with Allan Carlson
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Our struggle could have gone to the political center. I learned to think 
about family policy from the Myrdals, Alva and Gunnar Myrdal in Swe-
den. There was a tension in their work which I talked about briefly in the 
book I did on Swedish family policy. 3 Alva Myrdal started off as a social-
ist feminist and atheist and internationalist. Gunnar Myrdal, there was 
always a conservative tug to him, which I didn’t fully understand, even 
when I met him and interviewed him a number of times. But ten years 
after his death, they released papers. A box of his earliest papers. Which 
showed that as a young man – and I’m talking about somebody at age 18 
or 19 – he was not a social democrat. In fact, he was an extreme right-
wing young man. God, soil, country, pro-aristocracy, he opposed women’s 
suffrage, he was a strong Swedish nationalist Christian. This was around 
1917, 1918, 1919. So at the time when the Great War was coming to a close, 
he was very much “hard Right.” He favored monarchy and all that. And 
what happened was that this world of his fell apart by 1919. He worked 
for a while as part of the Farmer’s Party. He was kind of a country law-
yer his first year or two. But he met Alva by accident on a bicycle trip and 
they fell for each other. To put it informally, she took him on as a project 
and turned him from what he had been into a social democrat. But there 
was always this underlying theme in Gunnar Myrdal’s thought. Their 
program for pronatalist, pro-marriage policies reflects a kind of moder-
ate Swedish nationalism. And which, of course, was countered with the 
whole socialist ethos that, “Oh, we’re not nationalist anymore.” It was cer-
tainly not national-socialist, in the German sense, but there was a kind 
of nationalistic socialism. I’m not trying to say that they had anything to 
do with Nazism but that’s kind of where he was. He made the shift from 
an authoritarian right-wing person to an authoritarian left-wing person 
without a whole lot of change. And, in fact, the Swedish welfare state of 
the 1940s and 1950s – which included some of what the Myrdals wanted, 
not what Alva wanted, but it was more in line with what Gunnar wanted – 
it was genuinely pro-family. It was genuinely pro-marriage. In fact I have 
no real quarrel with what the Swedes were doing in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Technically a socialist country, their textbooks on marriage and family 
3 Allan C. Carlson, The Swedish Experiment in Family Politics: The Myrdals and the 
Interwar Population Crisis (Transaction Press, 1990).
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and sexuality could have been published by any Christian organization at 
the time. So, things there could have stayed that way. And I am planning 
one of these days to write a defense of the Swedish welfare state, but the 
welfare state of 1955 – not what it is today. 
Your Swedish example is not unique in Europe. Most European countries have a tra-
dition of strong coordination between state and church, with the churches having 
had, in the past, a last word on legislation regarding marriage, divorce, or abortion. 
This model of state-church coordination in Europe is now coming to a close. Europe 
is itself arguably nearing the situation of the United States, where in a context of dis-
establishment religious organizations and the religious grassroots from below take 
their claims into politics. The World Congress of Families is an example of this trend. 
The churches are not necessarily very happy about this development, because it dis-
rupts the older model of cooperation. 
That may well be the case. I agree that we, the World Congress of Fam-
ilies, have had an impact. Let’s take the example of the Italian “League,” 
or what used to be called “The League of the North.” The party started 
pretty much as a negative party. It was Pagan, anti-immigrant, anti-Si-
cilians, and all that sort of thing. I think what they’ve got now is a posi-
tive agenda. A pro-family, positive agenda. I think maybe we’ve contrib-
uted to that. I hope the commitment to our agenda is genuine. I cannot 
judge whether Salvini’s support, the League’s support for the World Con-
gress of Families, is a cynical act on their part. I hope not. I think in Hun-
gary this support was definitely genuine. Most of the actors of the Fidesz 
Party are living closer to the core of values we’re talking about here. But I 
understand these problems. What may happen next? I don’t know what 
is going to happen with the French National Front. There again, that’s 
another negative party with Pagan roots who’ve had some strange poli-
cies sometimes. I remember one that bothered me. You may remember 
a couple of years ago the issue with Muslim women and beaches. They 
were wearing hijabs. And the National Front said that it was un-French 
not to wear a bikini. Wait a sec? Modesty and women – well, you know, 
okay, you don’t have to be required but you shouldn’t condemn it. I mean, 
what’s wrong with that? I think that’s perfectly fine. 
Interview with Allan Carlson
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What you are pointing to is the contradiction between a political agenda that is prev-
alently anti-immigrant and anti-Islam, and a political agenda that is more tradition-
ally Christian conservative. 
In my view, the Christian democracy that came out of World War II had its 
roots in French Christian democratic writers of the late thirties, mid-for-
ties. And in the ideas of German writers, such as Wilhelm Röpke. I write 
about this in my book Third Ways. 4 These thinkers had a consistent fam-
ily policy that was tied to the model of a modest, real welfare state; a wel-
fare state that took cognizance of children, marriage and families, and 
tradition. This was the same in Italy, too. This model worked until at 
some point the Christian Democratic Parties stopped being Christian 
and became just some center-right parties run by ambitious politicians. 
Resurrecting Christian democracy of the original kind would be a great 
thing. Resurrecting the original model of the European Union – I’m all 
in favor of what the European Union was. 
You mean the European Union of Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann?
Yes. A political union that would leave family policy and sexual policy to 
the member states. That is how it was in the United States initially. Fam-
ily policies, as they called it back then, were the provenance of the states. 
The federal government had nothing to say or do about it. I think that was 
a good system. But all that fell apart slowly between 1865 and 1965. In 
Europe, that separation has dissolved much more recently and much faster. 
Starting in the 1990s. I am not against the European Union. I cheered the 
European Union when it first came out. But I think it’s gotten off track. It 
has gotten off track because the Christian democrats, who really helped 
put it together, lost their ideology, gradually dissolving into just a “party 
of the center-right,” increasingly mostly interested in economic questions. 
4 Allan C. Carlson, How Bulgarian Greens, Swedish Housewives, and Beer-Swilling 
Englishmen Created Family-Centered Economies – and Why They Disappeared (ISI Books, 
2007).
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Why do you think this change came about? Do you blame this development on secu-
larization and the cultural revolution? 
Yes. When the cultural revolution or the sexual revolution or all the rev-
olutions tied up together came along, there was no one there, really, to 
defend the old way, the old system, the old models. Partly because every-
body got complacent. Things were going pretty well in the United States, 
say between ’45 and the mid-seventies. The Vietnam War was a symptom 
as well as a cause of the trouble. But for twenty-five, thirty years things 
pumped along really well. And then it fell apart. And why? Well, part of 
it again, complacency by leaders who shouldn’t have been complacent. 
People forgot why things were working well. I’ve written about American 
family policy which was never consciously structured quite the way it was 
in Europe. But we got it right. I’m a persona non grata in many American 
conservative circles because I’ve defended the social policies of Franklin 
Roosevelt’s New Deal from the 1930s. Because they were pro–traditional 
family, very much so, pro-marriage, pro-baby. Back then the Democrats 
were the party of the family. They had not bought into the cultural-sex-
ual revolution. The Republican Party was the party of Wall Street. The 
Democrats were the party of the main street. 
Do you consider yourself to be a “typical American conservative”? 
No, I would not consider myself and the aims of the World Congress of 
Families typical for American conservatives. We’re not the people who 
get invited to speak at a conservative political action committee. This is 
because of my support of the social policies of the New Deal which were 
grounded in a real ideology or at least a consistent set of principles. 
Do you consider yourself to be representative of the libertarian tradition? 
In a way all Americans look like libertarians to Europeans, and I’ve writ-
ten for some libertarian journals. So I have done, I have written that and 
I believe that. What makes me not so libertarian is that I think the cor-
Interview with Allan Carlson
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porate sector, particularly finance capitalism, is also a threat to the fam-
ily. While the state has every interest in weakening the family, so do the 
high levels of finance capitalism. The family gets in the way of the effi-
cient allocation of labor. The family, particularly the family that feeds 
itself in its garden or does some home production and repairs things, is 
not a good consumer, it limits the potential of the consumer market, so 
capitalism in the abstract has no real place for strong families. I believe in 
free markets, but capitalism and free markets are not the same thing. In 
fact, mostly, capitalism winds up with the big guys taking control of the 
government and running it in their favor and making sure the little guys 
don’t have a chance to compete. Crony capitalism. I greatly love fami-
ly-held companies, companies that are run by families, real families, and 
they don’t tend to be socially destructive; they tend to be socially crea-
tive and socially supportive. But it’s the big guys in New York, the finance 
guys, they don’t have much of an interest in such companies. And that’s 
where I’m not a libertarian, because I think that unrestrained capitalism 
of that sort has its own destructive possibilities.
So could this understanding of a restrained capitalism be the reason why your ideas 
find resonance in Europe? 
Maybe. If you ask me what my economic views are, I’m actually close to 
the ideas of G. K. Chesterton and the distributist movement of Hilaire 
Belloc. There were some uncomfortable things in that movement, but 
mostly, it was good. What do I think the state should do? I think the state 
should strengthen families. How does a state do that? Some of it is coun-
terintuitive. It can do things creatively. In fact, one of the good things that 
I think’s happening in Europe now is that you’re adopting a model that 
I really like. In particular, not to use allowances so much anymore. Giv-
ing state allowances for families and state allowances for this and that. 
Instead, European states are more and more giving tax benefits, which I 
think is the right way to go at it. It is a good model when families are rais-
ing children, they don’t pay as much tax or they pay no tax at all, which is 
I guess sort of the Hungarian model right now. Sometimes family allow-
ance policies start out pretty good, but they’re subject to a lot of political 
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manipulation. And eventually, even in Sweden, the allowance was not so 
much a family allowance but a mother’s allowance. That was not what 
Gunnar Myrdal intended. In fact, he favored tax policy. He favored gen-
erous tax cuts for families and not allowances which could be tailored, 
ideologically, to meet certain goals. So, you see, my economic ideas come 
from there. I’m an untypical American conservative. I favor broader prop-
erty ownership. I’m in favor of things that shock people in America. We 
should limit the size and the number of Walmarts or we shouldn’t even 
allow a Walmart to exist. And there’s a way to do that – again, using tax 
policy. You do progressive taxation on corporate income. 
Let us shift the conversation to the engagement of the World Congress of Families 
in Russia. One thing we found out in our research is that there were other pro-family 
groups in Russia active at the time, during the 1990s. For example, Focus on the Fam-
ily organized events in Russia during the early 1990s. When you first got into contact 
with Russians, were you at all aware of that? Were you aware that Russia had become 
a kind of mission territory for groups from the US? 
That’s true in a much broader sense. Everybody on the right flooded into 
Russia. The economic Right, and the Russian experiment of cowboy cap-
italism, it came with American encouragement, from American support, 
quite broadly. And that turned sour, for at least a lot of Russians. But you 
are also right, there were groups like Focus moving in and so on. 
What does Russia bring to the World Congress of Families? 
Some commentator of the late 19th century or maybe it was early 19th 
century, looking ahead, said that the world would have two great nations. 
It’s not going to be France, it’s not going to be England, it’s not going to 
be Germany. The two great nations of the future are the United States 
and Russia. And I think that was true. And I think that remains true. It 
certainly was true for most of the 20th century, although Russia had a 
bad time for a while, but it’s kind of coming back together again, it’s 
becoming an important nation again. It’s kind of finding its feet again. So 
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the first thing Russia brings to the World Congress of Families is Russia 
itself. The other thing Russia brings is the Orthodox tradition. Over the 
last ten to twelve years, the Orthodox Church has broken out of its shell 
and is taking its place as a global religion. And that’s particularly impor-
tant now that under Pope Francis, the Roman Catholic Church is pulling 
back on these social issues. For whatever reason, Francis has decided not 
to emphasize pro-family and pro-life activities as much as his two pre-
decessors, who put those things right at the very center of the Catholic 
Church’s international witness, not so much now. I think the fact that the 
Orthodox Church is becoming a public witness internationally on these 
questions is a huge development. It’s not just small, it’s huge. It seems to 
be something that’s going to survive the current patriarch. Even Ameri-
can Protestant Churches are going through a confusing phase right now. 
The leadership of the pro-family people there is gone, there have been a 
number of people that either retired or died in the last five or ten years. 
It appears that a new generation is coming. Probably the most promi-
nent guy is going to be Franklin Graham, Billy Graham’s son. He’s very 
strong on these questions, and his father was actually not that great on 
these questions. He pretty much stuck to evangelism, and he didn’t get 
involved on the social issues. His son is deeply involved, and has been for 
some decades. So that’s changing, too. 
Relations between Russia and America today are not the best, can this influence your 
cooperation?
They’re quite bad; well, they’re awful. But until I’m prohibited from doing 
so, I need to work with and strengthen our connection with the Russian 
Orthodox Church. We’re not here to praise or to condemn Putin. That’s 
not what we’re about. But we are supportive of most of the pro-family 
initiatives that the Russian government has taken. But yes, if you praise 
Putin right now, you get yourself in trouble. Like pro-family people in the 
Baltic States. They’re kind of paralyzed right now, I mean, if you’re too 
pro-family, they say you’re for Putin, right? Well, no, it’s not. 
uibk_kern_stoeckl_postsecular-conflicts_170x220mm_1.4.indd   48 25.05.20   09:19
49
The leader of the Russian chapter of the World Congress of Families is Alexey Komov. 
His connection with Konstantin Malofeev is well documented, as are Malofeev’s ties 
to ultra-right Russian groups involved in the war in Eastern Ukraine. 
One thing I do want to make clear: We never received – as long as I was 
running the place, which was until I retired in 2015, when I stopped being 
responsible for the finances – we never received a dime from any Rus-
sian source. Our ideas have been picked up in Russia and in other parts 
of Europe because of a shared understanding around some fundamen-
tal issues. I can’t bear responsibility for all sides of this cooperation. I’m 
a writer and an author. I’m thrilled when somebody sees something that 
I’ve written and they like it and they use it and they take it and they go 
forward with it. And I can’t be entirely responsible for it. I’m surprised 
where this has gone and I’m not quite sure what to make out of what’s 
going to happen tomorrow. If I’m responsible for that on some level? I 
probably am. Although I come out of the American experience, I’ve studied 
the European and the Swedish model, I’ve looked at the history of Chris-
tian democracy. What I try to say is a universalist thing. I am a Christian. 
Christianity is a universalist creed. It’s not just for my little tribe back 
home. It’s for everybody. 
How do you see the goal of the World Congress of Families? Where should everything 
lead to, in your vision? 
I wrote that in my natural family manifesto. 5 There’s a section called 
“Vision.” It’s a couple of paragraphs: it’s happy families, larger families, 
stronger marriages, more autonomous families, happy children, neigh-
borhoods that are alive again with children, where mothers and fathers 
are both more economically engaged in their homes. And I’m a great 
believer in the re-functionalization of home, that’s why homeschooling 
is so important, it’s just one way to re-functionalize a home. Homes that 
don’t do anything are weak, and fragile, and easy prey for grasping corpo-
5 Allan C. Carlson, The Natural Family: A Manifesto (Spence Pub, 2007).
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rations or aggressive states. Families that do things for themselves, that 
educate their own children, raise some of their own food, run a small busi-
ness in the home, make things in the home, all of those make the family 
strong. I’m not a materialist, but I guess love is not enough to hold a fam-
ily together in the world. It has to have a material dimension to it. And 
it has to have a functional dimension to it. My vision is to find ways to 
re-functionalize families. And again, homeschooling is a perfect exam-
ple of a function that naturally belongs to the family. It was taken away 
in the 19th and 20th centuries, and is now coming back. And again, the 
conditions now are much more favorable. I understand why, say, a Rus-
sian peasant family in 1890 probably was not set up to home educate their 
children beyond just being a peasant. They didn’t have the time, didn’t 
have the knowledge, they didn’t know how to read themselves, or some-
thing like that. Things have changed now, and it’s possible to be gener-
ous to mass state education, maybe it was a necessary stage to lift a great 
number of people out of illiteracy and out of general ignorance, and to 
create the conditions where education could come home again. That was 
not entirely true in the United States, even in the early American colo-
nies almost all children were literate, particularly in New England, the 
New England Puritans deeply believed in educating their children and 
the boys and their girls so they could read the Bible, so they could become 
good Protestants. So literacy was quite common. But in other places, not 
so much. Not among the Scotch Irish in the hills of West Virginia and so 
on, they were a different kind of people, less literate. 
Modern societies are pluralistic, and individuals have different visions of what makes 
a good life. The vision you just described is not commonly shared. Do you see this world 
of families as existing somehow parallel to, let’s say, the world of feminism? Like, you 
just don’t touch us, and we don’t touch you? Or would you like to see the world develop 
more in the direction of re-traditionalizing the whole society? Do you see yourself 
more like a fraction inside a pluralistic society or as a potentially hegemonic force? 
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Well it may be a fraction inside, but have you read the book Shall the Reli­
gious Inherit the Earth by Eric Kaufman? 6 He’s an English political sci-
entist. He looks at differential demographics, who’s having more babies. 
What communities are having more babies, what are having less? Salafi 
Islam, Mormons, there’s certain ultraconservative groups of Lutherans, 
even in places like Finland, who have big families. The Old Order Amish 
in the United States, Hasidic Jews have huge families. And his argument 
is that, you know, if these current trends continue, in about a century and 
a half the religious vision is the world’s future. Secular liberals are just not 
having children. However, the flaw in Kaufmann’s argument is that sec-
ular liberals have found ways to indirectly or directly take other peoples’ 
children by putting them in state schools and teaching them new values, 
which are not the values of the parents who brought them into the earth. 
The families in Germany, Sweden, Norway who homeschool are being 
harassed or imprisoned.
But if you do homeschooling, then you need some universities and so on. You need 
institutions that would defend you from society for all of your life. 
They’re there. It’s all very small now, it’s on the margins, but every great 
change in human development comes from little groups on the margins. 
Kaufman talks about the Old Order Amish, a German-speaking people, 
they go back to the 17th century, they’re Anabaptists, they stick to them-
selves, don’t take government welfare, are exempted from all this govern-
ment benefits, they take care of themselves, as we would say they self-in-
sure. There were only 5,000 of them in 1900. Today, it’s about 350,000, 
and it’s all natural growth, they have big families. Now they’re starting to 
slow down a little bit, but they’re still having really big families, instead of 
maybe nine or ten on average it’s still six or seven, and they’re spreading 
across the country. The Amish are buying up marginal farmlands, and they 
can make a living on farmland where a regular American farmer can’t any-
more. Because they use child labor, they focus on specialty crops, they live 
6 Eric Kaufmann, Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth (London: Profile Books, 2011). 
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simply, they don’t borrow money, and they actually do really pretty well. 
They’re repopulating the American countryside. It’s happening without 
anybody really being quite aware. And one day, you just wake up, and you 
say, “Oh my gosh, look what’s happened. Everything is changed.” That is 
where I think it might come from. It’s going to be from groups on the mar-
gins, who keep quiet, stay to themselves, one day you wake up and find 
out “God, they’re everywhere.” I think that’s a way in which something 
may change. At the very least you carve out your little world, you defend 
it, you find friends and allies, you be smart politically. I think it’s going to 
be really interesting times ahead. The hegemony of moral liberalism is 
not going to last; secular liberalism has lost its sustaining mythology. So, 
the great battles lie ahead. We’ll see how it turns out. 
Interviewed by Dmitry Uzlaner (Moscow, Russia, May 2018)  
and Kristina Stoeckl (Verona, Italy, March 2019)
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“This is not the traditional  
culture war”
Interview with R. R. Reno (in New York, USA)
Rod Dreher in his book The Benedict Option argues that American conservatives have 
lost the culture wars. Do you agree with this view or can we still speak of culture wars 
in the United States? 
I think that we can speak of culture wars in America today even more so 
than ever. Trump put the wall at the center of his campaign rhetoric. The 
wall is an image of two visions of the future. One is a sort of utopian, bor-
derless world with fluid interactions of all human beings in a universal 
community. The other is the vision of a particular national community, and 
the wall represents the reconsolidation of this vision. I would say, there-
fore, that this is not the traditional culture wars – about abortion, gender, 
and sexuality – that have been so prominent in American cultural poli-
tics, but is culture wars over two divergent visions of community. This is 
true as much for the United States as it is for Europe. You see, I was born 
in 1959, so I am socialized into a certain consensus about 20th-century 
history. This consensus is “never again.” “Never again” is a very power-
ful cultural imperative, in particular in Europe. But when Trump went to 
Warsaw, he offered a different reading of 20th-century history and a dif-
ferent imperative. In his speech in Warsaw, Trump dwelt on the Warsaw 
Uprising of 1944, and the message was, instead of “never again,” “let us 
honor the courage and let’s live like that.” So, his message was not “never 
again,” but, “let’s do that again”! This was very striking to me. 
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Some commentators reacted very critically to that speech and called it ethno- 
nationalist and dangerous.
The question is: are we on the cusp of neo-fascism, or are we on the cusp 
of a kind of dissolving globalism? If you think it’s the dissolving globalism, 
then you will welcome Trump’s speech. If you think we’re on the cusp 
of neo-fascism, then you recoil in horror. This is the situation of Amer-
ican politics; Trump is a divisive figure for almost exclusively cultural 
reasons, for reasons over different visions of the future and of commu-
nity. If you look back to the leading political and intellectual figures of 
the post-Second World War era, we see that they were all instrumental 
for creating that 20th-century consensus. My intuition is that this con-
sensus is now becoming unraveled – which makes sense, it’s been seventy 
years, that is a long time for a consensus to hold sway. We underestimate 
how deeply the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 and its final dissolution 
in 1991 have put into question the cultural consensus organized around 
Cold War imperatives. 
 Can you explain this in more detail? 
By Cold War consensus I basically mean a center-right and center-left con-
sensus. This is very well discernible in the American politics. I give you 
an example: In 1940, the United States Supreme Court said that a Jeho-
vah’s Witness child was obligated to say the Pledge of Allegiance. They 
did not have a right, a religious right of conscience, to opt out of what 
was thought to be the indispensable tool for consolidating solidarity and 
unity. And in 1943, the very same Court reversed itself on the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses and said that children of Jehovah’s Witnesses had a constitu-
tional right to opt out of this collective ritual. I think this was a turning 
point, it was in 1943 when the American elites became worried that we 
would become our enemy to defeat our enemy. And so I think that from 
that point onwards, the consensus center-right and center-left was that 
America had to open things up and loosen things. Racial discrimination 
in the United States is, if you will, a sort of American Auschwitz, it is our 
“never again.” People on the center-right typically said “well, not too fast 
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with cultural deregulation”; people on the center-left said “not too fast 
with economic deregulation”; but everybody generally agreed that we 
would be a better society if we were more open, more fluid, more inclu-
sive, more diverse, less regulated, more dynamic, more innovative, more 
creative. All those terms, innovation, creativity, diversity, inclusion, they 
all connote fluidity and openness. And they were largely shared between 
the Right and the Left.
And this consensus is now being unraveled?
Exactly. The end of the Cold War has made the cultural consensus of 
the Cold War era, built around “never again,” “diversity over unity,” and 
“openness over closure” both more powerful and more dysfunctional. It 
became more powerful, because there was no opposition any longer, and 
it became dysfunctional, because it took on a life of its own and was no 
longer serving the purposes for which it was originally created. That is 
true in Europe as well, I think.
I agree with you that your analysis also holds true for Europe. Also in Europe we are 
living through battles over what makes for a good society between a cosmopolitan 
and a nationalist vision. In this context, I wanted to talk with you about Russia. From 
your observation, when did people searching for reconsolidation and unity over cos-
mopolitanism and diversity start to look at Russia as a potential partner?
American social conservatives have indeed become kind of pro-Putin. It is 
really about Putin, not about Russia and not about the Russian Orthodox 
Church. I think that the starting point for this positive vision of Putin was 
in 2013, when the British government threatened to cut off foreign aid to 
Uganda because of their anti-gay laws. On this occasion, Putin began to 
make statements against the decadent West. He began to position him-
self in the context of the unravelling consensus we talked about earlier. 
During the Cold War, America used to be leader of the free world versus 
the totalitarian world, right? In 2013, Putin started to position Russia as 
the leader of the moral world versus the decadent world. That was was a 
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brilliant strategic move on his part; perhaps it’s sincere, perhaps it’s cyni-
cal, in a certain sense it doesn’t really matter, because it achieved its goal: 
it undermined the West’s geopolitical and cultural consensus.
Why is gay marriage such a central issue in the affirmation or undermining of this 
cultural consensus? 
The question of gay marriage has created a feeling of existential threat to 
conservative Christians in the United States. When the Supreme Court 
legalized gay marriage across the country, it did so on the grounds of 
protection of freedoms. The protection against racial discrimination has 
been extended to include discrimination on the basis of sex, and now of 
sexual orientation. Social conservatives, who dissent with this move, felt 
threatened. And they began to look for a protector, for a champion: “Who’s 
going to fight for me?” And there’s Vladimir Putin, waving his Russian 
flag, saying “I’ll fight for you!” 
So you would say that 2013 was the moment when both sides began to realize that 
there was an increasingly globalized battle over cultural issues?
Yes, that is my assessment. The Obama administration made gay rights 
a real priority, also in foreign policy. From my point of view, it was stra-
tegically crazy on the part of the United States administration to do that, 
because it injected our cultural conflicts into the global scene. The Obama 
administration basically created the opportunity for Putin to make a coun-
ter move.
Interviewed by Kristina Stoeckl, November 2017
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“Let us create another  
culture war”
Interview with Alexander Dugin  
(in Moscow, Russia)
You are a prolific writer and your books have been published not only in Russia, but 
also abroad. Could you tell us more about your career as a writer? 
My biography is my bibliography – this is a phrase by Julius Evola, but it 
also applies to me. I have written and published over sixty books since 
the late 1980s. My books have been devoted to different topics: tradi-
tionalism, geopolitics, the philosophy of politics. Much later, I defended 
my PhD in philosophy, then a PhD in political science, and then another 
PhD in sociology. For six years I held the chair of sociology of interna-
tional relations at Moscow State University (MSU). Then I went to work 
in television, at Tsargrad TV. I am now engaged in the international Eur-
asian movement and I am completing a book series of twenty-four books 
called “Noomahia.” Right now I’m writing the last volume, the first twen-
ty-three are ready. This is my biography; I have written sixty books by the 
age of sixty. What do I do the rest of the time? Well, the rest of the time, 
I’m either writing books or thinking about what I’m going to write. My 
biography is my bibliography. As for the question of why these books are 
translated into European languages, I don’t think that this is a question 
of contacts or personal influence. It’s just that my books are interesting. 
If they’re being translated, it means they’re being read. And if they are 
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read, it means they are interesting. I have my own vision of why people in 
the West read my books. I believe that the West is in a colossal crisis, in a 
fundamental crisis. A lot more than any Western man can comprehend. 
The West is not even in the face of death, it is inside death. The West is 
dying. Someone is happy about it, someone is hypnotized by it, someone 
does not understand what is happening. The West hasn’t just walked 
up to the abyss, it is already in there. And somebody, some people in the 
West, wake up as they are falling and ask, what is going on? It is a small 
number of awakened people that have the feeling: something is wrong. 
Something went wrong. Etwas ist nicht richtig [Something is not right]. 
This realization, “something went wrong,” makes them pay attention to 
a variety of alternative views.
Do I understand you correctly that you describe your own philosophy as such an alter-
native view, a view that explains the perceived crisis of the West?
Yes, exactly, but I do not simply explain how to correct this crisis, I offer a 
systematic, a generalized critique. A global critique. The farther everything 
goes, the more a global view is required; the deeper the situation goes, 
the larger it becomes. As Nietzsche used to say, “The desert is growing.” 
And this growth of the desert does not require specific adjustments, it 
requires generalizations. In the spirit of Heidegger. But Heidegger has 
been cursed by the Europeans, and with him the whole classical Euro-
pean Logos. There is almost nothing left. Today, the small islands of crit-
ical thought are no longer found on the left. Because of the way in which 
Marxist discourse has been handled in the West, the leftist potential for cri-
tique is gone. It has been successfully dissolved, decontaminated, digested. 
So what remains is the potential for a critique of the West from the right, 
from the perspective of traditionalism and from a total, radical criticism 
of modernity, as we find it in Heidegger (but Heidegger has been forgot-
ten). And here is exactly where Russia comes into play. Russia has always 
been aloof from this modernization process, it has always had its own 
position, its own opinion. At the same time, from the European perspec-
tive Russia is a myth. The myth that there is another Europe, in the per-
ception of most it is a very scary, negative, barbaric Europe. But when it 
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comes to the feeling that something is wrong in the West itself, the per-
ception of Russia changes. Europeans become interested in Russia. And 
well, here I am! I combine the fact that I am Russian and the fact that I 
am a traditionalist. People in Europe had already noticed me and started 
to read my books in the early 1990s. I first had a book published in Spain, 
and only afterward my first book was published in Russian. It was always 
the traditionalists, the conservatives, who were interested in me.
Let us go back for a moment to the late eighties, it was the time of perestroika, the 
time of transformation, but still Soviet society was quite closed, also intellectually 
closed. And it was in those years that you started to read Julius Evola and René Guénon. 
How come? How did it happen that you started to work on these texts and translate 
them? 
You could say that it happened by accident; you could say it was provi-
dential. I was a very Soviet person, that is, I had a Soviet family, Soviet 
parents, I was born in Moscow. Yet all the time, I was deeply anti-myself. 
Maybe it was some form of mental or psychic disorder, I don’t know, it’s 
hard to tell. But I hated my sociological self, my sociological personality. 
Hated the whole community around me. I hated them deeply. With no 
reason to do so! If I had been, for example, an Armenian, a Jew, or a Ger-
man, I could have said, “I’m here in the Soviet Union temporarily, I came 
here to live.” Well, like in a hotel. Or if I had been an aristocrat, for exam-
ple, I could have said, “Hey, the Bolsheviks here, they burned down my 
family palaces.” Had I been Jewish or a German, I could have looked for 
my way to the promised land or to the West. That is, I would have had a 
reason to distance myself from my sociological person. But I did not have 
this option, and I was outraged by myself, I felt a distance between me 
and my sociological self. I was not satisfied with my apartment, my par-
ents, my school, what I saw on TV, what I heard, read, saw in the movies. 
I just saw that it was some kind of hell. Hell is hell. Yet, at the same time, 
when I became interested in Western culture, I saw that it was hell, too. 
And then I met people who saw the world in the same way. Who, like 
me, were in some sort of absolute metaphysical opposition to everything. 
Just everything. It was hypernihilism. They weren’t even dissidents, 
Interview with Alexander Dugin
uibk_kern_stoeckl_postsecular-conflicts_170x220mm_1.4.indd   59 25.05.20   09:19
60 Postsecular Conflicts
because the dissidents usually had some positive program: they could 
go somewhere, pack up things, emigrate, or shout slogans in the square. 
Many of those whom I met – most of them actually – collaborated with 
the KGB. My acquaintances were not dissidents. Chiefly, I mean Yuri 
Mamleyev, Yevgeny Golovin, Geydar Dzhemal. Mamleyev had already left 
abroad by then, but Golovin and Dzhemal were there. When I met them, 
I saw that they treated the world around them the same way as I did. It 
was almost by instinct that I found them. Before meeting them, I didn’t 
know anything, I couldn’t do anything. And in this circle I was told: if you 
want to find a justification for such a nihilistic position, go learn languages, 
one, another, a third, fourth, fifth language. And go read those books that 
explain to you why you see your life as hell. And that’s when I read The 
Crisis of the Modern World and The Reign of Quantity and Signs of Times 
by Guénon, that is when I read Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit and Nietzsche. 
In this way I started to bring order into my ideas. I got an explanation 
why I perceived the environment as hell while everybody else around me 
seemed to think it was just normal. I started to understand that my posi-
tion was actually the reasonable one and that I’d been taken to a mad-
house or to jail or hell. I understood that we are in Kali-Yuga, in the dark 
age. If you think in a Christian context, this is the kingdom of the Anti-
christ. An age of loss of spiritual dimension, the Bolsheviks, their atroc-
ities, Western materialism. There was the explanation! 
Again, it is not that I rejected the world because I didn’t find my 
place in it. I had normal parents, absolutely decent people. They didn’t 
drink, they didn’t fight. My father worked for the KGB. Mom was a doctor. 
Grandma worked for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central 
Committee. I mean, I was a regular person. Like millions of Soviet people. 
Medium, not the first, but not the last. Without any traumas. I wished that 
there was something wrong. Just to have an explanation. And thanks to 
these people, thanks to this small group, I got acquainted with the crit-
ical worldview that gave me the explanation. It was the right-wing cri-
tique of the modern world. 
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The left-wing critique of modernity was no option?
The criticism on the left didn’t suit me. First of all, we lived in a left-wing 
society. Secondly, I was completely dissatisfied with materialism and an 
explanation of everything through economic processes. I needed some 
more serious religious, metaphysical justifications, and I found them in 
the right-wing critique. Heraclitus has a phrase, the essence of which is 
that at first I did not know anything until some point, and then I began 
to know everything. This is the moment I’m very clear about. It’s 1981.  
I didn’t know anything until 1981. Nothing. It’s just that… And then, after 
1981, I knew everything. Everything stayed the same, I hadn’t changed,  
I hadn’t even improved my knowledge. I just went through some kind of 
barrier. Now I knew everything. And it has stayed like that since, from 
1981–1982 until now, I feel the same way. 
You say that you have moved from a situation where you knew nothing to a situation 
where you knew everything. The point of transition comes with the discovery of the 
right-wing critique of the modern West. Can you explain in more detail how and when 
you make this discovery? 
This was in 1981. In that year I met the three people I just mentioned. All 
three had had the exact same experience as me in the past, in the fifties, 
in the sixties, in the seventies. They were older: Dzhemal was ten years 
older than me, Golovin was twenty years older than me, and Mamleyev 
was thirty years older. They had been discovering this Rechte Kritik [Right-
wing criticism] for decades already. The ideas resonated very much with 
our Russian Orthodox tradition, but we did not know that back then. 
We started with the Western Rechte Kritik, with the right-wing critique 
of modernity. So this body of Western thought was already known to 
them. Of course, at the time there didn’t exist any translations, but they 
knew the books. Partly Dzhemal had a library, partly Golovin. For the first 
time, I got to know these ideas from their retellings. They told me about 
them. Then I quickly learned two or three European languages within six 
months. Besides, I signed up for the Lenin library. I even faked an entry 
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card because they wouldn’t let me in. And with this library card, I went 
to the library and sat there, studying Rechte Kritik. I spent about a year 
there. Found Evola’s book, Pagan Imperialism, 1 the only book by him that 
was in the Lenin library. A lot of people have asked me why I translated 
it – well, there just weren’t any others. I saw it, and I translated it. And 
it’s still being reissued somewhere. That was 1981. It was all happening 
instantly. That is, the process of moving from being a Nicht­Wissender to 
a Wissender [non-knower to a knower] took place rapidly. In the same 
way, the study of languages proceeded very quickly. There was no grad-
ual progression for me, it was first one thing, then another. Through the 
Western critique of the West I understood why I hated Communism, but 
I also understood why the West was not an alternative. So this insight of 
mine took shape in 1981, at most in 1982. And nothing has changed since 
then. It became the basis of my thought and I gradually began to select 
Russian authors to build on it: conservatives, Slavophiles, Eurasians. 
So the Russian, the Orthodox context joined after that?
Yeah, only after that. In the beginning, when I thought about philosophy, 
I even thought in French, Italian, German. For me, Evola, Heidegger, and 
Guénon were much closer than any Russian thinker. For me, they were 
like my kin. I thought in their categories. And the Russian thinkers came 
only later. You know, Guénon said: “We need a sacral tradition.” I looked 
around and saw: oh, the Russian Orthodox tradition! I had been baptized 
as a kid, but I started to go to church because that is what Guénon said. 
Because according to him there needed to be faith; because according to 
him there needed to be anti-modernity. Evola said we should be against 
the Communists and liberals. I was against the Communists myself, but 
I didn’t know the liberals, there weren’t any around. But since Evola said 
we should hate them, I hated them. Back in 1981 I could have killed some-
body at the word “liberal”; and also at the word “Communist.” 
1 Julius Evola, Pagan Imperialism [1928/1932] (N. p.: Gornahoor Press, 2017); Russian 
edition: Iulius Evola, Iazycheskii imperalizm, trans. Aleksandr Dugin (Moscow: Arktogeia, 
1990).
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Heidegger taught me how to criticize the Western European tradi-
tion, he taught me the need to find a fundamental ontology. I couldn’t find 
Heidegger in German at first, but I got hold of him in French and learned 
him by heart in French. Then I found him in German, read the books again 
and again. I read Heidegger all the time. You can’t read him all the way 
to the end, he is an infinite author. And the fact that the Germans today 
are purging this treasure from their German philosophy is for me evi-
dence of some kind of oligophrenia, a mental retardation. There’s noth-
ing more beautiful than Heidegger. His philosophy is the greatest thing 
that happened after Plato. Heidegger is a miracle! Well, Schelling, Hegel, 
they are also great of course. When I was in Freiburg, a German professor 
told me: “Look, I was running the chair of phenomenology here. Now it 
has been closed down and replaced by gender studies, by queer studies.” 
This is a perfect example of what is happening to Europe. While in China 
and Iran, Heidegger is now recognized as the greatest thinker of our time. 
You found your intellectual interlocutors in Western critics of the West early on. But 
this was still an intellectual universe, a universe of letters. When did you personally 
meet with representatives of this Western tradition of criticism of the West? 
That was in the late 1980s, when it was already possible to travel abroad. 
In 1989, I came to Paris for the first time – I had started a letter exchange 
with somebody there. A year before, I had found the addresses of differ-
ent people in Paris who occupied themselves with traditionalism, Guén-
onism, alchemy, Gnosticism, and had started to correspond with them. 
This exchange of letters resulted in an invitation to Paris. There, I met 
with Alain de Benoist, I met disciples of Guénon, of Evola, admirers of 
Heidegger. It was the beginning of an intense dialogue. 
The Soviet Union still existed at the time, and I had a very nega-
tive attitude toward Communism. Unconditionally negative. A complete, 
totally negative attitude toward Communism. But I only had a theoret-
ical aversion to liberalism through reading Evola and Guénon. And this 
aversion was fully confirmed by experience. Everything I saw in the West 
was absolutely disgusting. It was just the other side of the same material-
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ism I abhorred in Communism. Maybe I saw the West through the eyes 
of my teachers, but at least the West didn’t surprise me. 
When I met Alain de Benoist in 1989, he said to me, “But you’re bet-
ter off!” I replied, “What do you mean ‘better off’? Communism is the 
worst evil.” He said, “No, the worst evil is liberalism.” Over and over again 
I heard from the Western critics on the Right that I didn’t yet understand 
what a nightmare liberalism was. In the beginning, I couldn’t believe it. 
I thought it was some kind of construction. And then it turned out they 
were right! There is nothing worse than liberalism, and that’s why it won. 
You see, there was something in Bolshevism that was not quite modern, 
not quite Western. Back then I didn’t see it, I refused to see it because I 
was anti-Soviet and I wanted Soviet power to end. But the moment the 
Soviet Union collapsed, I stopped being anti-Soviet. In 1991, I saw what 
bastards our liberals were. The Communists had been monstrous, but 
what came after them was worse! Those who came to power after the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, they were just scum. Everything was bad in the 
Soviet Union, but among all the bad things, some were even worse. These 
were the liberals who came to power in the 1990s. So you see, it all came 
together: my new friends on the right told me that maybe we had not yet 
lost everything, that Soviet society had somehow preserved something. 
Really, at first I did not know what they meant. It was only later, when I saw 
what happened after the Soviet Union, that I fully understood what they 
had been telling me. And this is when I founded the National Bolshevik 
Party: it was a party of Rechte Kritik with, on top, Linke Kritik [Left-wing 
criticism]. I wanted to gather all sources of critique in order to oppose 
liberalism, because Communism no longer existed, but liberalism did. 
And from that moment onward, a pretty serious interest in my ideas 
set in in the West. In 1994, a French magazine published an article that 
said that Mr. Dugin expresses the sharpest, the most terrible, but also the 
most adequate ideas about the state of affairs in Russia. That is, by 1994, 
there were people in the West who followed my publications. From then 
on, my articles started to be being translated, published, I started to give 
interviews to the Western press. 
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Why didn’t you first turn to religious critiques of liberalism, such as the Catholic cri-
tique of liberalism? Religious critiques of modernity have been around for a long time. 
Why didn’t you pay attention to this in the first place? 
I’ve overlooked that question a little bit. I have a strong antipathy towards 
Catholicism since the Second Vatican Council. I’ve met with Catholic 
traditionalists, they’re okay, but they have extremely narrow views. And 
most Catholics are just conformists. I think that a Catholic critique of 
liberalism is possible only in Latin America. And only among some cir-
cles. I am thinking, for example, of the so-called “theology of the peo-
ple” (teologia del pueblo). It was formulated by right-wing Jesuits, right-
wing Catholics. These were Peronists and Catholics at the same time. But 
again, these ideas exist only in very narrow circles, and from an intellec-
tual point of view I find them very weak. Compared to Heidegger, com-
pared to the traditionalists, it’s just a pathetic babbling. And compared 
to Orthodox criticism, too. 
How do you explain that your texts were interesting to readers in the West? 
You see, in the 1990s there was really a lack of bright figures on the side of 
the Rechte Kritik. There was only one real outstanding intellectual among 
them, and that was Alain de Benoist, the founder of GRECE. 2 When I 
started to travel to the West, I realized that the tradition of the conserva-
tive revolution had somehow been interrupted. The tradition of Heideg-
ger had been interrupted. The tradition of Guénon had turned into some 
completely idiotic Masonic scholastic circles. The Evolaists, even worse, 
a bunch of hooligans, extremely right-wing and more interested in street 
actions than intellectual work. So there was a real intellectual vacuum, and 
I think that this is one of the reasons that many people became interested 
in me. I wasn’t just repeating what Evola, Guénon, or de Benoit had writ-
ten, I was offering my own perspective. Besides, Russia was exotic. Pre-
senting my own reading of Guénon or Evola or Heidegger was met with 
2 Groupement de recherche et d’études pour la civilisation européenne, founded in 1968 
by Alain de Benoist to promote ideas of the Nouvelle Droite.
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interest. Maybe I didn’t understand everything in their works to the last 
detail, and maybe precisely because of this my work became even more 
interesting. My Western readers were impressed by this new reading [Eng-
lish in the original]. It was fresh, because of Communism. It was exotic, 
because of Russia. And all this has contributed to consolidating my repu-
tation as a new and important thinker of traditionalism and Rechte Kritik. 
At what point does the North American context enter into your debates and contacts? 
I mean, the United States. At what point did you discover the American Christian Right 
and their criticism of liberalism? For instance, is Pitirim Sorokin an important figure 
for you? 
I discovered Pitirim Sorokin very late, when I was already teaching soci-
ology at MSU. I didn’t know him before, but he’s an absolutely brilliant 
writer. His cyclical understanding of history, his criticism of our sensate 
civilization. And the prediction that our time will come one day, the time 
he called ideational culture. This is our cyclical, traditionalist view, which 
I fully share. But, to your question, I met the Americans through Telos 
magazine and Paul Gottfried. Paul wrote a preface to my book Martin Hei­
degger: The Philosophy of Another Beginning. 3 That was in the 1990s. But 
I didn’t have any important contacts in the US, just some acquaintances. 
For example, I was acquainted with the late Adam Parfrey, who edited 
the book Apocalypse Culture. 4 He was a kind of postmodernist critic of 
everything, and we exchanged letters in the 1990s. 
As soon as the Internet came up, I put all of my writings online. Just 
everything. Without worrying about copyright. There was one English 
translation of a text of mine that had been prepared by an Italian, it was 
a very bad translation, because it was not his native language. I didn’t 
even bother to correct it, I just put it online. And so my ideas started to 
live. Gradually, certain circles emerged in the US that were interested in 
me. By then, I was already focusing on National Bolshevism and Eura-
3 Alexander Dugin, Martin Heidegger: The Philosophy of Another Beginning (Whitefish, MT: 
Radix, 2014).
4 Adam Parfrey, ed., Apocalypse Culture (Port Townsend, WA: Feral House, 1990). 
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sianism. I discovered Eurasianism in the late 1980s, but at first I thought 
it was just something like traditionalism. Eurasianism and National Bol-
shevism became my trademarks. Russian traditionalism, National Bol-
shevism, and Eurasianism. The Americans have always perceived Euro-
pean traditionalism with the Russian factor in mind. That is, by the end 
of the nineties, they were talking about de Benoit, Robert Steuckers, and 
Dugin. In the American reception, I was already a part of the New Right, 
only from Russia. 
I want to talk with you about the concept of the “culture wars.” It signifies a confron-
tation between progressive, liberal forces, and traditionalist, conservative forces in 
American society. How do you evaluate this concept? 
I think that today the parameters of the cultural wars have changed a lot. 
Today we are not talking about progressives against conservatives. The 
picture has changed dramatically – and this is largely reflected in my 
works on “the fourth political theory.” Before, during the Cold War, there 
was indeed a dispute between conservatives and progressives in society, 
a conflict that determined the policy and cultural agenda. After the end 
of Communism and the victory of liberalism, we now live in a unipolar 
world. It is unipolar not only in terms of strategy, but also in terms of ide-
ology. This unipolarity is embodied in the word “liberalism.” Liberalism is 
neither right nor left. Liberalism is, in fact, as a combination of right and 
left. It combines right-wing ideas about economy and free market ideol-
ogy and left-wing cultural politics. Progressives have usually advocated 
left-wing politics, individual rights and freedoms, and social justice. And 
the rightists were in favor of conservative values, family, church, and big 
business. And today the following has happened: liberals have merged a 
rightist economy and a leftist politics. Liberals have created their own 
progressive-conservative ideology. It is progressive in terms of values, 
but conservative in terms of economics. That is, the cultural wars have 
changed their parameters – this process took place throughout the nine-
ties, and in the 2000s things became finally clear. 
Remember, there used to be an abyss between these two components. 
There was a split between them. It was a prohibited zone. You couldn’t 
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go there. Not from the right side, not from the left side. If the Right was 
moving towards the Left, they were breaking the law of anti-Communism. 
And if the Left was moving towards the Right, they were breaking the 
law of anti-fascism. But you see, this is all a liberal manipulation; the old 
version of the cultural wars – the Right against the Left – has served the 
liberals to define the discourse. However, our idea is to get out of this 
impasse. We – I do not want to attribute the merit of these ideas only to 
myself – have suggested: let us create a worldview that will combine a 
right-wing politics with a left-wing economy. Let us attack the liberals. 
That is, let us create another culture war configuration. Not of conserva-
tives against progressives, but of the center against periphery. Or the lib-
erals against the anti-liberals. I call this “the fourth political theory” – it 
is not right, not left, not liberal. When you see it like this, the term “cul-
ture wars” acquires a completely different meaning. This is precisely the 
meaning of populism. Trump stands for such a populist movement against 
global liberal elites and also the European populisms, right and left, are 
examples of this. 
Speaking about populist parties in Europe, in Italy we have had a coalition of a leftist 
party and a rightist party. Is that the kind of coalition between a left economic politics 
and a right value politics that you have in mind? 
Yes, exactly, and I would even say that I am partly responsible for it. I am 
on excellent terms with Matteo Salvini. He has visited me here in Mos-
cow, we had a conversation. I speak Italian and I have had a lot of sup-
porters in Italy since the early nineties. Many of today’s politicians were 
young people who came to see me in the early 1990s. 
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What role does religion play in your “fourth political theory”? 5 
That depends on the specific context. For example, my book about the 
fourth theory has been very successful in Iran, where it is perceived as an 
apology of the Iranian revolution. It is perceived as the glorification of Shia 
Islam, although there is not a word about Shia Islam in it. I believe that 
every society has its own specific identity. It can be religious or non-re-
ligious, that does not matter, but there’s always an identity. Take China – 
there is no formal, established religion in China, but there is a great deal of 
interest in my “fourth political theory.” And to come back to Italy: I think 
that right-wing populism in Italy protects Catholics more than Catholics 
protect themselves. The League protects Christian identity more than 
the current Vatican. 
I want to push you further on the topic of Christianity. What is the role of Christianity, 
specifically of the Orthodox Church, for traditionalism? If we are within the Orthodox 
tradition, not “Tradition” with a capital letter, but within the Orthodox tradition, then we 
do not believe in “Tradition” with a capital letter, but we believe in the one, holy, catholic, 
and apostolic church through which we find salvation. How do you bring together faith 
in Tradition with a capital “T” with Christian soteriology?
That is a very interesting question. Indeed, traditionalism in the West 
started either Islamic, as in Guénon, or Pagan, as in Evola or de Benoist; 
actually, in de Benoist it is certainly polytheistic. I think this is due to 
the fact that in the West, Christianity has endured as a religion, but it 
has ceased to be a tradition. In my understanding, tradition functions as 
some kind of metaphysical map, a mental frame, in which a lot of things 
can find their place. The church fits in there, but also, let’s say, Chinese 
society: it is a traditionalist society, but not a religious one in our sense. 
Then there is a second map, a second mental frame, and that is moder-
nity. We can place the church in this map too, only this will be a modern-
5 Title of a book by Alexander Dugin published in 2009, in which the author states that 
he is laying the foundations for an entirely new political ideology that integrates and 
supersedes liberal democracy, Marxism, and fascism.
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ist church. This is what happened to Catholicism and especially Protes-
tantism, they are a combination of religion, formally called by the same 
name, and modernity. 
So you are saying that salvation comes not through Christianity, but through tradition?
For me it is important to have these two maps, these two frames: moder-
nity and tradition. The church can find its place in either of the two. The 
Western churches have become modernist churches. Orthodox Christi-
anity is different. Eastern Orthodox Christianity fits well into the tradi-
tionalist frame. But modernism is also penetrating the Orthodox tradi-
tion, and we have to stay vigilant.
Interviewed by Kristina Stoeckl & Alexander Mikhailovskiy, November 2018.
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“We need something else now.  
We need holiness …”
Interview with Alexander Filonenko  
(in Moscow, Russia)
Nowadays we often hear about “traditional values”? What does this concept mean 
and what is behind it?
“Traditional values” are a construction that operates very differently in 
different contexts and situations. To me, it is particularly interesting and 
important to analyze how the language of safeguarding traditional val-
ues is applied in today’s political, social, and religious context. If we take 
a closer look, we will see that, regardless of creed, regardless, it seems, 
even of the region of the globe, communities are divided not by worldview, 
not by the type of values, but on much deeper grounds. This is the divi-
sion between people who defend “traditional values” and people whose 
position is much more difficult to define sociologically and politically – I 
call them “witnesses.” People who testify about the experience of meet-
ing with Christ. These two types of people are found inside any parish, 
be it Protestant, Catholic, or Orthodox. 
I am from Ukraine, and the Ukrainian crisis for me personally exem-
plifies this deadlock, this division of parishes. If in Europe and in America 
this division is peaceful, in Ukraine it has led to a real conflict. In Ukraine, 
it has become impossible to say that these are just two ideological posi-
tions; there is something deeper. So this is why we need to criticize tra-
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ditional values: of course, the idea of values is not terrible, but we live in 
strange and terrible times, when the discourse of defending traditional 
values poses a threat. A threat inside the church, inside each parish. 
The second thing to add to the discussion on “traditional values” is 
that the people defending traditional values really operate in a modern-
ist secular matrix: they postulate what there is and what there ought to 
be, a moral ideal, essentialist and proper. In fact, it’s vulgar neo-Kantian-
ism. It turns out that there is no one more secular in the church than the 
defenders of traditional values. Paradoxically, the bearers of traditional 
values are the most secular members of the community, who are concerned 
about the ideal and a certain set of norms and values. And so it seems to 
me that the phenomenon of a community defending traditional values is 
an example of secular communities in a postsecular context. 
Is there any way to have a positive, constructive conversation about traditional val-
ues? Or do we inevitably enter into the space of ideology and geopolitics and begin to 
protect something from someone?
Positive examples? In 2013, a group of curators gathered to prepare a Euro-
pean exhibition in which Orthodox and Catholics could testify together 
to the beauty of Christianity. I remember a very revealing episode at a 
gathering with fellow curators, during which we were deciding about the 
topic of our next exhibition. We wanted the exhibition to be about the 
hottest, the most pressing topic of today. Together we decided to make 
an exhibition about the family. But even as we had reached consensus on 
this topic – the family is really very important, it is a traditional value – 
when we began to talk about how to develop the exhibition, how to offer 
a story, it turned out that immediately there were two positions. For me, 
these are the positions I was talking about above. 
The first position was this: let’s talk about the fact that the family 
is being destroyed. Let’s demonstrate through sociology, through the 
demographic situation, how rapidly the institution of the family is being 
destroyed. Further, let’s show that the church is concerned and prepares 
protective documents and carries out some defensive actions. The logic 
was clear: something is disappearing, we are protecting it. 
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Then there was the second position. One of the curators said, “Look, 
if the family is breaking down, it is unlikely that Christians are those in 
the community who are able to protect it, and it is definitely not interest-
ing to tell anyone about this, because if we start to protect the family, we 
have lost in advance.” It’s much more interesting to look at this situation 
differently. First, a family that disappears and a Christian family are dif-
ferent things. And it is bad that Christians themselves do not understand 
the difference between family and Christian family. Today, when people 
talk about the traditional value of family, they usually mean a very mod-
ern family, a nuclear family – father, mother, and children – no one men-
tions grandparents, grandmothers, the family home, and so on. As a rule, 
we are dealing with a situation where Christians protect the family, but 
it does not matter to them that it is not a Christian family. 
For Christians themselves, we need to better understand the nov-
elty of the Christian family. Why is it beautiful? And if it is beautiful for 
us, then we should have an exhibition to show that even if the Christian 
family is disappearing, even if there are two left in the world, we should 
show it to everyone so that people can see whether it’s attractive to them 
or not. The only way to talk about Christian values is to show their attrac-
tiveness, and a person can freely take a position in relation to this attrac-
tiveness. For me, that’s the way to bear witness. 
I am very suspicious of all these attempts to defend tradition, because 
this position is not actually church-like. The problem with the Russian 
Orthodox Church is that it constantly reacts. The position of the Russian 
Orthodox Church in the public today is as follows: an event happens – the 
Church reacts. People hear nothing but the reaction of the Church and 
they think that is the way it should be. But for me personally, it doesn’t 
matter whether the Church reacts or not. It’s important to me that she 
bears witness. The notions of bearing witness and of reaction are differ-
ent. Today’s Church doesn’t bear witness, and that’s the problem. 
How often do we hear the Russian Orthodox Church speak in public 
about the beauty of Christianity, which is beautiful for the whole world, 
not just for Christians? For example, the canonization of Mother Teresa 
by the Catholic Church was such a testimony. It’s not just an avowal of 
holiness within one’s church, it’s an offering for everyone where people 
can’t avert their eyes, no matter who they are – atheists, skeptics, Mus-
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lims, Buddhists. At such moments, people understand that before them 
is the testimony of the beauty that Christianity offers. That’s what wit-
ness means to me. And the question of liberalism or conservatism is only 
secondary. 
What is your attitude to the discourse of traditional values as it exists in Russia and 
as it is broadcast abroad by the Russian Orthodox Church, including in the Ukrainian 
context?
I am from Kharkiv, Ukraine, and I am a parishioner and member of the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. In a situation 
where members of one and the same Church kill each other, it is impos-
sible to talk about values. Today traditional values are protected by tanks 
and they lead to the murder of parishioners of one and the same Church. 
You see, in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine there are not two different 
churches, because on the one side you have a metropolitan and on the 
other side you have a metropolitan, and they belong to the same church 
and meet at the Council in Moscow. 
When, for example, in Crimea, the metropolitan of the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate blesses the missiles aimed 
at Kiev, it seems normal for the Russian community, because everything 
should be blessed. There are missiles in Crimea, why not bless them? And 
what does the press service of the Moscow Patriarchate do? It reports in 
all the news outlets that missiles are blessed and that in case something 
happens they will reach Kiev. For me, as a member of this Church liv-
ing in Ukraine, that is a somewhat strange position. There is a patriarch 
who, on the one hand, wants to embrace the entire Slavic world, and on 
the other hand, he does not remember his parishioners in Ukraine at all. 
He doesn’t remember them in public. He does not talk to them, maybe 
he prays for them, but the Ukrainian Orthodox who are faithful to the 
Russian Orthodox Church know nothing about it. For me, this is not just 
a psychological problem or a particularity of this patriarch, it is a much 
more fundamental situation. We have a situation of numbness, when the 
conflict within the church has reached a point that there is nothing to 
talk about. We need something else now. We need holiness. 
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This very conflict – this very division – I see it all over the world. It’s 
not specific to Ukraine. It’s not specific to Russia. The horror is that this 
is the specificity of all Christian parishes. We see these divisions every-
where. Even in Europe, only more civilized. In Europe, at least to my 
experience, the different camps still talk to each other. One part of the 
parish goes to demonstrations in defense of the family, against abortion, 
against gays, and so on, and the other part of the parish says: strange peo-
ple, well, let them go, it’s their choice. I’m not going to go. I will go to the 
canonization of Mother Teresa. That is, whereas in Europe there is still 
a space of tolerance, where people can coexist and accept a situation of 
disagreement, here in Ukraine we are facing a much more fundamental 
conflict from which demons are born. 
The Russian situation is exactly the same as in Ukraine and I would 
like to comment on it as a member of the Orthodox Church. Five years 
ago it would have been absolutely impossible to have a section called “The 
spiritual and moral security of the state” at the Christmas Readings. 1 It 
is completely incomprehensible to me how this is possible. That is, it is 
impossible for a Ukrainian to imagine that the Russian Orthodox Church 
holds a conference with such a section. And of course, this section is dedi-
cated to the protection of traditional values. But these values are unknown, 
are alien to me. This section at the Christmas Readings, I take it as a kind 
of a marker: does the Russian Orthodox Church perceive of itself in con-
nection with the issue of state security? Whose state? 
The matrix of church-state relations in Ukraine is completely differ-
ent from Russia. In 2014, one analyst from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church 
said that for him the most important result of the Maidan 2 is that it ended 
a situation in which, for all these years, the Orthodox Church has been 
too close to the state and has not noticed society at all. The situation of 
a weakened state and a strong society, as it is today in Ukraine, leads to 
confusion in the Russian Orthodox Church, not because it does not have 
a position, but simply because it has never seriously talked to society. The 
Russian Orthodox Church believed its partner in conversation was the 
1 The biggest conference of the Russian Orthodox Church organized every year in Moscow. 
2 The revolution in Ukraine that happened in 2014 and led to a serious deterioration of 
relations between Russia and Ukraine. 
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state. As soon as this partner disappears, it’s as if the whole public space 
of the church disappears. This is the Ukrainian situation. In Russia, it is 
the opposite. The partner is interested, and there is a very serious con-
versation between the state and the patriarch. The public discourse of 
the church is determined by its dialogue with the state, not with society. 
You mentioned that this division inside single churches is not limited to the Russian 
or Ukrainian situation. What about Europe? 
As far as Europe is concerned, I have had the privilege of giving lectures 
all over Italy for several years. I saw many different parishes and in all of 
them I got the sense of an internal division between those who bear wit-
ness and those who react. For example, once I gave a lecture on the new 
martyrs of the Russian Orthodox Church in the south of Italy. After my 
lecture, an old lady came up to me and said: “Thank you for reminding us 
tonight what kind of fathers’ children we are.” That was amazing! Imagine: 
here comes a man talking about Siberia, about the Gulag, about people 
she is hearing about for the first time in her life, and she realizes that she 
is reminded of her own fathers. To me, this is the point of testimony that 
allows us to come together today. When we are not talking about our-
selves, our identity, our concerns, our traditional values, but about those 
whom we love. And it turns out that this love is shared. That’s one path I’d 
like to better understand and explore, both politically and socially. This 
is essential for Ukraine today, and maybe not so fundamental for Russia. 
I can also say the following about Europe: For many years people have 
been talking about the crisis of Europe and about the role Christianity 
in European history. Many people today describe the crisis in Europe as 
a situation where the church has to make decisions about values, has to 
protect and defend. As if the identity of the church were linked to its abil-
ity to defend itself. It seems to me that the contribution of Ukraine and 
Russia to the European debate is significant, because thanks to what is 
happening in our countries, Western European Christians can learn that 
the position of defending values is not safe for the nature of the church. 
The church ceases to witness, and for many people it becomes simply an 
institution that is defensive, conservative, and reactionary. 
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Are the experiences of Ukraine and Russia somehow connected? Or are these two 
completely different stories within the same church?
The history of Russia and Ukraine is one story. These are not two or three 
different stories, they are different plots within the same narrative. I mean, 
this is essentially the story of the post-Soviet person figuring out his life. 
In Ukraine that same post-Soviet person somehow discovered the theme 
of human dignity. Not because there was a human rights campaign, not 
because we held more conferences, but because a person was put in a sit-
uation where he was deprived of everything and they were going to take 
away his dignity. He may not have thought about dignity until that day, but 
when he found himself in that situation, he realized that he was ready to 
stand there until death in order to preserve his dignity. What we saw in 
winter at the Maidan is really a rediscovery of the theme of dignity. And 
it is a surprise – when the most cowardly person suddenly finds out that 
such a theme exists. Ukraine in this sense has taken the path of rediscov-
ering the theme of dignity and reopening the issue that your existence is 
seriously connected with the possibility of openness to the world. 
In Russia there was resentment. This is quite obvious to me. The 
solemn speech of the president of Russia regarding the annexation of 
Crimea 3 was terrible for me not only because Crimea was annexed, but 
because I saw Russia’s entire political discourse falling into resentment. 
That is, until that point it was obvious to me that there were a variety of 
discourses in Russia. Political positions, something else, but for me this 
famous Kremlin speech was a sign that the state had made a choice. It 
went the way of resentment. 
Since the Russian Orthodox Church has a strong relationship with 
the state, it could not avoid this position. The patriarch was absent from 
Putin’s Crimea speech. Interestingly, Russians read this as if he was sick. 
And there was no comment on where the patriarch was. As if Russians 
weren’t interested in why there was no patriarch at the historic speech. 
For Ukrainians, it was a sign of optimism, as if the patriarch wanted to 
3 The speech of the president of the Russian Federation on 18 March 2014. The full text of 
the speech is available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603 (accessed 
19 May 2020). 
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say that he did not agree. A small ripple went through Ukrainian society: 
they said, look, for the first time the church distinguished itself from the 
position of the state. But then it became clear very soon that this was not 
the case; the Russian Orthodox Church took certain steps to confirm not 
only its loyalty, but also its agreement with this position of resentment. 
The situation of the Russian Orthodox Church today is different from 
the situation during the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union, the Church 
was loyal, but it did not agree. It is impossible to imagine that at the time 
a religious person would talk about the new martyrs and simultaneously 
praise Stalin as a father, patriarch, and bearer of traditional values. Such 
a position was unimaginable in the Soviet Union. You were on the side 
of the Church, or you were defending some Soviet narrative. What hap-
pened in Putin’s Crimean speech was the combination of the Red and the 
Orthodox myths. This was of course not entirely unheard of inside the 
Russian Orthodox Church, but it had not been mainstream. Now it has 
become mainstream. 
I am not one of those who believe that a close relationship of church 
and state is a mortal sin. Relations with the state have always been diffi-
cult for the Orthodox Church. The problem is that today there is no rela-
tionship with society and the Church’s only connection to society is its 
attitude of reaction to what is happening. 
But why is the position of “protecting values” so problematic? There are values, they 
are disputed, and they need to be protected so that they can be passed on to subse-
quent generations … 
Values do not need to be protected in order to be passed on to subsequent 
generations. That’s not how values are transmitted. We must not con-
centrate our energies on the alleged crisis of values, but instead find the 
place from which these values are resurrected. The defenders of tradi-
tional values are trying to protect what they have, but that is not enough. 
In my opinion, in the current situation, we have only one way. To return 
to the place values come from. It’s not a way to protect values, it’s a way 
to reproduce them. If we need family in society, we don’t need to protect 
it. We need to return to the place where it was born. 
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Where is this place? 
Exactly! Now that’s the beginning of a real public debate. For example, 
Fukuyama’s discussion of trust in his famous book: how is trust built? 4 
Some believe that trust, memory, and values are formed, first of all, in 
the relationship of the child and the mother, who then transmits these 
values to the relationship with the father, the family, society, and so on. 
Some think it’s friendship. I believe that the Church as a witness of Christ 
is an invaluable place for society to revive the value of trust. Church is 
the place where values are produced. They are made there. Not because 
Christians impose their worldviews, propagate their ideas, and defend 
their values. That’s not what this is about. Christians live in such a way 
that in some cases their lives become attractive to non-Christians and as 
a result Christian values penetrate into the public sphere. That’s what we 
saw in the case of the Nobel Prize for Mother Teresa of Calcutta. That 
is, maybe the majority of people in the world do not even know from 
what religious order she is, how she lives, what she prays, they have not 
read theological books. But it’s obvious to everyone that they’re dealing 
with some kind of beauty that is universal. This is the universality of the 
saints, their ability to transcend confessional boundaries. I mean, saints 
are saints to everyone. The experience of holiness is penetrating even for 
atheists. The Church today is facing two possible ways forward: either 
the Church returns to the revival of values, by which I mean starts to bear 
witness (first of all through education), or it continues in its defense of 
values, which is what we are mostly seeing today. 
The problem with the focus on the protection of traditional values is 
that it remains unclear what these values actually are. They are traditional, 
so do they come from the past? But which past? Shall we return to Kievan 
Rus? Well, that’s a long way off. If we speak about defending traditional 
values, we surely need some kind of lived experience of these values. So 
maybe go back to the past Soviet experience? Isn’t the code of the build-
ers of Communism a crypto-Christian product, isn’t that the proof that 
not everything was so bad in the Soviet Union? Today’s defenders of tra-
4 Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: 
Free Press, 1996). 
uibk_kern_stoeckl_postsecular-conflicts_170x220mm_1.4.indd   80 25.05.20   09:19
81
ditional values in Russia are obliged to combine the Soviet and Christian 
narratives, otherwise they are deprived of the opportunity to appeal to 
lived human experience. Logically speaking, this is absurd, but from the 
point of view of the program of protection of values it is the only possibility. 
What do you think about the dialogue between different faiths? Can values and their 
protection become the basis for new ecumenical interactions? Or do the same prob-
lems arise here? And what could become the new agenda for such interaction today? 
That is, what is the alternative to “protecting traditional values” in the context of ecu-
menical interaction? 
I frequently participate in interfaith dialogues. When representatives of 
the Catholic, Orthodox, and Greek Catholic communities in Ukraine meet, 
there is always the difficulty to decide what we are going to talk about, 
what will be our agenda? As a rule, these talks were about what separates 
us: how we differ in our teachings, how our attitude to the Pope differs, 
what’s different about our understanding of history. The agenda was usu-
ally dictated by some challenge that we must respond to. But at one point 
we realized that we have an abyss of difficulties, we will not work them 
out at one conference, not even at ten or a hundred conferences. So what 
can we give to each other? Something that would be valuable to each of 
us? The answer was: the saints of our traditions! So we started to build 
the agenda of our meetings on this basis: let’s look at the best that there 
is in every tradition and confession. This is the experience of the saints. 
And it turns out that when everyone talks about what makes him or her 
alive, personally, it’s important for everyone. It was at these meetings that 
we discovered holiness as a lens for examining problems.
So for me, there are two types of interfaith meetings. There are con-
ferences that discuss the defense of something. conservative groups that 
find out how exactly we are in trouble, how the world is trying to hurt 
us behind the scenes. This is one kind of interfaith cooperation. I’m not 
interested in it. For me the second position is attractive – when I as Ortho-
dox listen to what Catholics say about what they love. When they, in 
turn, are not interested in what I think of the crisis in Catholic theology, 
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but when they are wondering what I think of Metropolitan Anthony of 
Sourozh (Bloom). 
I don’t think there are conferences where these two types of people 
meet. And that’s a problem. It turns out that there is a great deal of sep-
aration between these communities. They no longer have anything in 
common, no shared space. It seems to me that the problem today is not 
to determine the differences – liberal, conservative, traditionalist, fun-
damentalist – but to determine the subject of our common contempla-
tion. Not the subject of our common politics, but the question who the 
saints are for us. 
For me, one of the strongest public gestures of the Russian Orthodox 
Church was the canonization of the new martyrs in 2000. We had a little 
more than 300 of our own Slavic saints in the Orthodox Church. Three hun-
dred and something at the beginning of the 20th century! Since 2000, the 
Russian Orthodox Church has canonized more than 1500 saints. 5 Doesn’t 
it mean something big to the life of the Orthodox Church that the num-
ber of saints honored in its calendar has increased by five? It must mean 
something! If the Church canonizes, it is up to us to strive to understand 
who these people are. To learn their names, learn what they looked like 
and how they bore witness. In the past, canonization in the Church usu-
ally happened in the opposite way: whenever there was persistent pub-
lic veneration of a person, the Church eventually recognized this person 
as a saint. In 2000, the opposite happened. The Church canonized over 
1,500 people with an offer for all of us to become familiar with them. And 
what do we see today in the Church? Strange as it may seem, the defend-
ers of traditional values don’t look at them! 
For me, the opportunity to look at a martyr’s experience is the oppo-
site of searching for and defending traditional values. They were all people 
who were certainly traditional, but they did not defend traditional values, 
they simply lived a life that was so beautiful even in unbearable conditions 
that this life could bear witness to faith in spite of hell. So even in hell, this 
5 In 2000, the Russian Orthodox Church canonized a new group of saints – new martyrs 
who were killed or persecuted after the October Revolution of 1917. See Karin 
Christensen, The Making of the New Martyrs of Russia. Soviet Repression in Orthodox 
Memory (London, New York: Routledge, 2019). 
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testimony was available, and so the Church survived. The Church did not 
survive because she was defending traditional values, but because she bore 
witness to the beauty of faith. When we talk about the new martyrs today, 
people immediately say: “Christ said, I will build my church; and the gates 
of hell shall not prevail against it.” What does it mean, the gates of hell 
shall not prevail against it? If you ask people what this means, the typical 
answer goes like this: there was a Church, the state struggled with it, the 
Church withstood the attack of hell during the whole 20th century, and 
now this attack has come to naught. This is the triumphalist tale. Well, I 
tell you: hell doesn’t attack, the gates stand where they stand. What does 
it mean, “the gates of hell shall not prevail”? Gates don’t have an engine, 
they are not moving. And it is clear that Christ means the opposite, that 
there is a power of testimony in the Church such that the gates of hell 
cannot hold that light and they break, so the light shines in hell. This is a 
different interpretation of the experience of the martyrs. 
Don’t you think that the narrative of defending traditional values has some kind of inter-
nal anguish, some tension that leads defenders of these values to embrace extreme 
positions …
Yes, I also notice the striking similarity of the discourse on the protec-
tion of traditional values to conspiracy theories. Why not defend these 
moral positions normally? Why do you constantly need to involve some 
schemes about conspiracy? How does this fusion of discourses happen, 
why does one generate the other? I think it’s an old-fashioned problem 
of modernity. My teacher was Zygmunt Bauman, who shocked Europe 
with the statement that the Holocaust was an outgrowth of modernity. 6 
That the Holocaust is only possible in a modern society. It seems to me 
that the defenders of traditional values are also an outgrowth of moder-
nity. These are people who defend an ideal and at the same time know 
that this ideal is not represented by anybody. Either you say that you 
adhere to values that no one holds, including yourself, which is certainly 
6 See Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2001).
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a humorous position, or you have to offer some kind of conspiracy model 
that explains where these values reside beyond our everyday perception. 
They say that there are communities that keep these values, but as lay-
people we do not see them, we do not know them, and cannot. There is 
a strange fusion of a radical modernist position, a vulgar dichotomy of is 
and ought with conspiratorial language. We cannot point to a real Chris-
tian experience in which these traditional values exist. We’re protecting 
something that’s not there. And we can’t admit it openly. We can only 
say that traditional values are like the city of Kitezh, 7 which still exists 
somewhere, and we just need to understand where it exists – on Mount 
Athos, maybe beyond the Urals, maybe with a single monk who hasn’t left 
his cell for fifty-three years. We see a conspiricization of holiness. It is a 
deeply paradoxical situation: the Russian Orthodox Church has canonized 
over a thousand new saints and has invited us to know them by name, to 
learn about them as people who make up the face of the church in diffi-
cult times. And what is happening instead? Today, the figure of the holy 
is covered in conspiracy theories. Who are the saints for the advocates of 
traditional values? What does humanity mean for those who represent 
the anti-humanist milieu of the Church? What is humanity for those who 
say they are not interested in humanism or human rights? Who do they 
follow within the Orthodox Church, not as an ideological leader, but as 
an example of humaneness? 
Does today’s Russia have any specifics in terms of traditionalism? 
There is a wonderful book by Mark Sedgwick, prophetically translated into 
Russian. 8 It is constructed as an intellectual biography of René Guénon 
and his followers. This book is remarkable for the fact that it was written 
more than ten years ago and its last chapter is on the fate of traditional-
ism in Russia. And it already shows to what extent the situation of tradi-
7 In Russian mythology a city that mysteriously disappeared in the 13th century under the 
waters of the lake Svetloyar when the Mongols wanted to conquer it. 
8 Mark Sedgwick, Against the Modern World: Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual 
History of the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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tionalism in Russia is strange. It is the only country in the world where 
traditionalism has managed to break out of the marginal field. To come 
together with the authorities. This simply has never happened anywhere. 
All of traditionalism’s attempts to flirt with power in other contexts have 
not led to anything. This only happened in Russia. 
How do you see a way out of this situation? Is there any reason to hope for an alter-
native to “protecting traditional values”? 
I would like to stress once again that the way out is to raise the topic of 
holiness and the subject of the testimony of faith in the public space. A 
sign, a sociological symptom for me was the TV series The Young Pope. 
It’s a really curious phenomenon: many people said, “What an abomina-
tion!,” “It’s a parody of the Church!” But when we look at the part of soci-
ety that was delighted with this series, we see that it resonated with peo-
ple who are not represented in the Church. These people said, “We expect 
you, dear Christians, to do just that.” This was the first time the unrepre-
sented spoke. The great hope is that they see hope in the Church and that 
hope is in the experience of holiness. Not in the Church as a new power, 
finance, network, control, but in the Church as a witness to the truth. For 
me, hope is in this position of a witness. In philosophy and social theory, 
it seems to me, there is still no developed toolkit to talk about testimony. 
This is what Paul Ricoeur tried to do in his old age when he said that after 
300 years of a philosophy of suspicion, we must create an equally power-
ful philosophy of witness and recognition. But it was never created. This 
work hasn’t been done yet.
Interviewed by Olena Kostenko on 31 January 2017
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Since the beginning of the third millennium Russian politics, the church 
sphere, public life, and mass media have increasingly been dominated by 
conservative trends and sentiments. The all-embracing conservative trend 
and atmosphere are asserting themselves aggressively, but it can read-
ily be seen that as distinct from the Soviet period, the prevalent course – 
“the general line” – is not informed with any complete ideology and does 
not have a robust ideological or philosophical foundation. Its intellectual 
support and theoretical basis represent disparate religious, philosophi-
cal, historical, or political constructs, journalistic musings, ideological 
schemes that tend to be unprovable, para-scientific, archaic, and down-
right fantastic. This chaotic body of ideas and attitudes may appear to 
have a kind of ideological cohesion because it has a common element, a 
sui generis common denominator in the shape of tradition. “Adherence 
to tradition,” “reliance on tradition,” “preserving and protecting tradi-
tion (or traditions)” – these and similar formulas are heard constantly 
and everywhere like an incantation, a cloying commonplace in Russian 
public discourse. On closer inspection, however, this commonplace is an 
empty place. In nearly all contexts – official, journalistic, and even aca-
demic – the meaning of the cure-all called tradition remains fuzzy and it 
is unclear what concrete traditions are meant. 
Moreover, we discover that in the majority of contexts there is no 
sign of an attempt to clarify the mysterious concept and identify exactly 
what traditions we should draw on. More often than not this question is 
sidestepped by substituting the term “tradition” with the still vaguer term 
“traditional values.” Today the traditional values discourse holds sway 
everywhere in Russia, while the content of this formula is expressed in 
a vague and declarative form through such notions as “family,” “moral-
ity,” and “social order.” This is in striking contrast with unambiguous and 
powerful old slogans such as Blut und Boden [Blood and soil] or “world 
revolution.” So, it would be wrong to say that the traditional values dis-
course performs the function of a state ideology or even the much-touted 
“national idea.” Rather, it is a palliative, a Band-Aid.
However, there is a plethora of varyingly marginal, exotic, and extrem-
ist ideas on the topic of tradition advocated by small groups and subcul-
tures. An odd picture emerges. The dominant conservative-traditionalist 
idea manifests itself in the ideological field in such a way that the center 
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of this space, which should be occupied by concepts shared by the major-
ity or imposed by the authorities, is essentially vacant, while the periph-
ery is replete with a multitude of traditionalist theories, concepts, and 
schemes of varying (but never totally scientific) standard, marginal and 
radical to varying degrees. The feature that they all have in common is 
cavalier treatment of tradition: they all promote a biased and distorted 
treatment of traditions – ideologized, stylized, mystified, etc. – and often 
describe imagined “ancient traditions” as the basis for their para-scien-
tific theories. In other words, the authors do not immerse themselves in 
tradition and its experience, but highjack tradition, producing various 
kinds of distortions and simulacra. 
The aim of this text is to provide a concise analytical description, 
classification, and assessment of the phenomena that crowd the field of 
present-day Russian traditionalism. Let us start with a brief catalog of 
the main phenomena in this field.
Exposition
Obviously, conservative thought in Russia draws above all on the religious 
tradition of Orthodoxy and the secular tradition of the monarchy. In Rus-
sian culture both have had a long and controversial history that defies a 
straightforward and unambiguous assessment. The relations between 
the two have seen many twists and turns. Present-day traditionalism, too, 
offers various interpretations, but they all share the view that there must 
be a close alliance, a unity of the two traditions. Such a union has been 
the rule throughout the history of the Orthodox world until the 20th cen-
tury, including the Russian Empire. The most salient example, however, 
is the Byzantine Empire, the first Orthodox kingdom that lasted a thou-
sand years. For the Russian conservative consciousness this example has 
acquired the status of a paradigm and an archetype, so that the modern 
concepts and platforms that advocate a marriage of Orthodoxy and mon-
archy can be considered to be part of the general current of Byzantinism. 
The term is polysemantic, its conceptualization going back to two antip-
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odes, Ivan Gagarin 2 and Konstantin Leontiev. For the purpose of this 
study I chose to focus on the narrow interpretation of Byzantinism as a 
trend in modern Russian ideological life.
There is no doubt that Byzantinism is the mainstream of Russian tra-
ditionalism today. But the trend is not monolithic, it has various subdivi-
sions. The divisions, however, are not sharp and do not rule out important 
unifying factors: thus, all the Byzantinist theories represent the Byzantine 
Empire as a positive example for Russia and the West as a dangerous and 
hostile entity. Nevertheless these theories are very different in terms of 
their main thrust, their emphasis and goals, and in many other ways. The 
most visible division is between the more pragmatic, political, and geopo-
litical Byzantinism and the more mystical and eschatological Byzantin-
ism. The first variety uses relatively moderate and rational discourse and 
clearly seeks to gain the recognition of the authorities and become the 
state ideology. A perfect example of such Byzantinism is the well-known 
television film The Lesson of Byzantium by archimandrite, now bishop, 
Tikhon (Shevkunov). These strivings have had some success: Byzantinist
 
“empire-building ideologies advocating a vertical integration […]  
of various peoples and states around Moscow and Russia […] are 
used by the Russian political regime. […] For a long time the Byz-
antinist narrative appealed mainly to marginal patriotic intellec-
tual circles. However, in the early 2000s it caught the eye of the 
people in the corridors of power where the mobilizing potential 
of this ideologeme was appreciated. The concepts of the Ortho-
dox civilization, post-Byzantine space, ‘the Russian World,’ the 
Third Rome, etc., came to be discussed.” 3 
2 On the role of Gagarin in the history of the concept of Byzantinism, see N. V. Sinitsyna, 
Tretii Rim: Istoki i evoliutsiia russkoi srednevekovoi kontseptsii (XV–XVI vv.) (Moscow: 
Indrik, 1998), 29.
3 A. N. Okara, “Novaia Vostochnaia Evropa v XXI veke: Sposobno li vizantiiskoe nasledie 
izmenit’ Rossiiu i ves’ mir?” Razvitie i ekonomika 4 (2012): 136.
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All these concepts, which are included in the sphere of political Byz-
antinism, have become part of the official discourse. 
The second variety has from the outset developed outside the limits 
of scientific critique: it is the discourse that blends real and sacral his-
tory and refuses to distinguish authentic sources, hagiographic narra-
tive, apocrypha, and legends. These tools are used to build mystical and 
fantastic schemes of history, and mainly of the end of history complete 
with the advent of “the last time” and the enthronement of the Antichrist. 
These two varieties occupy different places in the public domain: while 
the former, as has been said, looks to the center, which it seeks to gain 
control of, the latter has long been consigned to the fringe zone although 
it leaps into prominence from time to time (as in our day). However, the 
differences between them are more external than internal: at the end of 
the day political Byzantinism rests on the same religious and historical 
foundations and ideas, though it prefers not to discuss them owing to their 
exotic character. I will consider these foundations below. 
Along with Byzantinism, Eurasianism is undoubtedly among the most 
influential ideological trends in Russia today. Its relevance to our theme, 
i. e., traditionalism, is not immediately apparent. Typologically, the early 
Eurasianism of the Russian émigrés in the 1920s was clearly an avant-
garde and not a traditionalist trend, which is why its proponents were 
described as “Slavophiles of the Futurist era” (Fyodor Stepun). However, 
today’s Eurasianism, or neo-Eurasianism, is a different phenomenon. It 
is still more heterogeneous than Byzantinism, comprising a whole spec-
trum of versions. But the important thing is that it is clearly evolving in 
the direction of traditionalism. With the exception of “left Eurasianism,” 
oriented toward leftist philosophical trends, 4 the discourse of tradition 
and the principle of reliance on tradition are present in all the main vari-
eties of modern neo-Eurasianism. However, unlike Byzantinism, Eura-
sianism cannot link its basic idea of Eurasia as a distinct type of civili-
zation and culture with any tradition that has ever existed. Therefore if 
4 See, for example, R. Vakhitov: “Modern followers of the left-Eurasian paradigm seek 
to find similarities of the theories of the civilizational approach […] and Western neo-
Marxism, notably in the philosophy of Antonio Gramsci and, to a lesser extent, the 
Frankfurt School thinkers.” Vakhitov, “Klassicheskoe levoe evraziistvo,” in Evraziistvo: 
Issledovaniia i publikatsii (Moscow: Parad, 2014), 291.
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neo-Eurasianism is to gravitate toward the traditionalist discourse, tra-
dition has to be interpreted in a special way.
Traditionalism in the narrow sense – associated primarily with the 
names of René Guénon and Julius Evola – provides a suitable interpre-
tation. The core of this theory is a special approach to tradition: it pro-
ceeds from the premise that the whole spectrum of world religions, cul-
tures, and civilizations has its source in a single “primordial,” “pristine,” 
or proto-tradition, the ancient sacred tradition that is still unknown to 
science. “The traditionalists claim that all sacred knowledge has a single 
source in the original tradition.” 5 Each of the theories within this kind 
of traditionalism propounds its own version of what the proto-tradition 
was, seeking to represent it as a reconstruction of genuine prehistorical 
tradition and find convincing arguments to explain why this tradition is 
unknown to science. 
It is clear that all this is outside the sphere of scientific cognition and 
belongs to some para-scientific or non-scientific paradigm. We will con-
sider this in more detail below, but at this point let us just note that this 
extrascientific paradigm, which simulates scientific discourse and method, 
opens broad opportunities – proposes a matrix, if you like, for producing 
constructs distanced from science to varying degrees, based on all sorts 
of imagined “traditions” that may serve various ideological, political, reli-
gious, and other purposes. There is great demand for these opportunities 
in the current Russian (and world) situation. As a result, traditionalism in 
the narrow sense is a highly visible and influential phenomenon in Rus-
sian culture, ideology, and to some extent in politics. Content-wise, it is 
divided into separate conceptions each asserting the existence of some 
proto-tradition that it uses as the basis for historical, historiosophic, reli-
gious, or political schemes and constructs. To evaluate these concepts it 
would make sense to distinguish among them, above all in terms of how 
far they are removed from reality and how much fantasy has gone into 
them: a “tradition” may be the one hundred percent invention of an arm-
chair historian or a modification of some real tradition, leavened with var-
ying degrees of arbitrariness, distortions, and additions.
5 G. Dzhemal, “Prorocheskaia eskhatologiia i traditsionnaia doktrina tsiklov,”  
in Eskhatologicheskii sbornik (St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2006), 476.
Sergey Horujy — The Misfortune of Tradition
uibk_kern_stoeckl_postsecular-conflicts_170x220mm_1.4.indd   91 25.05.20   09:19
92 Postsecular Conflicts
Let us use this principle to compile a brief catalog of the main pres-
ent-day traditionalist concepts, starting with moderate ones and moving 
gradually to those that blatantly disregard reality and science. 
(1) The spectrum of neo-Eurasian concepts contains a relatively mod-
erate version whose authors, while taking liberties with historical and cul-
tural data, still avoid undisguised additions and distortions. Such moderate 
traditionalism has produced the widely known theories of Lev Gumilyov 
and, among modern authors, of Aleksandr Panarin, who claimed the exist-
ence of “a single tradition that is archetypically common to the peoples 
of Eurasia,” 6 but did not venture to describe it, saying that such recon-
struction would be a task for the future. 
(2) Evgeny Shiffers (1934–1997), a brilliant film and stage master, came 
up with a very original version of traditionalism. His spiritual quests led 
him to a syncretic mystery-like fantasy that blends Tibetan Buddhism and 
mystical Orthodoxy. 7 Shiffers had and still has a small but staunch follow-
ing and his extraordinary sensitivity to the spiritual tradition puts him in 
the category of traditionalists and not simply New Age–style dilettantes. 
He puts forward his own version of Eurasianism connected with the idea 
of the “Eurasian proto-motherland.” However, Shiffers does not introduce 
the concept of the primordial tradition, so in our classification his con-
cept is in between traditionalism in the narrow and in the broad sense.
(3) In the broad sense it can be said that Eurasianism is close to Ten­
grism, another post-Soviet branch of traditionalism. Tengrism claims that 
the proto-tradition is the cult of the god of heaven Tengri, and this cult is 
the most ancient monotheistic proto-religion, which is supposed to have 
been practiced by all the peoples of Central Asia long before Buddhism 
and Islam. According to the radical version of Murad Adzhayev (Murad 
Adzhi), Tengrism, which sprang up among the Turkic peoples in Altai, 
was the source of all the cultures and religions of India, the Middle and 
Near East, North Africa, and Europe, where it turned into Christianity. 
In the Asian regions of Russia and the former Soviet republics Tengrism 
6 A. S. Panarin, Rossiia v sotsiokul’turnom prostranstve Evrazii (Moscow: Parad, 2014), 463.
7 E. L. Shiffers, Religiozno-filosofskie proizvedeniia (Moscow: Russkii Institut, 2005).
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is widely recognized and is included in textbooks in some places; there 
are many organized groups of its followers. 
(4) A Russian analog of Tengrism, albeit on a smaller scale, attempts 
to present the paganism of the ancient Slavs as a proto-tradition often cov-
ered by the blanket term Rodnoverie (Slavic native faith). Similar attempts 
are made by a number of small neo-Pagan movements such as Velesov 
krug (The circle of Veles), Bayanova tropa (The path of Bayan), and oth-
ers, which preach the revival of the pantheon, myths, rituals, and cus-
toms of Pagan Slavs. They have no unity or any coherent construct of a 
proto-tradition. However, they often have a political orientation, which 
usually gravitates toward Russian nationalism. 
(5) Traditionalism in the narrow sense should also include the well-
known Salafiyah trend in modern radical Islam (salaf means “forefathers” 
in Arabic), which advocates a return to the original Islam of the time of 
Mohammed. Salafi trends and groups are active today all over the Islamic 
world, including Islamic regions in Russia. The proto-tradition here is 
the Islam of the early Muslim preachers, about which infinitesimally lit-
tle is known, so that, like in other traditionalist trends, it is not so much 
about reconstruction as about arbitrary construction of the basic tradi-
tion. While it is common practice to include Salafis in traditionalism in 
the broad sense it has also been noted that by its nature the movement 
meets the definition of traditionalism in the narrow sense. The typolog-
ical kinship of the Salafi ideology with the doctrine of the Aryan Nordic 
proto-tradition in German Nazism has been noted. 
What exactly was it like – the world of nascent initial Islam? […] 
Various attempts have been made to reconstruct it […] The end 
product turned out to be a utopia that had never existed in real-
ity. An extreme manifestation of Muslim reaction is today rep-
resented by people like Osama bin Laden. […] These groups are 
sometimes called Salafite movements. […] They create an imagi-
nary world […] and we discover a striking similarity between the 
imaginary world of ultra-reactionary Muslim movements and 
the reconstruction of imaginary German Aryanism […] German 
Aryanism was an ultra-reactionary reconstruction of the past 
that never was. […] It was argued that if the Germans had acted 
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like their Teutonic ancestors they would again control Europe. 
Here we discover an analogy with the ultra-reactionary Muslims 
who claim that if the Muslims of the world had acted like their 
righteous and devout ancestors they would again be in control 
of the Middle East.” 8
Here we see yet another important feature of proto-tradition projects: the 
ultimate driving motives of these projects are usually political, geopoliti-
cal, and ideological goals and plans. From the outset, they separate these 
projects from the task of impartial research, of establishing the true his-
torical and spiritual reality. As we shall see below, a natural correlation 
arises: the more radical and extremist the external motivations, the more 
blatantly unscientific and remote from the truth and reality the imagined 
“traditions” tend to become. 
(6) The resemblance of Islamic and Aryan-Nordic traditionalist pro-
jects may appear to be formal and artificial. But this is not so. Russia today 
has at least one more example of such a resemblance. It is the tradition-
alism of Geydar Dzhemal. Dzhemal, a Shiite Islamist also known as “the 
metaphysician of Tradition,” in his treatise Orientation­North (1997) pre-
sents a philosophical transcription or parallel of the Nazi theosophy of 
Herman Wirth (1885–1981) with its theory of the northern land, Arcto-
geia, a land of superhumans called Hyperboreans. According to Dzhemal, 
the north is “the point where Cosmos ends,” “the last frontier of reality,” 
“the pole of the impossible,” and the orientation toward the north means 
the orientation toward getting rid of the “plague of being,” the cult of 
death, apocalypse and chaos. The universe is cyclic, ruled by the princi-
ple of “cosmic fire,” “titanic will” – this is the set of motives that resonate 
with the Teutonic mythology in the Nazi edition. An important feature 
of Dzhemal’s traditionalism is political activism of a markedly extremist 
kind; he was a government member of one of the warring Islamic groups 
in Tajikistan. The basic premises of Shia extremism have much in com-
mon with Salafism; thus, in an interview he proclaims the aim of Islamic 
8 Z. Kogan, “Dialog avraamicheskikh religii,” Mirovoi Obshchestvennyi Forum “Dialog 
Tsivilizatsii” Vestnik 1 (2006): 195–96.
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policy to be “people’s self-government corresponding to the democratic 
spirit of the original Islam.” 9
(7) Extreme features of radial traditionalism are highlighted by the 
multifarious activities of Alexander Dugin, a noted political figure, journal-
ist, and author of numerous books. Characteristically, he refers to his ver-
sion of traditionalism as “total traditionalism.” It is a compilation, a hodge-
podge of elements of many traditions and teachings obviously prompted 
by the exigencies of Russian politics. Let us look at its main components. 
The main content of “total traditionalism” is the Nazi Hyperborean geoso-
phy of Wirth (Dugin and Dzhemal come from the same Moscow intellec-
tual or occult underground circle), which is now presented in an upfront 
and detailed way; most of Dugin’s books were published by Arktogeia, a 
publishing house he founded. Dugin mostly presents his theories on the 
conceptual and methodological platform of René Guénon (1886–1951), 
who introduced substantial changes in the traditionalist discourse, gen-
eralizing it and shaping it into a coherent system. Added to this basis are 
new elements that adapt it to the modern Russian context. Chief of them 
are Turanism, 10 due to which “total traditionalism” includes Eurasian-
ism in its orbit (Dugin’s position is often described as neo-Eurasian) and 
Russian Orthodoxy. 
The author chose to give prominence to the last element exactly at 
the time when he emerged on the Russian political scene: he had con-
cluded that “Trinitary Orthodox metaphysics,” “which provides a full 
and perfect expression of all the most valuable revelatory vectors,” is the 
highest point of the development of tradition. 11 But his concept of Ortho-
doxy is somewhat peculiar: Dugin reveals a “strikingly literal, even totally 
structural […] coincidence between the Christian tradition […] and the par-
adigms of Hyperborean sacrality so brilliantly unpicked and restored by 
9 See G. Dzhemal, Osvobozhdenie Islama (Moscow: Ummah, 2004).
10 Turanism is “a late 19th- and early 20th-century movement to unite politically and 
culturally all the Turkic, Tatar, and Uralic peoples living in Turkey and across Eurasia from 
Hungary to the Pacific. Its name is derived from Tūrān, the Persian word for Turkistan 
(i. e., the land to the north of Iran).” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed 11 December 2019,  
https://www.britannica.com/event/Pan-Turanianism.
11 A. G. Dugin, Absoliutnaia rodina (Moscow: Arktogeia, 1999), 153.
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Wirth.” 12 Dugin has not contributed anything new to the body of funda-
mental ideas of traditionalism, nor has he discovered any new proto-tra-
dition. However, his derivative and eclectic constructs are skillfully pre-
sented and appeal to the masses, attracting a following. They bolster his 
political activities, which peaked during the war in Donbass. Today Dugin 
is undoubtedly the most influential figure in Russian traditionalism, both 
in the narrow and broad senses.
Anatomy
The above impressive list of traditionalist concepts and movements clearly 
shows that traditionalism in Russia today is a significant element of the 
ideological and political situation. In starting to analyze and assess it, it 
has to be acknowledged that for all its heterogeneity and diversity, it has 
an important common feature: all these elements treat tradition as an 
instrument, a tool and means of achieving political and ideological goals 
that are extraneous to tradition. Traditionalism as such cannot set as its 
goal the simple and unbiased scientific study of tradition. Likewise, it does 
not seek to simply take part in tradition and become immersed in its liv-
ing experience. Traditionalism is by no means the same as life within a 
tradition and faithfulness to tradition, and those who live in tradition are 
anything but traditionalists. Traditionalism either produces a certain con-
struct that it bills as proto-tradition (traditionalism in the narrow sense) 
or manipulates some real tradition to fit some political, ideological, or 
religious project (traditionalism in the broad sense). For traditionalism 
is always a certain project, and tradition has to provide its foundation, 
and to this end it is fitted into a corresponding Procrustean bed inevita-
bly distorting and twisting and subjecting it to vivisection. Or it is simply 
invented on somebody’s commission. 
Hence any traditionalism fulfils an assignment involving methodo-
logical or epistemological arbitrariness or plain subterfuge by passing off 
12 Ibid., 745.
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a fresh-baked construct as an ancient tradition or interpreting some real 
tradition, taken off the shelf for some extraneous reason, in an arbitrary 
way. And of course it seeks to present its concepts not as a loose hypoth-
esis or a literary composition, but as a scientific truth. Thus, fulfilling an 
assignment presents a problem that different traditionalist trends tackle 
in their own way. However, it is easy to see some common principles and 
methods behind these solutions. By revealing them we may gain an insight 
into the way traditionalism works and peer into its secret laboratory. 
One approach to solving the problem readily suggests itself: the 
required concepts, theories, and views should be presented in a way that 
is impeccable from the scientific point of view. To this end they should 
be given a science-like form, which is not a major challenge; but in addi-
tion, and most importantly, the substance of these concepts should be 
unassailable. On that key point intuition again comes to the rescue: the 
concepts should be taken from outside of the domain of standard scien-
tific discourse with its norms and rules and the requirement of being in 
accord with the existing foundation of scientific principles and data, of 
being provable and verifiable, etc. In other words, one should find some 
vacant space, some discursive Lebensraum or Wild West, a space that is 
out of reach of existing science and in which anything can be declared 
to be a science. There are actually ample opportunities for finding such 
space. I will now name the two main strategies used by traditionalism 
before taking a closer look at how they are implemented. 
The simplest and most obvious way is manipulating the chronotope. 
Academic science has yet to provide a detailed and authentic study of all 
the remote epochs while the body of sources and testimony in written 
and material culture shrinks dramatically as we go further back in time. 
Beyond a certain point in historical time lie areas of the global chrono-
tope about which infinitesimally little is known – the space of the “pre-
historic” or “proto-historical” existence of man; so, given the will, it is 
quite possible to colonize these spaces, filling them with the kind of con-
tent that is required for a traditionalist project, populating it with eth-
nic groups and races, and ascribing to them a suitable culture and most 
importantly, “a tradition.” 
It will readily be seen that the majority of the abovementioned trends 
in modern Russian traditionalism – projects meeting the definition of 
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“traditionalism in the narrow sense” – follow the simple model of find-
ing ”vacant space” that can be filled arbitrarily. They differ only in the 
choice of the “vacant space” and the thoroughness in elaborating their 
teachings. As regards the choice of space, the body of trends mentioned 
here offers the following options: 
Proto-North (Hyperborea, Arktogeia) + proto-Russia (Dugin);
Proto-North + proto-Islam (Dzhemal);
Proto-Islam (Salafites);
Proto-Slavdom (Slavic native faith, or Rodnoverie); 
Proto-religion of Central Asia (Tengrism).
The claim to belonging to such special (fictional!) space is usually estab-
lished by the prefixes “proto-” and “paleo-.” Attaching these symbolic 
prefixes to categories of standard historical, ethnological, cultural-civi-
lizational discourse has been a standard method of traditionalism since 
the times of Guénon, and one of the main methods of colonizing “vacant 
space.” This is how a traditionalist teaching is created: “proto-civiliza-
tion,” “proto-language,” “paleo-continents,” etc., may be introduced in the 
vacant space and with a certain amount of effort a coherent alternative 
world history can be fabricated. To build such theories their authors even 
introduce traditionalist imitations of the main human sciences, which are 
called “sacral” or “symbolic” disciplines: thus sacral history, sacral geog-
raphy, linguistics, and ethnology appear, corresponding to the proto-tradi-
tion and its space. However, only some projects attain such a global scale: 
among the Russian teachings it is the Dugin project and outside Russia 
the classic traditionalist projects of Guénon, Evola, and Wirth. 
Another widespread strategy of gaining “vacant space” does not claim 
to present a newly discovered “ancient tradition” and is in that sense less 
radical. The main tool of this strategy is not the chronotope, but discourse, 
its key method being a mixing of totally different types of discourse. If dis-
courses with diametrically opposite rules are mixed together, the result 
will be a free-for-all kind of discourse without any rules of rigor or cor-
rectness, so that any arbitrary propositions can claim to be true. This is the 
kind of strategy cultivated by traditionalism in the broad sense, which in 
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Russia is above all represented by Byzantinism. We have already pointed 
out its two varieties: the moderate one, leaning toward politics, and the 
radical one with a mystical-eschatological thrust. I will now proceed to 
explain their methodological and epistemological principles, which are, 
for our purpose, pretty much the same, only modern Byzantinism uses 
them with caution whereas radical Byzantinism goes to extremes. 
As pointed out above, any traditionalism seeks to implement a cer-
tain project. The nucleus of the Byzantinist project is a blend of Ortho-
dox and monarchic or imperial principles. Such a blend should be pre-
sented in a form that the broad popular consciousness, especially political 
circles and the educated part of society, find convincing. This calls for a 
scientific discourse; but, as I have stressed, no traditionalist project can 
be justified from the scientific standpoint, which makes it imperative to 
go beyond scientific discourse. 
The concepts of Byzantinism are linked with Orthodoxy and draw 
mainly on the discourses of Holy Scripture and holy history and less fre-
quently on the discourses of dogmatics, hagiography, etc. These are spe-
cialized discourses belonging to the sacral sphere in Christianity, and by 
borrowing elements thereof and drawing on their data Byzantinism is 
included in the category of confessional discourses (unlike traditionalism 
in the narrow sense, which presents its proto-tradition discourse as a 
discourse of scientific truth unconnected with confessional limitations). 
Such discourses combine sacred and secular elements. Because they fol-
low different rules, how they are combined is crucial. Correct confes-
sional discourses take into account the fact that sacral discourses call for 
special hermeneutics and special methodologies of reading, and use rules 
that are rooted in the foundations of the corresponding religion. Because 
of this the assertions and conclusions of sacral discourses have a differ-
ent sphere of validity than secular discourses, and this difference is scru-
pulously taken into account in correct confessional discourses, as exem-
plified by Christian theology. Considering the nature of the discourses 
is particularly and vitally important in the case of mystical-eschatologi-
cal discourses. This is a special kind of sacral discourse whose subject is 
real or supposed events of the direct encounter of man with sacral reality, 
such as visions, revelations, and transformations of systems of percep-
Sergey Horujy — The Misfortune of Tradition
uibk_kern_stoeckl_postsecular-conflicts_170x220mm_1.4.indd   99 25.05.20   09:19
100 Postsecular Conflicts
tion. Their organization, logic, and epistemology are far removed from 
and diametrically opposed to the characteristics of scientific discourse 
and require a special kind of treatment. 
However, there are a host of incorrect confessional discourses in 
which secular and sacred discourses are mixed and blended indiscrimi-
nately. In such cases discourses of the sacred are exploited without tak-
ing into account their special nature on a par with secular and scientific 
discourses, which leads to various errors and false assertions. Going back 
to Byzantinism, I maintain that it has to be categorized as incorrect dis-
course. Indeed, the most actively used discourse here is apocalyptic, one of 
the most radical and offbeat mystical-eschatological discourses, in which 
incorrectness is taken to an extreme. By combining incompatibles, blend-
ing together opposite discourses into something that looks like science, 
Byzantinism ends up with a discourse that is “vacant space” or, to use an 
earlier expression, free-for-all discourse that follows no rules, is open to 
arbitrary statements, and makes it possible to “prove” anything. We can 
readily see it by taking a closer look at the notion of katechon, which forms 
the ideological nucleus of modern Russian Byzantinism. 
The term “katechon” (Greek τὸ κατέχον “that which withholds” or 
ὁ κατέχων “the one who withholds”) goes back to the New Testament (2 
Thessalonians 2:2–3,6-7: 
“the day [of Christ] shall not come, except there come a fall-
ing away first, and that man of sin is revealed, the son of perdi-
tion. […] And now ye know what withholdeth that he might be 
revealed in his time. For the mystery of iniquity doth already 
work: only he who now letteth [ὁ κατέχων] will let, until he be 
taken out of the way.” 13 
13 Quoted from the New King James Version, https://azbyka.ru/biblia/?2Thes.2&acgr. 
Compare a different translation from the New International Version: “the day of the Lord 
[…] will not come until the rebellion occurs and the man of lawlessness is revealed, the 
man doomed to destruction[…]. And now you know what is holding him back, so that he 
may be revealed at the proper time. For the secret power of lawlessness is already at 
work; but the one who now holds it back will continue to do so till he is taken out of the 
way.”
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This is one of the principal texts of an apocalyptic and prophetic char-
acter that says that the coming of the Antichrist (“the son of perdition,” 
“the mystery of iniquity”) and his freedom of action are restrained by “ὁ 
κατέχων.” Since ancient times interpretations of the text have sought above 
all to guess what exactly St. Paul meant by the cryptonym “that which 
withholds,” or “katechon.” Various versions were put forward, with the 
main and long-established version of St. John Chrysostom identifying 
katechon with the Roman state. His argument goes as follows: 
“When the Roman Empire is taken out of the way, then he [the 
Antichrist] shall come. And naturally. For as long as the fear of 
this empire lasts, no one willingly submits himself to the Anti-
christ.” 14 
The identification of katechon with the power of Rome, and the claim that 
Rome prevented the coming of the Antichrist, contributed to the positive 
(re)assessment of the Roman Empire in Orthodox thought (and indeed in 
general Christian thought because this identification was characteristic of 
the Western Church Fathers as well – Irenaeus of Lyon, Tertullian, Augus-
tine). Along with other factors the idea of empire as katechon also con-
tributed to the emerging Byzantine ideology of the sacralization of power. 
Later the so-called Apocalypse of Pseudo-Methodius of Patara 
(7th–8th centuries) linked “the one that withholds” in 2 Thessalonians 
2:6–7 not with the Roman Empire, but with Byzantium (the Greek king-
dom). This early Byzantine prophetic text exerted a considerable impact 
on historical thought in Muscovite Rus. For example, Philotheus of Pskov 
transfers some of the theses of Pseudo-Methodius concerning the Greek 
kingdom to the Moscow tsardom in his writings elaborating the idea of 
the Third Rome. 15 However, neither Philotheus nor other authors treat 
14 St. John Chrysostom, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii v 12 tt., vol. 11, book 2 (Moscow: 
Respublika, 2003), quoted from “Early Church Fathers on the Timing of the Rise  
of Antichrist,” Biblelight.net, http://biblelight.net/fathers-on-antichrist.htm  
http://newadvent.org/fathers/23054.htm.
15 For text and translation of the Apocalypse, see V. M. Istrin, Otkrovenie Mefodiia 
Patarskogo i apokrificheskie videniia Daniila v vizantiiskoi i slavianorusskoi literaturakh: 
Issledovanie i teksty (Moscow, 1897). For an interpretation of “one who withholds” by 
Pseudo-Methodius, see Sinitsyna, Tretii Rim, 265–66.
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the katechon as implying such a transition to Rus. Nowhere – neither in 
Russia, nor in Byzantium, nor in the West – is the text of 2 Thessalonians 
2:3, 6–7 and its concept of “the one who withholds” used as the basis for 
any historiosophic or political-state concepts. They are confined entirely 
to eschatology, remaining within the special genre of apocalyptic prophe-
sies and its main theme, i. e., the Antichrist. This genre is typically highly 
marginal, its authors are isolated figures and its audience is formed by 
ill-educated circles who tend to trust fantasies and easily fall prey to the 
spirit of alarmism and fanaticism. Its content can be described as “con-
crete eschatologism” and an authoritative Orthodox historian claiming to 
be “an apologist for Byzantinism” cannot help issuing this warning: “Con-
crete eschatologism has always easily degenerated into superstition.” 16 
In calm epochs the audience for this genre is small. But there are 
periods when apocalyptic discourse, talk about the Antichrist, “the last 
times,” and “the last kingdom” gain greater prominence, moving from 
the periphery closer to the center of public attention. The cataclysms 
of Russian history in the 20th century inevitably served as a catalyst for 
the interest in apocalyptic discourse. Present-day Russian Byzantinism is 
one of its manifestations and the form it has assumed is centered on the 
idea of the katechon. The idea is elaborated further to link it directly to 
Russia. This “Russian edition” is attributed to Sergey Nilus: part 3 of his 
well-known book The Great in the Small (1905/1911) presents, next to the 
notorious Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a modernized scheme or matrix 
of apocalyptic discourse totally oriented toward Russia as the key actor 
in the final act of world history that is already upon us. 
The pattern is canonical: immediately before the end of world his-
tory the Christian Scriptures predict the coming of the Antichrist, “the 
son of perdition,” and his enthronement; the coming is already approach-
ing (“the mystery of iniquity doth already work”), but it cannot occur as 
long as there is a katechon in the world. The new element is that this kat-
echon can only be provided by Russia. “Russia is the last bulwark.[…] If 
Russia […] becomes remiss in piety then what is predicted in the Apoc-
alypse is sure to happen.” Apocalypticism is concrete and, according to 
16 A. V. Kartashev, Vossozdanie Sviatoi Rusi (Moscow: Stolitsa, 1991).
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Nilus, the katechon is embodied in the leaders of Russian autocracy and 
Orthodoxy. Thus the Antichrist failed to triumph during the European 
troubles in 1848 because 
“autocracy was in the strong hands of Emperor Nicholas I; Ortho-
doxy was safeguarded by the two Filarets, ‘the holy and the wise,’ 
and a cloud of hierarchs like stars in the firmament. St. Paul’s 
‘the one who withholds’, ὁ κατέχων (2 Thessalonians 2:7), had 
not yet been taken out of the way.”
Emperor Alexander III was an equally strong katechon: “Russia and its 
peacemaker tsar were for the whole world what St. Paul designated by 
the word ὁ κατέχων (“the one who withholds”). […] Such is the world sig-
nificance of the reign of Alexander III.” Thereafter the need for the Rus-
sian katechon and its world importance continued to grow because “all 
the efforts of covert and overt, conscious and unconscious servants and 
workers of the Antichrist […] are now directed toward Russia.” In the polit-
ical and state sphere the Antichrist’s servants “strenuously propagate lib-
eralism”: according to the Protocols, the Zion Elders state that “we have 
infected state bodies with liberalism, a lethal poison.” 17 
It is worth noting that although Nilus is extremely focused on Russia, 
his matrix records universal features of a certain type of consciousness: 
fanatical extremism fueled by an eschatological itch and building schemes 
of the end of the world. This type has since been very much in evidence. 
The anti-Semitic part of Nilus’s scheme was taken on board by Nazi doc-
trine and was actively used by Nazi propaganda. Today Nilus’s matrix is 
given a new lease on life by Islamic extremism, based entirely on the Mus-
lim substratum in the framework of the latest traditionalist ideology of 
the Islamic State (IS). The gist of this ideology was thus summed up by an 
IS militant: “This revolution is […] the end of the world preceded, accord-
ing to Hadiths, 18 by the victory over the West in Syria, the revival of the 
17 S. A. Nilus, Velikoe v malom (Novosibirsk: Blagovest, 1994), 373, 365, 386–87, 396, 487.
18 The Hadiths are the collected sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad. 
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Caliphate and the advent of the Prophet Isa [Jesus].” 19 This is an excel-
lent example of the translation of ideological matrices across epochs and 
cultures: the Nilus matrix has traveled from the Christian to the Islamic 
context, from the conservative to the revolutionary discourse, while pre-
serving intact its readily recognizable apocalyptic nucleus. 
Today’s Russian Byzantinism faithfully follows the Nilus matrix in 
reviving the idea of an Orthodox empire. Only two or three undesirable 
details have been dropped such as overt anti-Semitism and lurid pic-
tures of the Serpent creeping over the map of Europe and “eating away 
and devouring all non-Jewish forces.” On the whole, “the idea of the gra-
cious katechon became a commonplace in the milieu of Russian monar-
chists in the 20th century.” 20 A century after the publication of Nilus’s 
book new links have been added to the chain of Russian katechons and 
– take note – this includes even the theomachist Bolshevik regime. V. I. 
Karpets notes that 
“the Soviet Union was heir to the Russian Empire, the Russian 
Empire was heir to the Kingdom of Muscovy and the Kingdom of 
Muscovy to three political-historical entities – the Kievan-Novgo-
rodian Rus of the Ryurikovichi, the Byzantine Orthodox Empire 
and the Eurasian Golden Horde”; 21 
the author stresses that inheritance of the katechonic mission “came with 
the territory.” Some Byzantinist texts openly claim that Stalin was also a 
katechon. Stalin’s empire turns out to be even closer to Byzantium than 
the Petersburg one because the Bolshevik “social experiment brought 
into politics and public life” masses of new people who “carried a pow-
erful charge of traditional Moscow Byzantinism.” 22 There the idea of kat-
echon merges with the current strong nationalistic apologia of Stalinism 
19 M. Efimova, “Konturnaia karta,” Kommersant Vlast, 29 June 2015, no. 25, p. 9, available at: 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2753304.
20 V. Tsimbursky, “Apokalipsis na segodnia,” in Eskhatologicheskii sbornik (St. Petersburg: 
Aleteiia, 2006), 515.
21 V. I. Karpets, “Imperiia neizbezhna,” in Eskhatologicheskii sbornik (St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 
2006), 491.
22 A. V. Efremov, “Dukh surovyi vizantiistva,” Razvitie i ekonomika 4 (2012): 50.
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and the “Red Orthodox project,” which, among other things, is part of the 
motley ideological baggage of today’s Donbass separatists. 
The geopolitical configuration is also changing. Needless to say, the 
servants and workers of the Antichrist still come from the West, but while 
for Nilus their center was “France, the Jewish-dominated nest of the Free-
mason Conspiracy,” today the main spawning ground is America. It has 
already occupied Russia: 
“Russia is directly ruled from America. […] We are an occupied 
territory. […] The system of occupation includes the government 
directed from outside, the agents of influence, grant recipients, 
traitors on various levels and the propaganda machine.” 23 
Its link with the “son of perdition” is obvious: 
“The sinister country on the other side of the ocean […] is assert-
ing its planetary dominance […] over all the Earth’s peoples. Over 
us. […] This is strikingly reminiscent of the prophecies of the 
advent of the Antichrist.” 24 
Furthermore, today’s version of the Nilus matrix aspires to a much higher 
theoretical level. While Nilus wrote religious essays for the public, the 
authors of modern Byzantinism for the most part belong to the scientific 
community and their articles (monographs are few and far between) often 
promote far-reaching conceptual constructions in history, the philosophy 
of history, and political philosophy. The main subjects are Russian and 
Byzantine history; the link between Byzantium and Russia; modern geo-
politics; apologia of imperial principles, monarchy, and autocracy; and 
criticism of Western liberalism. In particular, the case for autocracy is 
made by positing a link between the tsar-autocrat and the katechon, “the 
one who withholds.” 
23 E. A. Fedorov “Esli Rossiia osvoboditsia ot vneshnego upravleniia, to ona avtomaticheski 
stanet derzhavoi nomer odin,” Razvitie i ekonomika 9 (2014): 94, 93, 91.
24 A. G. Dugin, Absoliutnaia rodina (Moscow: Arktogeia, 1999), 657–58.
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As for the theme of empire, its treatment is usually based on a leit-
motif that is often expressed in Tyutchev’s words: “Empires do not die.” 
This is the underlying intuition of Byzantinist imperial thinking that is 
best expressed and justified exactly through the idea of the katechon, 
and today, of the Russian katechon. This line of thinking represents a 
continuous logical chain: the world is threatened by the Antichrist who 
is already at work, ergo to preserve the world and the course of history 
“that which withholds” is needed, the one who withholds can be only an 
empire that is supported by faith in Christ (and also the Roman Empire 
because, according to Luke 2:1–3, it included Christ in its population cen-
sus. “Our Lord was written into Roman power” is the argument of Kosma 
Indikoplov (6th century), which was taken up by Philotheus), therefore, 
the existence of the Russian Orthodox Empire in our day guarantees the 
existence of the world and history. If history is to continue this empire 
has to be. This is the innermost nerve of Russian Byzantinism.
Alas, this does not rule out the fact that the nerve is but a phantom or 
sick nerve, a disease of social consciousness. Quite obviously, the above 
logical chain consists of patently unprovable propositions in all its links 
and all its implications. The majority of them hark back to long-familiar 
stereotypes that form part of the peculiar discourse of end-of-the-world 
prophecies, a prophetic and eschatological discourse of an utterly cryp-
tic, illogical, and obscure nature. This discourse stands apart even in the 
circle of sacral discourses as a direct opposite not only of scientific dis-
course, but of any discourse that is epistemologically clear and transpar-
ent. Meanwhile traditionalists try to make it the basis of their concepts of 
the philosophy of history and political philosophy and develop an ambi-
tious project to determine Russia’s geopolitical strategies. In the process, 
of course, they mix together absolutely incompatible discourses and end 
up with a no-holds-barred free-for-all discourse that provides them with 
the coveted “vacant space.” 
The Antichrist takes on a new role, that of a broad discursive oppor-
tunity. What embodies his threat, from where it may strike, who and what 
contribute to it – all this is totally unknown and unknowable, but tradi-
tionalists discuss it all in a scientific guise and in great detail. In deter-
mining the salutary katechon and pointing a finger at the servants of the 
Antichrist, in executing and pardoning, they comfortably deploy under 
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the screen of Orthodox eschatology their own likes and dislikes, com-
plexes and idiosyncrasies. It is hard to disagree with a critic’s judgment: 
“Modern Byzantine fantasies […] are the narrative of a medical case.” 25
Just one more thing can be added. Without any eschatology, which 
should not be mentioned needlessly, the Antichrist is a fixture of modern 
Russian discourse. Traditionalists trumpet his successes, ascribing to him 
a great role and power in the modern world. In this way they undoubt-
edly inflate his significance and advertise him. But does it not mean that 
they are the servants of the Antichrist in the sphere of public relations?
Conclusions
As we have seen, anatomizing traditionalism supports our preliminary 
assessments. No version of today’s Russian traditionalism and Byzantin-
ism is conducive to genuine insight into tradition and immersion in its 
living experience. They all speculate on tradition in various ways, mainly 
in the field of history and politics, with history leaning toward historio-
sophy and politics leaning toward geopolitics, i. e., areas long favored by 
the authors of way-out para-scientific theories. These speculations have 
certain basic elements. The main method of traditionalism is creating a 
“vacant space” in which it is free to develop its unprovable theories. As 
a rule, the “vacant space” is created by clearing up chunks of historical 
time, past and/or future. A model example is the concept of “primordial 
tradition” that underpins all of “traditionalism in the narrow sense.” It 
adds to the real historical past an imaginary prehistoric stretch its authors 
fill ad libitum, however they like, and using this filling, in light of their 
imagined tradition, the whole picture of the real past is cardinally changed 
and reformatted. In other words, proto-tradition is used to supplant or 
even to steal the past. Thus, in traditionalism-Byzantinism apocalyptic 
and eschatological schemes create a “vacant space” that defies critical 
reason, while interpretations of the Apocalypse are a special genre in 
25 A. Lyusyi, “Vizantiiskii narrative,” Razvitie i ekonomika 4 (2012): 235.
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which fantasies and speculations have always thrived. Modern Byzantin-
ism translates these speculations into a quasi-scientific discourse spawn-
ing futurological concepts and strategies and creating an image or model 
of the future in accordance with a certain apocalyptic scheme. In other 
words, apocalyptic schemes are used to hijack the future. One can argue 
that stealing the past and hijacking the future are the two main operational 
techniques of traditionalism. 
Bearing in mind the assessments given above we can conclude that 
modern traditionalism is a profoundly false form of ideological life. It is 
similar to faking antiquities – faking paintings by old masters, and pieces 
of furniture and artifacts of ancient cultures has long been practiced in 
the world of art and antiquities. One cannot but see that consciousness 
engaged in faking tradition or stylizing as tradition is diametrically oppo-
site to consciousness that has a tradition and is based on tradition. There-
fore traditionalism poses a threat to tradition and tradition needs to be 
protected against traditionalists. 
Lack of intellectual scruple, faking, stylization, mystification, and often 
obscure roots and total fantasy – all this likens traditionalism typologi-
cally and epistemologically to such phenomena as occultism, theosophy, 
anthroposophy, and the New Age subculture. They all share a common 
quality – lack of disciplined thought and cognition, lack of elementary 
methodological culture and, as a consequence, intellectual second-ratism. 
Mikhail Bakhtin in his time noted that such phenomena cannot be first-
rate in principle. One might have thought that one variation of tradition-
alism stands apart from all others and has nothing to do with the criti-
cized features. Moderate Byzantinism focused on political-state aspects 
shies away from fantastic theories, be it proto-tradition or the symbolic 
Serpent with its heads devouring Russia. But on closer inspection that 
version is not much different from the others. As has been said, it is best 
represented by the film The Lesson of Byzantium. This is the comment it 
has drawn from Viktor Zhivov, a world authority on links between Rus-
sia and Byzantium: 
“People who are ignorant of history should refrain from mak-
ing comments on it [history – S. H.] being aware of their igno-
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rance. These words fully apply to […] the film about Byzantium. 
The paradigm its authors construct does not exist in reality.” 26 
So, that too is a fake, the only difference being that this time around it is 
a politically commissioned piece of work without a shadow of mystique. 
The effect is the same: traditionalism invariably brings ignorance and 
inferiority to Russian culture. 
Yet, in spite of all this, traditionalism, and especially Byzantinism, is 
growing stronger and stronger. Its champions are full of confidence: “The 
ideological and socio-political practices of today’s Russia […] will forever 
fall back on Great Russian Byzantinism.” 27 “Byzantinism is emerging as a 
kind of unofficial ideology, an inner metaphysical dimension of the church 
and state life of Russia.” 28 Current Russian reality provides ample grounds 
for such confidence. Pompous celebrations have just been held of the mil-
lennium of the Russian monastic presence on Mount Athos, and this event 
sent a wave of enthusiastic wishes of “Many Years to Basileos Vladimir!” 29 
over the Internet. This gives cause for concern. Marginal shoddy think-
ing that spawns pseudo-scientific and pseudo-mystical theories and sees 
enemies everywhere is coming to the surface and claims to occupy the 
high ground in the country’s ideological life. This is certainly a symptom 
of an unhealthy atmosphere and unhealthy processes in society, a sign of 
a dangerous downgrading of intellectual culture. 
The issue of how to counter this trend is beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, it has to be stressed that modern Orthodox thought is 
fully equipped to answer the challenge of traditionalism. A correct under-
standing of tradition and the art of living inside tradition has been handed 
down from century to century. Today it can be found in the theology of 
culture of Father Georgy Florovsky and in the synergic anthropology that 
develops it today. It consolidates again the old Orthodox paradigm of the 
26 V. M. Zhivov, “‘Issledovanie togo, kak Rossiia sviazana s Vizantiei, dolzhno byt’ tonkim i 
niuansirovannym’: Interv’iu V. M. Zhivova,” Razvitie i ekonomika 4 (2012): 170.
27 A. V. Efremov, “Dukh surovyi vizantiistva,” Razvitie i ekonomika 4 (2012): 51.
28 I. L. Brazhnikov, “Vizantizm: stilizatsiia ili faktor identichnosti?” Razvitie i ekonomika 4 
(2012): 85.
29 This is a clear reference to Vladimir Putin’s rule. 
Sergey Horujy — The Misfortune of Tradition
uibk_kern_stoeckl_postsecular-conflicts_170x220mm_1.4.indd   109 25.05.20   09:19
110 Postsecular Conflicts
Living Tradition: the spiritual tradition is the preservation and passing on 
of the living experience of the Christian’s communion with Christ. It is a 
school of personal spiritual experience, and not an ideology, be it impe-
rial, apocalyptic, or any other. It draws on the spiritual practice of Ortho-
dox hesychasm, and preserving this invigorating and directing link is a 
reliable counterweight to all the manipulations and speculations about 
tradition, all attempts to create ideological fakes, of which modern tradi-
tionalism is one example. Adequate treatment of tradition contrasts with 
traditionalism on yet another important point. Traditionalism is fully in 
the framework of the old philosophical and political thinking based on 
binary oppositions, above all the opposition of tradition and modernity. 
But seeing tradition as a school of living experience that does not make 
an absolute of any entities and institutions prompts an interpretation 
of tradition as creativity, thus paving the way to resolving these opposi-
tions. As leading authorities on philosophy and sociology admit, resolv-
ing the tradition-modernity opposition is a prerequisite for the develop-
ment of society today. Alain Badiou writes: “A situation has to be created 
that escapes this alternative… [the tradition-modernity alternative. – S. H.] 
you must not let yourself be structured by this opposition.” 30 This means 
that unlike the strategies of traditionalism, strategies based on true loy-
alty to the spiritual tradition do not structure new situations of conflict 
and do not increase global threats and risks.
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Andrey Shishkov
Two Understandings of Tradition 
in Russian Orthodox Theology
In order to understand the issue of traditional values in Christian com-
munities such as Russian Orthodoxy, one should first consider the theo-
logical understanding of the concept of “Tradition.” I will examine this 
question primarily from the perspective of Russian Orthodox theology.
In Russian Orthodoxy, ecclesiastical Tradition (Traditsiia) is also 
called Predanie. Etymologically, the word predanie indicates the trans-
mission (peredacha) of a thing or idea. There is no substantive difference 
in Orthodoxy between the meanings of traditsiia and predanie. The Rus-
sian Orthodox Church employs these terms synonymously.
When discussing the ecclesiastical understanding of Tradition, one 
should distinguish what could be called “Living Tradition” from vari-
ous conceptions of tradition that are constructs of theological thought. 
“Living Tradition” is a non-reflexive narrative of an uninterrupted trans-
mission of church experience and practices. The religious consciousness 
absorbed in “Living Tradition” does not give a second thought to the ori-
gins of this tradition. One could imagine “Living Tradition” in the form of 
a chain. As a rule, the bearer of “Living Tradition” does not see the begin-
ning of this chain or even the places where its links are joined, but has a 
sense of communion in the chain. From this perspective, people gener-
ally consider as traditional the experience of the immediately preceding 
historical period and not the earlier periods of church history, because 
the comprehension of the earlier periods requires reflection and the con-
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structed work of the imagination. Thus, in modern Russian Orthodoxy, 
people consider many practices traditional that only relate to the recent 
past (say, the 1970s to 1990s) and that were considered new and occasion-
ally even avant-garde when they first appeared (for example, frequently 
partaking of the Eucharist at a church service 1). This “Living Tradition” 
could also be called “Fluid Tradition,” since it is constantly changing, but 
its bearers, being immersed within the flow, do not sense the changes or 
discontinuities.
In Orthodoxy, the conceptualization of Tradition is a reaction to the 
emergence of historical criticism and historicism. In antiquity and in the 
medieval period, theologians worked with all available sources without 
distinguishing any historical stages of development. Of course, Holy Scrip-
ture has always had a special status, but the works of the Church Fathers 
were considered as if they were all “contemporaries.” The well-known 
formula of St. Vincent of Lérins, who defines the catholicity of the church, 
comes to mind: Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est 
(that faith that has been believed everywhere, always, and by all). That 
formula contains no historical time. The Fathers of various periods of 
church history seem to be on equal footing.
With the emergence of a historical consciousness in the modern era, 
historical criticism, which subjected the medieval conception of Tradi-
tion to deconstruction, gained momentum. Placing creedal and theological 
sources into their historical context allowed for the exposure of discon-
tinuities and contradictions in the course of the historical development 
of ecclesiastical thought, which brought into question the very notion of 
catholicity. Under the weight of historical criticism, “that which has been 
believed everywhere, always, and by all” was stripped of integrity, which 
until then had been an essential attribute of catholicity. 
It was in the context of modernism that various conceptions of tra-
dition, which represented various methods for unifying the historical 
with the universal (catholic), began to emerge. A search for the “living 
and mysterious thread binding the whole historical fullness of Church 
1 Today in the Russian Church, it has become the norm to partake of the Eucharist once or 
twice a month, while in the imperial period the usual practice was to have communion 
several times per year (usually at the end of each of the four fasts).
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life into one catholic whole” 2 became the task of theologians. Accord-
ing to Florovsky, Holy Tradition is “a concrete expression of the Church’s 
catholic self-consciousness,” and in a similar vein, he wrote, “The Chris-
tian Faith is essentially historical and historically concrete.” 3 
Jaroslav Pelikan, an American theologian and church historian who 
converted late in life from Protestantism to Orthodoxy, wrote, 
“Tradition without history has homogenized all the stages of 
development into one statically defined truth; history without 
tradition has produced a historicism that relativized the devel-
opment of Christian doctrine in such a way as to make the dis-
tinction between authentic growth and cancerous aberration 
seem completely arbitrary.” 4 
Attempts to conceptualize Tradition can be divided into two basic 
approaches that I will call liberal and conservative. The liberalism and 
conservatism of the two approaches should be understood relatively; they 
are liberal or conservative only in relation to each other. Similar designa-
tions are in no way connected with political liberalism or political con-
servatism. Many authors who have worked within the liberal paradigm of 
Tradition have been rather conservative politically and culturally. Propo-
nents of both approaches agree with one another in their view that one 
can only discuss Holy Tradition in the context of the life of the Church. 
Tradition is maintained in the Church by the Holy Spirit and is actualized 
by each member while experiencing the life of Christ. The two approaches 
differ in their definition of authentic Tradition, their method for working 
with Tradition, and their stated criteria for belonging to that Tradition.
The liberal conception of Tradition distinguishes the unchanging 
substantive core that expresses the true essence of the Christian faith 
2 George Florovsky, “The Catholicity of the Church,” in The Collected Works of George 
Florovsky, Vol. 1, ed. Richard S. Haugh (Vaduz: Büchervertriebsanstalt, 1987), 45. 
3 Georgii Florovskii, “Bogoslovskie otryvki,” Put’ 31 (1931): 23; Florovskii, “Dom Otchii,” Put’ 
7 (1927): 65.
4 Jaroslav Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100–600) (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1971), 9.
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from the temporary strata that are determined by historical context and 
that frequently overshadow or obscure this core. Proponents of the lib-
eral paradigm consider this unchanging core to be the true Church Tra-
dition to which it is imperative to return. The liberal approach proposes 
a free, critical rethinking of Church Tradition by (1) separating out and 
describing the core of the Christian faith, (2) purifying it from elements 
that obscure it, and (3) returning to the authentic foundation of the faith 
through the actualization of the unchanging core in modern times. Here, 
the instrument for the construction of Tradition is theological reason, 
which distinguishes the unchanging core of the faith, compares it to var-
ious elements of Church Tradition, and from this perspective considers 
the current state of the church. Significantly, the liberal approach to Tra-
dition requires the freedom to theologize while taking into account the 
results of historical criticism. 
As Russian theologian and social thinker George Fedotov writes: 
“The Church’s Holy Tradition is included within the common 
stream of historical tradition, which is ever complex, ever neb-
ulous, and humanly interwoven in verity and falsity. Just as sin 
resides within human righteousness (holiness), so falsity resides 
within human tradition – and even in ecclesiastical tradition. 
The task of moral askesis consists in the pruning of sin and in 
the process of a person’s sanctification. The task of theology 
consists in the release of the pure first principles of Holy Tra-
dition from under the historical dross that has built up in time 
alongside religious gains.” 5
Examples of the liberal approach to Tradition are theological projects like 
the Eucharistic ecclesiology of Fr. Nicholas Afanasiev and the liturgical 
theology of Fr. Alexander Schmemann. In each case, the aforementioned 
theologians make an attempt to ascertain the core of the Christian faith 
and to separate it from the historically conditioned strata, which they char-
acterize as a distortion of Tradition. For example, Schmemann examines 
5 Georgii Fedotov, “Pravoslavie i istoricheskaia Kritika,” Put’ 33 (1932): 4.
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the Divine Service as the source of theological thought. Yet, with this in 
mind, he states that it is necessary to return to the authentic (traditional) 
understanding of the Liturgy as an eschatological event. He writes, 
“The Divine Liturgy should once more be interpreted as the lei­
tourgia of the Church, and this is the theologian’s task. But in 
order to resolve this task, we need to discover the true Liturgi-
cal Tradition again, and this is the liturgist’s task. If the work of 
the theologian is to purify the Divine Liturgy, the work of the 
Divine Liturgy is to return to theology that eschatological full-
ness, which only the Divine Liturgy can ‘actualize.’” 6 
Here, we see the merging of the work of the theologian and the histo-
rian (the liturgist).
The conservative approach to Tradition consists of the adoption of 
the accumulated church heritage. From this point of view, Tradition itself 
can be depicted as a cloud (or “cloud storage”), in which private theo-
logical opinions, practices, and traditions (with a little “t”) are located 
alongside the foundational truths of the faith. The conservative concep-
tion of Tradition does not assume the existence of “an external criterion” 
that defines affiliation with Holy Tradition. This criterion is a personal 
mystical-religious experience in which one meditates upon the aspects 
of Tradition “through the feat of prayer, through the spiritual develop-
ment of the believing personality, [and] through living communion with 
the eternal experience of the Church.” 7 Florovsky further writes, “The 
identity of experience is loyalty to Tradition.” 8 In other words, the com-
prehension of ecclesiastical Tradition occurs not on the basis of an anal-
ysis of Tradition and the subsequent synthesis of a theological position, 
but through the reinforcement of an experience that is considered simi-
lar to that of the Holy Fathers.
6 Aleksandr Schmemann, “Bogoslovie i liturgicheskoe predanie,” in Sobranie statei,  
1947–1983 (Moscow: Russkii Put’, 2009), 230.
7 Florovskii, “Dom Otchii,” 82.
8 Florovsky, “The Catholicity of the Church,” 49.
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If in the liberal approach, the basic instrument of work with Tradition 
is theological reason, in the conservative approach it is mystical-religious 
intuition. This intuition allows one to understand whether any particular 
theological opinion relates to Tradition or not. In such an approach, the-
ology’s task is preservation. Theology goes beyond the cloud’s bounda-
ries and works to excise heterodox elements if they suddenly float to the 
surface. In light of such an orientation, “preservation theology” is preoc-
cupied more with the search for and exposure of heresy than with free 
theologizing and the synthesizing of theological conceptions.
Florovsky writes, 
“Theologizing in its roots should be intuitive, defined as the expe­
rience of faith [and] vision, and not as a self-satisfying dialectic 
movement of inert abstract concepts. For in general, dogmas of 
faith are the truths of experience, the truths of life, and they can 
and should be revealed not through logical synthesis or analy-
sis, but only through spiritual life, through the presence of tes-
tified dogmatic definitions of experience. At the basis of Ortho-
dox ‘theological opinions’ and judgments there should lie not a 
[logical] conclusion but direct vision, contemplation.” 9 
Florovsky directly attacks the approach I called “liberal” above: 
Mistaken and untrue is that theological minimalism, which 
wants to choose and set apart the “most important, most cer-
tain, and most binding” of all the experience and teachings of the 
Church. This is a false path, and a false statement of the ques-
tion. Of course, not everything in the historical institutions of 
the Church is equally important and venerable; not everything 
in the empirical actions of the Church has even been sanctioned. 
There is much that is only historical. However, we have no out-
ward criterion to discriminate between the two. The methods 
of outward historical criticism are inadequate and insufficient. 
9 Florovskii, “Dom Otchii,” 82.
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Only from within the Church can we discern the sacred from 
the historical. From within we see what is catholic and belongs 
to all time, and what is only “theological opinion,” or even a sim-
ple casual historical accident. 10
An example of the conservative approach to Tradition is the theologi-
cal project of the neo-patristic synthesis proposed by Georges Florovsky 
and developed further by Vladimir Lossky, Fr. John Meyendorff, Metro-
politan Kallistos Ware, and today by Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeyev, Fr. 
John Behr, and others. At present, this project has become dominant in 
Orthodox theology.
I have to note one apparent peculiarity in Florovsky’s position. In 
his work The Ways of Russian Theology, he subjects all Russian theologi-
cal thought that emerged outside the influence of Byzantine theology to 
a devastating criticism. To him, the theological tradition that took shape 
from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries proved to be irrelevant. He 
calls this “Western captivity” and “pseudomorphosis” – a distortion and 
perversion. According to Nikolai Berdyaev, “Florovsky [in The Ways of 
Russian Theology] essentially denies everyone, all Russian theology and 
philosophical thought, everywhere condemns Western influence.” 11 How 
does such a position correspond with the conservative approach to Tra-
dition? Since one’s affiliation with Tradition is determined by a religious 
feeling, Florovsky feels that Russian theology of the seventeenth to nine-
teenth centuries does not reflect the Tradition of the Church: 
“The crisis of Russian Byzantinism in the sixteenth century was 
also a departure of Russian thought from the patristic tradition. 
[…] In theology, the patristic style and method were lost. […] It is 
not enough to be acquainted with the texts and to know how to 
draw quotes and arguments from them. One should possess the 
theology of the Fathers from within. Intuition is perhaps more 
10 Florovsky, “The Catholicity of the Church,” 50.
11 Nikolai Berdiaev, “Ortodoksiia i chelovechnost’,” Put’ 53 (1937): 61–62.
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important for this than erudition, for intuition alone revives 
their writings and makes them a witness.” 12
Florovsky excludes Russian theological thought from ecclesiastical Tra-
dition like an editor cuts a film. Pseudomorphosis cannot be part of the 
Holy Tradition, which means that it should be deleted, as should other 
heresies and distortions. “Preservation theology” ensures that such ele-
ments are excised. For this reason, Florovsky’s position fits well within 
the conservative approach to Tradition. Florovsky says: 
“The retrieval of patristic style is the first and main postulate of 
the Russian theological renaissance. I do not mean a mere ‘res-
toration,’ repetition, or going back. At any rate, ‘to the Fathers’ 
always means forward, not backward. I am talking of being faith-
ful to the patristic spirit, not the letter.” 13
Other proponents of the conservative approach to Tradition are not as rad-
ical as Florovsky. They consider both Russian imperial and Soviet works 
within “Tradition.” The works of all theologians and ecclesiastical writers 
ever glorified into the Communion of Saints automatically fall within the 
confines of Holy Tradition. Those who hold a conservative approach to 
Tradition create various notions of the consensus patrum, which are called 
upon to remove contradictions of opinion between the Holy Fathers. In 
its extreme expression, the conservative approach to Tradition is return-
ing to a medieval understanding in which history is absent.
In modern Russian Orthodoxy, the conservative paradigm of relat-
ing to Tradition dominates. The Russian Orthodox Church formulates 
its attitude toward the modern world within this paradigm. Yet, in my 
view, the problem with such an approach and the “preservation theology” 
associated with it consists in the way its theo-analytical toolkit is subor-
dinate to the task of unmasking heresies. “Preservation theology” does 
not offer a positive program of a theological apprehension of the day-to-
12 Georgii Florovskii, Puti russkogo bogosloviia (Minsk: Izdatel’stvo Belorusskogo 
Ekzarkhata, 2006), 495–96.
13 Ibid., 496. 
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day realities of the modern world and their correlation to Church Tradi-
tion. Such a position is inherently reactionary.
And although Florovsky claimed that we should create a new theology 
that would apprehend the day-to-day realities of the modern world “in 
the spirit of the Fathers,” neither he nor his successors could offer a con-
vincing social and political theology. Today’s proponents of the neo-pa-
tristic synthesis see their task entirely as the retrieval and compilation 
of the Fathers’ opinions from the entire mass of the sacred patristic leg-
acy in order to explain modern processes. Such an approach to theology 
makes it completely irrelevant to the very realities of life in which the 
Church exists.
For example, today’s Russian Orthodoxy believes that monarchic pol-
ity better corresponds to Orthodoxy than does democracy (and this is 
on record, including in the church’s official documents). This has taken 
place because the vast majority of the Church Fathers lived under mon-
archy, and some of them justified it from theological positions; but one 
can only count on one hand the number of saints who would have written 
in defense of democracy. Yet, the restoration of monarchy in its medieval 
understanding is already impossible, since it has long been impossible to 
deny the modernist idea of the sovereignty of the people as a source of 
power in the state.
The irrelevance of the conclusions of “preservation theology” leads 
believers to some form of alienation from ecclesiastical doctrinal authority. 
Believers thus search for answers to their questions “on the side,” turn-
ing to secular notions and explanatory strategies. They do not understand 
why monarchy is good, but democracy, human rights, and capitalism are 
bad. Is it merely because the latter did not exist in the times of the Church 
Fathers? At the recent Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church 
in Crete, participants seriously discussed the question of whether it was 
permissible to utilize the term “human person” (prosopon) in church doc-
uments dedicated to social issues. 14 One of the obvious proponents of the 
neo-patristic synthesis, Metropolitan Hierotheos Vlachos, explained the 
14 “The Mission of the Orthodox Church in Today’s World,” Holy and Great Council of the 
Orthodox Church, accessed 30 August 2017, https://www.holycouncil.org/-/mission-
orthodox-church-todays-world?_101_INSTANCE_VA0WE2pZ4Y0I_languageId=en_US.
uibk_kern_stoeckl_postsecular-conflicts_170x220mm_1.4.indd   120 25.05.20   09:19
121
problem by stating that the Holy Fathers never used the term person in 
their writings. 15
A second problem facing “preservation theology” is that one cannot 
even call it “theology” in the strictest sense of the word. The most essen-
tial thing – the theological element – is missing from this stance. This the-
ology does not correspond to God, but to a sacralized historical tradition 
that exists “in this age” – the saeculum. In one sense, it represents a sec-
ularized form of religious thought. The example of the debates around 
the human person wonderfully illustrates this point. In the case of Met-
ropolitan Hierotheos, a commitment to historical tradition has won out 
over a theological approach. He rejected the term “human person” not 
because there can be no theological content within it, but because the 
Greek Holy Fathers did not ever use it. As a result, the Church continues 
to speak with believers in a little-understood, archaic language. 
The absence of a relevant contemporaneity of theology does not allow 
believers to occupy any kind of theological position in relation to the 
problems and conclusions of the modern world. Moreover, this void in 
the place of theology actually becomes a position. And this is a common 
problem for today’s Orthodox socio-religious thought, from representa-
tives of the church leadership to popular publicists.
The liberal conception of Tradition looks more optimistic in this 
respect. It allows one to freely theologize with a reliance upon the unchang-
ing core of the Christian faith and offers theological solutions in the lan-
guage of its time, under the condition of maintaining the crucial meanings 
of the Christian religion. Certainly, one should separate one’s own reli-
gious thoughts here from that which could be called the cultural identity 
of Christianity. The latter could be deeply rooted within Tradition, but 
that said, it does not relate to the basic principle of the Christian faith – 
human salvation – and may even contradict it. In the final analysis, it is the 
salvation of the human person for eternity, and not the defense of a cul-
tural identity of Christianity, that should be the priority for the Christians.
15 See more about this discussion: Paul Ladouceur, “Human Beings or Human Persons?” 
Public Orthodoxy, accessed 30 August 2017, https://publicorthodoxy.org/2017/06/06/
human-beings-or-persons/. 
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Aristotle Papanikolaou
I Am a Traditionalist,  
Therefore I Am *
Amidst the culture wars, the word “traditionalist” has gained currency and 
has been co-opted in a variety of ways. Broadly, it is a self-naming mostly 
by those who identify as religious and are seemingly faithful to their reli-
gious tradition in the face of attacks either against religion in general or 
by others within their religious tradition who challenge various givens 
of that tradition. For the Orthodox Christian crowd, a very simple exam-
ple would suffice: a self-named traditionalist would typically oppose the 
ordination of women to the diaconate, while a non-traditionalist – usu-
ally called, pejoratively, a liberal – might challenge the givenness of the 
non-ordination of women. 1
An extension of “traditionalist” is “traditional values,” which has 
come to mean a very select set of “values” related to gender and sexuality. 
“Traditional values” has very recently become a transnational slogan that 
cuts across the East-West divide, since there are Westerners (American 
Evangelicals) making alliances with Easterners (Russian Orthodox actors) 
1 AnnMarie Mecera et al., “Toward a Reasoned and Respectful Conversation about 
Deaconesses,” Public Orthodoxy, 17 April 2018, https://publicorthodoxy.org/2018/04/17/
conversation-about-deaconesses/.
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in order to advance “traditional values” through established national and 
international legal structures.
The meaning of “traditional values” has been further amplified with 
the neologism “Orthodox morality.” 2 I say neologism, because never in 
the history of Christianity – at least Orthodox Christianity – has the word 
“Orthodox” functioned as an adjective for “morality.” Never. This neolo-
gism has a very non-traditionalist – dare I say, modern – ring to it. 3 It may 
appeal to those attracted to a version of the so-called “Benedict Option,” 
but this Donatist logic of purity was condemned a long time ago.
My thesis is very simple: the use of the word “traditionalist” and 
its derivative forms (“Orthodox morality,” “traditional values”) is philo-
sophically untenable, i. e., it’s wrong. Why? Because we are all tradition-
alists. How? Because it is impossible to exist as a human being without 
tradition. Put another way, traditionless existence is impossible. Put yet 
another way, humans exist not simply in and through, but as tradition.
If this thesis is unexpected, what may be more shocking is the fact 
that it’s actually been around for a long time; I’m definitely not the first to 
articulate it. I’m simply repeating an axiom that has gained a fairly wide 
philosophical consensus and was probably most famously articulated by 
the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, whose work many of the so-called 
traditionalists appropriate. 4 They do so selectively, because they fail to 
mention that for MacIntyre, everything is tradition, even the liberalism 
against which the “traditionalists” self-define. The fact that liberal democ-
racy itself is a tradition sustained by particular civic practices was defin-
itively shown by the Princeton philosopher, Jeffrey Stout. 5
At this point, a “traditionalist” might accept that all is tradition and 
that we are all traditionalists but would probably argue that the use of 
2 Rod Dreher, “Male and Female He Did Not Create Them,” The American Conservative,  
3 February 2016, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/dreher/male-female-god-
transgender/.
3 George Demacopoulos, “‘Traditional Orthodoxy’ as a Postcolonial Movement,” The 
Journal of Religion 97, no. 4 (2017): 475–99. 
4 Aristotle Papanikolaou, “Tradition as Reason and Practice: Amplifying Contemporary 
Orthodox Theology in Conversation with Alasdair Macintyre,” St. Vladimir’s Theological 
Quarterly 59, no. 1 (2015): 91–104.
5 Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,  
in association with Hebrew Union College Press, Cincinnati, 2004).
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the word “traditionalist” is meant specifically against those who identify 
with the shared religious tradition but are trying to change it in order to 
adapt to the current culture and to be more relevant. They might con-
clude that those who argue, for example, that women should be ordained 
to the diaconate contaminate the Orthodox tradition with godless liberal 
tradition. This approach would actually be more philosophically and the-
ologically tenable, but if that is what’s being claimed, then the word “tra-
ditionalist” needs an adjective, like “pure,” in order to indicate what kind 
of traditionalism is being evoked.
This argument, however, is still not quite reflective of the reality. 
How would one describe someone who practices Orthodox Christian-
ity faithfully, accepts the authority of the dogmatic proclamations of the 
Ecumenical Councils, believes that Jesus is fully divine and fully human, 
that God became human so that humans can become gods (theosis), and 
on the basis of these particular “traditional” beliefs argues that discus-
sion and change are possible within the tradition on issues of, say, gen-
der and sexuality? If there is no such thing as traditionless thinking, and 
if these arguments are being made based on thinking in and through the 
beliefs of the Orthodox tradition, is this not “Orthodox traditionalism”?
One could argue that simply making claims about gender and sex-
uality is an infiltration of a mutually exclusive tradition. But how is that 
the case if the arguments made are actually based on theological princi-
ples and beliefs constitutive of Orthodoxy? And if one claims that the very 
fact that we are discussing these issues is only because of liberalism, then 
the counterargument is the historical fact that there were Pagan philoso-
phers challenging Christian thinkers with questions. If, in fact, the source 
of the questions disqualifies those very questions, then on that basis, the 
entire history of Christian thought should be rejected.
What these “traditionalists” often forget or choose to ignore is that 
Alasdair MacIntyre explicitly stated that while traditions themselves are 
often differentiated by distinct epistemic presuppositions, a tradition must 
open itself to all questions and challenges if it is to survive as a tradition. 
The viability of a tradition will depend on how well it can answer the 
challenges and questions of a particular era while incorporating the best 
insights of a rival tradition in a way that does not threaten the internal 
coherency of the tradition. This does not mean a tradition must change 
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its givens; but, if those givens fail to be credible responses on the basis of 
the tradition’s own non-negotiable presuppositions, then that tradition 
will, in fact, not survive.
What the word “traditionalist” muddles is the real debate, which is not 
whether one is a traditionalist or non-traditionalist, faithful or non-faith-
ful. The fault line exists at the disagreement over the implications of pre-
suppositions or beliefs held in common by those who adhere to the tradi-
tion. To return to our example, when I argue that the Orthodox Church 
should allow women deacons, it’s not to make Orthodoxy more relevant, 
but it’s because there does not exist a good theological argument con-
sistent with the belief in God’s Incarnation (which includes the Cross 
and Resurrection) that would preclude women serving the Church in 
this way. That would also serve as my guiding light when thinking about 
issues of sexuality.
One thing is for certain: the non-religious would, at least, consider 
me a traditionalist; but their use of the term is simply the flip side of the 
bad religious use of the term. Again, it’s not about being a traditionalist 
versus a non-traditionalist; it’s about identifying what kind of tradition-
alist we are. For the record, I am an Incarnational traditionalist. I sus-
pect those with whom I disagree on what is discussable in the Orthodox 
tradition share this epistemic presupposition. Our real debate is over the 
acceptable amount of diversity that can exist among those who share a 
common dogmatic tradition.
We should, thus, recognize our common presuppositions and affirm 
those common presuppositions, especially the dogmas, as ground rules 
for debate. We need to stop using words like “traditionalist,” “traditional 
values,” and “Orthodox morality,” which only obfuscate what we share in 
common or, at worst, become rhetorical tools for demonization. These 
words are conversation stoppers, which, for anyone who knows the his-
tory of Christianity, is actually antithetical to the living Tradition.
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Sergey Chapnin
The Rhetoric of Traditional 
Values in Contemporary Russia
Although the notion of “traditional values” has recently become popular 
in Russia, it is actually a new phenomenon in both religious and politi-
cal discourse. In the 1990s, the most common and established use of the 
word “values” was with adjectives such as “spiritual” and “moral,” while 
the word “traditional” was mostly attributed to religions.
In a certain sense, the very concept of “spiritual and moral values” 
was used as a transitory one. Having emerged between the 1980s and the 
1990s as an antithesis to Communist values, this concept was neverthe-
less based on an understanding of spirituality that was exceptionally wide 
and could not be limited exclusively to the Orthodox framework. 
As a result, the new social and political situation required a clarifi-
cation of notions and definitions.
One can trace the use of the concept of “traditional values” in the 
Orthodox context with a high level of certainty. For several years (2000–
2012), it was used only by Metropolitan Kirill and a circle of publicists 
around the WRPC 1. Yet, even in this milieu, it took a while for the notion 
to take root. In an extended collection of articles and speeches published 
1 The World Russian People’s Council (WRPC) – a public forum founded in 1993 and 
patronized by Kirill (Gundyaev), then the metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, who 
has been the patriarch of Moscow and all Russia since 2009; the WRPC plays the role of 
the main Orthodox think tank.
Kristina Stoeckl, Dmitry Uzlaner (Eds.):
Postsecular Conflicts
© 2020 innsbruck university press
ISBN 978-3-903187-99-3, DOI 10.15203/3187-99-3
uibk_kern_stoeckl_postsecular-conflicts_170x220mm_1.4.indd   128 25.05.20   09:19
129Sergey Chapnin — The Rhetoric of Traditional Values in Contemporary Russia
in 2008, Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, the closest assistant to Metropoli-
tan Kirill, uses the expression “traditional values” only three times, with 
one of those being a hybrid: “traditional, spiritual and moral values.” 2 
In the wider church context outside of Metropolitan Kirill’s circle, the 
concept of traditional values was not in use and went largely undetected. 
Only much later, somewhere around 2010, did politicians begin to use 
this expression, following Vladimir Putin. 
Such a remarkable gap indicates that at that time the Metropolitan 
Kirill’s ideas did not have much influence even within the Russian Ortho-
dox Church. His statements did not influence the public and political 
sphere and rarely caused a serious reaction in Russian society until they 
became an element of state ideology and, by extension, state propaganda.
Kirill (Gundyaev):  
Traditional Values 1.0
It is relatively easy to trace when the rhetoric of traditional values made 
its grand entrance into the agenda of the Russian Orthodox Church. Met-
ropolitan Kirill (Gundyaev) wrote the crucial text for understanding the 
church’s approach to this subject, an article titled “Norms of Faith as 
Norms of Life,” published in Nezavisimaia Gazeta in February 2000. 3 
In the article, Metropolitan Kirill used the term “traditional values” for 
the first time, explicitly contrasting it with liberal values. In fact, he rein-
troduced the ideological model of a clash between two “global systems” 
that are engaged in a “cold war” of sorts, if not in an open conflict: “The 
fundamental antagonism of our age and at the same time the key chal-
lenge for the humanity of the 21st century is the opposition between lib-
eral civilizational standards and the values of cultural and religious iden-
2 Vsevolod Chaplin, Tserkov’ v Rossii: Obstoiatel’stva mesta i vremeni (Moscow: Izdatel’skii 
Sovet Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi, Arefa, 2008), 137.
3 Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, “Norma very kak norma zhizni,” 
Nezavisimaia gazeta, 16 February 2000, http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2000-02-16/8_norma.html. 
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tity.” 4Metropolitan Kirill claimed that it is not enough to discuss these 
conflicts on an inter-state level with the aim of establishing a just world 
order. The conflict between liberals and traditionalists is based on how 
the different actors interpret individual human rights and on how they 
view modern society as a whole. Metropolitan Kirill has no doubt that the 
liberal doctrine leads to “the liberation of the potential of sin in a person” 
and that “it would not be an exaggeration to characterize that doctrine 
as anti-Christian.” 5
Hence, he draws two main conclusions. He addresses the first con-
clusion to society, framing it as a rather mild proposal to form a model of 
behavior and social fabric “that would allow interaction between liberal 
and traditional ideas and values.” Acknowledging that this is an extraor-
dinarily difficult task, Metropolitan Kirill goes on to call for cooperation 
between “other traditional religions, all sound forces in our society that 
love Russia and wish it well, and the Russian Orthodox Church, first of 
all with its theologians.” The main goal of this cooperation is “to help 
the modern man in grasping the meaning of tradition as the norm-form-
ing factor that defines the values system including the cultural, spiritual, 
and moral orientation of a person and of society.” 6 Metropolitan Kirill 
addresses his second, much bolder, conclusion to the Russian state: 
If currently liberal thought is used as a basis for the country’s 
public and social development model, then, in full compliance 
with the liberal principle of checks and balances, it must be coun­
tered with a policy of introducing a system of values that are tra-
ditional for Russia into the upbringing of youth, education, and 
interpersonal relationship formation. Thus, the issue of shap-
ing legislation, education, culture, social relations, and public 
morals is, in fact, a matter of preservation of our national civili-
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in the global community of nations and of survival as an Ortho-
dox nation. 7
At the time, Metropolitan Kirill was relatively alone in his criticism of lib-
eralism. His efforts saw no support from Patriarch Alexy, the Synod, or 
any other hierarchs. Yet, he did not seem bothered by this lack of back-
ing. Metropolitan Kirill had to wait another twelve years for the state’s 
clear and positive reaction to his call.
Paradoxes of Tradition
In light of Kirill’s premise that “today, in the context of globalization, 
the main danger comes from the destruction of tradition as the mecha-
nism of passing on values from generation to generation,” 8 the Ortho-
dox Church has expended tremendous effort to endorse and reinforce 
these mechanisms.
However, the result turned out to be paradoxical. In Russian society 
today, it is not an interest in the Christian tradition that is growing, but 
rather an interest in the heritage of the Soviet past. And this is under-
standable, since Russian society is highly secular and detached from the 
Christian tradition as it is understood by the Orthodox Church. The only 
living tradition in Russia is, in fact, the Soviet tradition. Busying them-
selves with fortifying the mechanisms of passing on “traditional values,” 
Patriarch Kirill and the Orthodox Church hierarchy seem to have failed 
to notice or consider this fact.
This long-term endeavor to impose traditional values has led to a 
surge in an interest in the Soviet past: 
 − Soviet-era repressions are being justified by an overemphasis on the 
achievements of the Soviet period;
7 Ibid.
8 Patriarch Kirill, “Khristianskoe ponimanie svobody v sovremennom obshchestve,” 
Tserkov’ i vremia 2, no. 51 (2010), cited from: https://mospat.ru/church-and-time/410. 
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 − Persecutors of the church, most notably Stalin himself, have received 
positive attention and “icons” of them have even been painted though 
officially these “icons” were not recognized by the church;
 − Church spokespeople admit that the church has always collaborated 
with the state, even with the Communist and atheistic one; 9
 − Secular and church traditions comingle: wherever possible, clergy at 
all levels, from the patriarch to regular priests, lay wreaths at eternal 
flames (in the Russian context this is not just a secular, but clearly a 
Soviet tradition), and in 2015, some even attempted to bring eternal 
flames into churches and light candles from this fire;
Orthodox ideology is being framed to replace the collapsed Commu-
nist ideology. Any attempts to question this peculiar fusion of traditions 
incite a defensive reaction from the church.
Vladimir Putin:  
Traditional Values 2.0
Only a year after the UN Human Rights Council had to admit that there 
was no common definition of traditional values, 10 Vladimir Putin made 
the decision to include those values in his political agenda. In his official 
address to the Federal Assembly after his third inauguration in 2012, he 
outlined a new approach:
Today, many nations are revising their moral values and ethical 
norms, eroding ethnic traditions and differences between peo-
ples and cultures. Society is now required not only to recognize 
everyone’s right to the freedom of conscience political views, 
9 “Vakhtang Kipshidze on Conflict Zone,” Deutsche Welle, 26 April 2017,  
https://www.dw.com/en/vakhtang-kipshidze-on-conflict-zone/av-38593214.
10 “Why the Fuss? Understanding the Human Rights Councils Resolution on Traditional 
Values,” International Justice Resource Center, 8 October 2012, https://ijrcenter.
org/2012/10/08/why-the-fuss-understanding-the-human-rights-councils-resolution-
on-traditional-values/. 
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and privacy, but also to accept without question the equality of 
good and evil, strange as it seems, concepts that are opposite 
in meaning. This destruction of traditional values from above 
not only leads to negative consequences for society, but is also 
essentially anti-democratic, since it is carried out on the basis of 
abstract, speculative ideas, contrary to the will of the majority, 
which does not accept the changes occurring or the proposed 
revision of values. 11
The terminology used in that speech became a key formula for his future 
political rhetoric. It is chock-full of path-breaking elements:
1. It shifts the accent from cultural issues to moral and ethical issues;
2. It directly discusses the topic of good versus evil;
3. It criticizes other countries without mentioning any country in par-
ticular;
4. It uses military rhetoric (the key word used alongside “traditional 
values” is “destruction”);
5. It claims to express “the popular will of the majority.”
A week after that speech, Vladimir Putin, while answering questions from 
CNN’s Jill Dougherty, effectively acknowledged that this was a new empha-
sis for him (and for Russia):
As for our traditional values, I seriously believe we should devote 
more attention to them. In the Soviet Union there was just one 
ideology dominating. And no matter what our attitude to it is, 
there were rather simple, comprehensible, or even quasi-reli-
gious values. If you read the code of the builders of Communism, 
it is a pale copy of the Bible: do not kill, do not steal, do not 
covet your neighbor’s wife. In the Communism builder’s code 
there’s everything but poorly articulated and extremely short-
11 Vladimir Putin, “Poslanie Prezidenta Federal’nomu Sobraniiu,” Prezident Rossii: 
Ofitsial’nyi sait, 12 December 2013, http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/
transcripts/19825. 
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ened. […] The new generation of Russian citizens, our young 
people do not know what it is. Yet, it can only be replaced with 
these traditional values. Without such values societies degrade. 
We must return to them, understand their worth and on their 
basis move forward. 12
Putin’s reply contains an important addition to the words from Scripture, 
marking the outline of a new internal policy based on traditional values: 
1. Attention to traditional values is directly linked to the ongoing crisis of 
Russian identity (the Communist builder’s code has passed away, but 
it has never been replaced with anything new);
2. One must “return” to traditional values, and only then would one be 
able to “move forward”;
3. Despite his pronouncement of a conservative program, the task of the 
program is development. 
A few months earlier, Putin had framed this even more clearly: “Conserv-
atism relies on traditional values but with an obligatory element being 
aimed at development.” 13
However, a claim to support traditional values means not only active 
efforts toward the growth of such values, but also a battle against those 
who are perceived to stand against those values. The president of Rus-
sia has no doubt that the modern world is at war against traditional val-
ues, which are being diluted, 14 depreciated, 15 humiliated, and mocked. 16 
12 “Press-konferentsiia Vladimira Putina,” Prezident Rossii: Ofitsial’nyi sait, 19 December 
2013, http://special.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19859.
13 Vladimir Putin, “Interv’iu Pervomu kanalu i agentstvu Assoshieited Press,” Prezident 
Rossii: Ofitsial’nyi sait, 4 September 2013, http://special.kremlin.ru/events/president/
news/19143. 
14 Vladimir Putin, “Vystuplenie na Zasedanii Soveta po mezhnatsional’nym otnosheniiam,” 
Prezident Rossii: Ofitsial’nyi sait, 31 October 2016, http://special.kremlin.ru/events/
councils/53173. 
15 Vladimir Putin, “Vystuplenie na zasedanii prezidiuma Gossoveta, posviashchennogo 
politike v oblasti sem’i, materinstva i detstva,” Prezident Rossii: Ofitsial’nyi sait,  
17 February 2014, http://special.kremlin.ru/events/state-council/20265. 
16 Vladimir Putin, “Vystuplenie v Evreiskom muzee i tsentre tolerantnosti,” Prezident Rossii: 
Ofitsial’nyi sait, 27 January 2015, http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47529. 
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Traditional values, according to Putin, should therefore be supported, 17 
defended, 18 promoted, 19 strengthened, 20 and protected. In other words, 
in the modern world, traditional values are under threat of elimination, 
and those who claim to defend them must fight against their “erosion” 
and put forth an effort to “support” them.
As in any war, the war for traditional values has both enemies and 
allies. The nations of the West are among the adversaries, while the Mus-
lim world is among the allies. 
And this presents a distinctly new line of argumentation that Russia 
in its fight against the global West has never used before in the post-So-
viet period: one of moral arguments. Russia sees Western countries as 
enemies not for any political or economic reasons, but because of their 
perceived moral decay. 
Traditional Values  
and Conservatives’ Radicalization 
Notwithstanding the moral line of argumentation, the rhetoric of tradi-
tional values actually spurred the momentum of some rather dangerous 
tendencies of radicalization in Russian society in 2017. As it turned out, 
the numerous calls for the protection of traditional values without any 
real content or specific definitions for those values have become an explo-
sive mix. While state propaganda is very clear that traditional values must 
be protected, the understanding of what precisely should be defended is 
17 Vladimir Putin, “Poslanie Prezidenta Federal’nomu Sobraniiu,” Prezident Rossii: 
Ofitsial’nyi sait, 1 December 2016, http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53379. 
18 Vladimir Putin, “Vystuplenie na tseremonii vrucheniia veritel’nykh gramot poslami 
inostrannykh gosudarstv,” Prezident Rossii: Ofitsial’nyi sait, 16 January 2014,  
http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20070. 
19 Putin, “Vystuplenie na zasedanii prezidiuma Gossoveta.”
20 Vladimir Putin, “Vystuplenie na vstreche s chlenami fraktsii politicheskikh partii v 
Gosudarstvennoi Dume,” Prezident Rossii: Ofitsial’nyi sait, 14 August 2014,  
http://special.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46451. 
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much less obvious. Thus, Russian patriots are left with a simple task: to 
determine what needs protection themselves. 
This is precisely how Russian state propaganda provoked a conflict 
around the release of the film Matilda, an unremarkable pseudohistorical 
movie about an affair between Tsar Nicholas II and ballerina Matilda Ksh-
esinskaia. Numerous groups protested the film’s release, including some 
of a radical or even a terroristic nature. The image of Emperor Nicho-
las II, whom the Russian Orthodox Church has canonized as a saint, has 
become a new traditional value that must be protected. The film’s direc-
tor, Alexei Uchitel, in his turn, has emerged as an enemy who is attempt-
ing to destroy this particular value by giving it a false interpretation, thus 
offending the late tsar’s memory and outraging all Orthodox believers 
and “the whole of Russia.” The conflict would seem to be unworthy of 
such epic proportions, yet a confluence of circumstances has turned up 
the heat in Russian society, reaching an all-time high. 
On the one hand, the Russian Orthodox Church has attempted to 
refrain from formulating an official position regarding the film. On the 
other hand, a number of bishops and priests have made an open stand 
against it. 
The state funded the film’s production, and despite all the protests, 
it issued a distribution certificate for the movie. Meanwhile, State Duma 
member and former attorney from Crimea, Natalia Poklonskaya, became 
one of the main anti-Matilda crusaders. Her tactics included searching 
for grounds to withdraw the distribution certificate and accusing Uchi-
tel of financial fraud. 
Against such a backdrop, an arson attack on a cinema in Ekaterin-
burg 21 and the burning of several cars parked near the office of Uchitel’s 
attorney looked especially dire. 22 In the former case, the arsonist admit-
ted that he had hoped to stop the screening of Matilda. In the latter case, 
the arsonists left a note near the parked cars that stated, “Burn for Mat-
21 “Protivnik ‘Matil’dy’ popytalsia vzorvat’ ekaterinburgskii kinoteatr,” RIA56.ru,  
4 September 2017, accessed 13 April 2018, http://ria56.ru/posts/5424584582458245.htm.
22 “Liudi v maskakh podozhgli dve mashiny u ofisa advokata Uchitelia,” Novaia Gazeta, 
11 September 2017, https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2017/09/11/135168-troe-v-
maskah-podozhgli-dve-mashiny-u-ofisa-advokata-uchitelya. 
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ilda.” 23 Thus, the actions of traditional-values campaigners have demon-
strated that the risk of the traditional-values movement’s radicalization 
throughout the entire nation of Russia is exceptionally high. 
* * *
The “traditional values” discourse has failed to become an essential part of 
a new Russian ideology – for the simple reason that this ideology, despite 
all efforts, was not properly thought out. For years it remained as a set 
of isolated elements. Moreover, traditional values have not become the 
basis of a new system of values. In the post-Soviet space, the values dis-
course should be perceived not within the context of axiology, but merely 
as a pragmatic, ideological instrument. Values are brought up only when 
a person in power wants to distance him- or herself from the previous 
ideological constructs, to destroy the image of an old enemy, or to create 
a new enemy. It is, therefore, advisable to brand this phenomenon the 
“rhetoric of values.”
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Epilogue:  
Reflections on Globalizing  
Culture Wars
Culture war is a concept that was used by James Davison Hunter in order to 
describe the bitter conflict in the US between “orthodox” and “progressive” 
over which moral vision is correct and should become the foundation of 
human society. 1 “Orthodox” actors – one can also call them conservatives or 
traditionalists – adhere to the idea that key human institutions are rooted in 
transcendent principles and cannot be changed by circumstances or human 
will, while “progressives” – one can also call them liberals – believe that 
all institutions develop historically and in new contexts can be conscien-
tiously changed. 2 The mobilization of religious conservatives (the Chris-
tian Right) – who are the focus of this volume and the Postsecular Conflicts 
research project project behind it – was a reaction to the advancement of 
the progressive agenda, which, in the opinion of traditionalists, under-
mined the moral foundations of society, for example, by questioning tradi-
tional notions of gender and authority. Culture wars have been embodied 
in a series of highly emotional confrontations over such issues as abortion,
1 See James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Control the Family, Art, 
Education, Law, and Politics in America (New York: Basic Books, 1992).
2 Ibid., 44.
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religion at school, homosexuality, pornography, contemporary art, etc. 3 
Hunter’s work was devoted to the processes in American society, but 
in general, similar conflicts have affected any society that was influenced 
by the “cultural revolution” of the 1960s and the social dislocations that 
followed. As Kristina Stoeckl rightly put it in the introduction, culture war 
is not the only form that these kinds of postsecular conflicts take. Culture 
war seems to be pretty much an American phenomenon, while the Euro-
pean context, for example, is better described through the concepts of 
postsecular society and the postsecular search for consensus (along the 
lines of Jürgen Habermas’s thought). 4 
To a certain extent, it can be argued that these kinds of conflicts have 
replaced the ideological confrontation of the Cold War and the “end of 
history” phase, which, as some believed, started as soon as the great bat-
tle between Communists and capitalists was over. It can hardly be argued 
that the confrontation between traditionalists and progressives over abor-
tion or LGBTQ+ rights is comparable in scope and intensity to the con-
frontation of the Cold War. However, it is undoubtedly one of several key 
contemporary conflicts along with, for example, the confrontation with 
global terrorism. 
In recent decades we have observed a very peculiar transformation: 
the culture war between conservatives and liberals, which was initially 
limited to American borders, began to take on a transnational and global 
dimension. 5 This process started as early as the late 1980s and its visible 
manifestations are the emergence of transnational alliances of conserv-
atives and the export of the traditionalist worldview to regions and con-
tinents that have not yet been fully seized by the dynamics of the Ameri-
can culture wars. 6 Culture wars are globalizing – not only in the sense 
3 Ibid. 3
4 Jürgen Habermas, “Notes on Post-Secular Society,” New Perspectives Quarterly 25,  
no. 4 (2008): 17–29.
5 For more, see Clifford Bob, The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
6 James T. Gathii, “Exporting Culture Wars,” U. C. Davis Journal of International Law & 
Policy 13, no. 1 (2006): 67–93; Peter Berger, “Exporting the American Culture War,” The 
American Interest, 20 August 2014, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2014/08/20/
exporting-the-american-culture-war/. The same, of course, could be said about the 
opposite – “progressive” or liberal – camp. However, the focus of this volume is on the 
conservative position.
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that conflicts over values are becoming visible all over the world and even 
in international institutions like the UN 7 (this is just one aspect of this 
globalization), but also in the sense that these conflicts more often than 
not take the form of a culture war, a fierce polarization where any con-
sensus is almost impossible. 
There are several key actors representing the traditionalist position 
in this new globalized context – these actors are joining their efforts in a 
kind of ecumenism 2.0. 8 One of these, of course, is the Vatican, which 
was one of the first to engage in this type of confrontation during the pon-
tificates of Pope Paul VI and Pope John Paul II. 9 Some Muslim actors, 
particularly the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which has tried 
to be active in the UN and to interact with like-minded partners from 
other religions, also subscribe to the traditionalist position. 10 However, 
the key actor for our research is the American Christian Right, a move-
ment forged during the American culture wars of the 1970s and 1980s. 11 
The Christian Right became the key drivers of this globalization of cul-
ture wars and the formation of transnational alliances of conservatives. 12 
Another important actor is Russia, which is a latecomer, becoming a sig-
nificant player on the conservative side only in the second decade of the 
21st century: in 2012 the Russian regime, backed by the Russian Ortho-
dox Church, started – quite successfully I should say – to position itself 
7 Katherine Marshall, “Engaging on Global Issues in a UN Setting: Religious Actors,” in 
Religion, State and the United Nations: Value Politics, ed. Anna Stensvold (New York: 
Routledge, 2017), 17–26.
8 On this concept, see Andrey Shishkov, “Two Ecumenisms: Conservative Christian 
Alliances as a New Form of Ecumenical Cooperation,” State, Religion and Church 4,  
no. 2 (2017): 58–87.
9 A good treatment of this is the recent book by Frederick Martel, which not only describes 
the chronology of this struggle, but also shows its consequences for the Catholic Church 
(Frederic Martel, In the Closet of the Vatican: Power, Homosexuality, Hypocrisy [London: 
Bloomsbury Continuum, 2019]).
10 See, in particular: Marie Juul Petersen and Heini Skorini, “Hate Speech and Holy 
Prophets: Tracing the OIC’s Strategies to Protect Religion,” in Religion, State and the 
United Nations: Value Politics, ed. Anna Stensvold (New York: Routledge, 2017), 44–61.
11 See Seth Dowland, Family Values and the Rise of the Christian Right (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).
12 Jennifer Butler, Born Again: The Christian Right Globalized (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 
2006).
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as the last bastion of traditional values and the leader of the global con-
servative front. 13 
This volume brought together conversations with some of the key rep-
resentatives of contemporary “culture war conservatism” both from the 
US and Russia. These conversations were balanced by voices that offered 
a critical look at this ideology. These materials show how contemporary 
traditionalists evaluate the dynamics of culture wars, whether they agree 
with the widespread thesis that conservatives have lost the culture war, 
how US conservatives perceive Russian conservatives and vice versa, and 
whether these alliances against transnational liberalism are stable and 
enduring. Finally, the materials show the conservative attitude toward 
Europe, which – against the backdrop of the rise of populist movements –  
has become a zone of special interest for the strategists and commanders 
of the culture wars. This last issue is especially relevant in the context of 
the question posed by Kristina Stoeckl in the introduction: if the culture 
wars are brought to Europe and if Europe is seen as a mission field by cul-
ture warriors, then the European model of a postsecular society oriented 
toward consensus is under threat and in danger of being replaced by the 
globalizing model of the American culture war. 
In what follows I will share my reflections and observations con-
cerning the current state of global culture wars on the basis of the mate-
rials published in this volume. 
Increasing polarization and disappearance of the center. The theme 
that cuts across the volume is the disappearance not only of some kind of 
consensus, but also of a dimension where meaningful rational exchange 
of arguments is possible. 14 These conditions are already implied in the 
very concept of culture war, but, as our interlocutors see it, the situation 
is becoming much worse. R. R. Reno points out that the general back-
ground of the Cold War pushed both conservatives and progressives not 
only toward a centrist position, but also toward the formation of a cer-
tain consensual positions: yes, changes are necessary, but – conserva-
tives asserted – these changes should not be too fast and too rapid. How-
13 See Kristina Stoeckl, “Postsecular Conflicts and the Global Struggle for Traditional 
Values” (lecture), State, Religion and Church 3, no. 2 (2016): 102–16.
14 This was emphasized by Clifford Bob in The Global Right Wing.
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ever, the end of the Cold War “made the cultural consensus of the Cold 
War era, built around […] ‘diversity over unity’ and ‘openness over clo-
sure’ both more powerful and more dysfunctional” (p. 55). The checks and 
balances that allowed centrist positions to exist and prevented excessive 
polarization with the inevitable radicalization of the parties have disap-
peared. The image that is often mentioned in descriptions of the current 
stage of culture war is that of a “civil war,” the most extreme phase of civil 
confrontation. As Rod Dreher, for example, puts it: “when I look at the 
US now, I think about Spain in 1931, when the trouble started there that 
eventually led to a civil war. I don’t think that we will pull guns against 
each other in the US, but the polarization is so great now and there’s no 
center left” (p. 28). 15
The image of violent confrontation over values and identities, which 
in the American context sounds like a warning, like a kind of exagger-
ated description of the intensity of ongoing polarization, in the Russian 
Orthodox context takes a much more sinister turn. Alexander Filonenko, 
philosopher, theologian, and member of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church 
Moscow Patriarchate, reflects on the conservatism of traditional values 
and evaluates it against the background of the ongoing military conflict 
between Russia and Ukraine. This conflict has a clear value dimension 
– at least from the Russian side it is often portrayed as a reaction to the 
attempt of the liberal West to subvert the “Russian world,” which is based 
on adherence to traditional values and a traditional way of life. Filonenko 
points to the growing cleavage between adherents of traditional values 
and those members of the Eastern Orthodox Church who don’t share this 
ideological vision. This cleavage is visible all over the Eastern Orthodox 
world. What is really troubling is the fact that these two groups – at least, 
in Ukraine – can no longer talk to each other and stop perceiving each 
other as parts of a single Orthodox community. These value conflicts 
are the context “from which demons are born” (p. 76) – demons of war 
and demons that divide the Church, members of which live both in Rus-
15 In the early 1990s James Davison Hunter paid attention to this sinister dimension 
of evolving value conflicts. In Before the Shooting Begins: Searching for Democracy 
in America’s Culture War (New York: Free Press, 1994), he described how discussion 
degenerates into a caricaturish battle dangerously charged with intense emotions.
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sia and Ukraine. Ideological confrontation, the struggle over values and 
identities exacerbated by the uneasy territorial relations between Rus-
sia and Ukraine, has split the common space of Russian Orthodoxy. The 
Russian-Ukrainian context that Filonenko is talking about is, of course, 
very specific and cannot be reduced solely to confrontation around dif-
ferent understandings of moral vision. However, it shows how easily con-
frontation over values and identities develops into a military struggle 
that threatens to destroy community. The tensions around the “Russian 
World” 16 reveal in a much more dramatic and violent form the polariza-
tion and loss of any consensus that American participants and observers 
of culture wars are talking about. 
The eclipse of the mind and the rise of emotions. Positions on the oppos-
ing sides in these conflicts appear to be embedded in large emotionally 
charged narratives that nearly bring the work of reason to a standstill. 
Certain issues in these struggles, for example, confrontations about the 
definition of family or non-discrimination against LGBTQ+ people, are 
not technical issues waiting to be resolved pragmatically. These are sym-
bols that, like any other symbols, point to something beyond – to compre-
hensive narratives about the war between good and evil, light and dark-
ness. This vision of something like a “cosmic war” makes it impossible 
for each side to hear the other’s positions and turns the very debate into 
a small part of a bigger story. Progressive, liberal actors adhere to the 
narrative of gradual progress and the emancipation of the human person 
from various limiting forces and prejudices, while the conservative side 
sees the culture war as the history of a transcendentally founded order 
that is about to collapse under the pressure of human sin and immorality. 
conservatives are not fighting same-sex marriages or abortions as such, 
these are just symbols of the moral order, of the hierarchies that might 
collapse at any moment, plunging society into the chaos of non-differen-
tiation, where everything becomes mixed – high and low, bad and good, 
old and young, male and female, parents and children. 17 Or alternatively 
16 On the concept of the “Russian world” and its controversies, see Mikhail Suslov, 
“‘Russian World’ Concept: Post-Soviet Geopolitical Ideology and the Logic of ‘Spheres of 
Influence,’” Geopolitics 23, no. 2 (2018): 330–53.
17 For more on this, see Dmitry Uzlaner, “The Logic of Scapegoating in Contemporary 
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they envision a world gripped by a new totalitarianism, where everything 
would be turned upside down – evil would take the place of good, low in 
the place of high, etc. The US Supreme Court has legalized same-sex mar-
riages and the world has not collapsed. But this is not a reason to give up 
the fight, because it is not a fight for or against same-sex marriage, it is a 
fight against chaos, against immersion in disorder, or the inverted order 
of the new 1984. Such narratives, imbued with emotions – fear, anxiety, 
righteous indignation – lead to a black-and-white perception of the world, 
to the demonization of the opponent and to the impossibility of achiev-
ing even some minimal consensus. 18
Russia and the United States as screens for each other’s projections. 
Russia and the US are once again becoming screens for each other, on 
which corresponding actors project some of their own images arising 
from the internal logic of corresponding societies. 19 The transforma-
tion, the inversion of each other’s images that has taken place since the 
Cold War, is remarkable. During the Cold War, the USSR (Russia is the 
successor to the USSR) was perceived by American conservatives as an 
“evil empire,” as a source of destructive cultural influences (let’s remem-
ber the fake “Communist Rules for Revolution” 20), while the US was per-
ceived as a force that was preventing the world from the final triumph 
of godless Communism and anarchy. The USSR, by contrast, positioned 
Russian Moral Conservatism,” in Contemporary Russian Conservatism: Problems, 
Paradoxes, and Perspectives, ed. Mikhail Suslov and Dmitry Uzlaner (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 
103–27.
18 Clifford Bob calls the outcome of such an emotional struggle “‘zombie’ policy” (Bob, The 
Global Right Wing, 6). The materials presented in our publication demonstrate that this 
trend shows no signs of abating.
19 Ivan Kurila, Zakliatye druz’ia: Istoriia mnenii, fantazii, kontaktov, vzaimo(ne)ponimaniia 
Rossii i SShA (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2018).
20 A fake document supposedly discovered by Allied forces in Germany in 1919 and then 
widely spread in the US by anti-Communists. The first rule is: “Corrupt the young, get 
them away from religion. Get them interested in sex. Make them superficial. Destroy 
their ruggedness.” A very similar fake document is spreading in post-Soviet Russia under 
the name of the “Dulles’ Plan” (see Vesna Smirnova and Serghei Golunov, “Proliferation 
of Conspiracy Narratives in Post-Soviet Russia: The ‘Dulles’ Plan’ in Social and Political 
Discourses,” Acta Slavica Iaponica 37 [2016]: 21–45). This plan, supposedly authored 
by Allen Welsh Dulles, the head of the CIA, includes among other things the following: 
“Poison the soul of the youth with unbelief in the meaning of life, stimulate interest in 
sexual issues, attract them with such lures of the free world as discs, poems, songs…”
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itself as a vanguard of emancipation, as a fighter for the progressive trans-
formation of humanity (away from religion and toward atheism 21) and 
against the reactionary forces of the West, led by obscurantists from the 
United States. Today positions have changed dramatically – it is the US or 
the ruling liberal establishment that – in the conservative narrative – has 
become the new or neo-USSR, spreading subversive ideas about family or 
the nature of authority around the world, while Russia has become almost 
a beacon of hope, “the last bastion of Christian values” that helps keep the 
world from sliding into a new left-liberal dystopia. Russia’s self-identity 
has changed accordingly – now it is Russia who actively resists destruc-
tive, revolutionary experiments with fundamental human institutions, 
experiments inspired by new revolutionary neo-Communists from the 
United States. Hence the cautious hopes that the US Christian Right have 
for contemporary Russia: they are literally projecting on Russia as if on 
a screen their fantasies about another West that has not been infected by 
the virus of cultural liberalism. 22 
However this vision of Russia finds little support among the Rus-
sian voices presented in this volume – with Dugin as a very big exception. 
These are the voices of Russian intellectuals who are trying to show the 
deeply problematic nature of the Russian ideology of traditional values 
and its image as the defender of Christian values. Sergey Chapnin in his 
contribution shows how new and unusual is this turn to “traditional val-
ues” for post-Soviet Russia: as late as the early 2000s traditionalism was 
still a rather marginal and not particularly elaborated ideology, the basic 
foundations of which were gradually developed by the future Patriarch 
Kirill and his circle. Other contributions emphasize how complex and 
ambiguous the concept of tradition in the Orthodox context is and how 
crudely this tradition is being instrumentalized for the sake of ideologi-
cal and geopolitical considerations. 
21 On Soviet atheism, see Victoria Smolkina, A Sacred Space Is Never Empty: A History of 
Soviet Atheism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018).
22 Peter Montgomery, “The Religious Right Has an Unholy Crush on Vladimir Putin,” Salon, 
23 December 2016, https://www.salon.com/2016/12/23/the-religious-right-has-an-
unholy-crush-on-vladimir-putin_partner/.
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The difference between Russian and American contexts. In interviews, 
American traditionalists often say that they experience themselves as a 
kind of new dissident 23 (hence their interest in the experience of Soviet 
dissidents), as losers in culture wars, who at any moment could be, if not 
outlawed, then at least seriously limited in their rights – for example, if 
discrimination against sexual identity becomes equal to racial or gen-
der discrimination. This understanding of their own desperate situation 
pushes them to look for hope somewhere else – either in the future, in 
the hope of some new demographic trend, when conservative religious 
families have more children than liberal ones, or in exotic cultures and 
regions – for example, in Russia, which, as I mentioned above, turns into 
a very convenient screen for all sorts of fantasies about an “alternative 
West” with an authentic Christian tradition. 
The Russian context is strikingly different from the American one. 
In Russia it is liberals who are nearly dissidents in a society almost totally 
dominated by conservative actors and institutions. These liberals are in 
the very vulnerable position of people who could be declared enemies of 
the people at any time and whose full membership in the national com-
munity could easily be questioned. From this experience a completely dif-
ferent attitude to “traditional values” and traditionalism arises, and this 
attitude is expressed by Russian contributors to this volume: conserva-
tism as a dead ideology, which threatens to turn Russia into a museum 
of archaic outdated forms, doomed to slowly fading in the face of rapidly 
developing neighbors both in the West and in the East. 
We are “driving on fumes,” says Rod Dreher in his interview (p. 33), 
referring to the decline of American society corrupted by left-liberal ide-
ology. We are “driving on fumes,” say Russian liberals, meaning the fad-
ing of Russia, which is prevented from any development by the suffocat-
ing new ideology of traditionalism. 
Focus on Europe. Europe is becoming increasingly important for cul-
ture war activists. Against the backdrop of a crisis of mainstream political 
parties and the rise of right-wing populist movements, in which religion 
23 See also: Gertrude Himmelfarb, “Comment: The Other Culture War,” in Is There a Culture 
War? A Dialogue on Values and American Public Life, ed. James Davison Hunter and Alan 
Wolfe (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 81.
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and traditional values play an important role, 24 both Russian and Ameri-
can conservatives look at Europe with hope. The current European situa-
tion is perceived as a very good opportunity to open some kind of “second 
front” in the culture wars. Moreover, some European societies are seen to 
provide the possibility of a kind of “third way” – compared to overly lib-
eral America and overly authoritarian Russia – and even to redefine the 
very configuration of culture wars, as Alexander Dugin describes in dis-
cussing his “fourth political theory” (p. 67). As he puts it, the traditional 
way of structuring the culture wars was to oppose the union of conserv-
ative economic views and conservative social views to the union of pro-
gressive economic views and progressive social views. 25 However, Europe, 
with its traditions of a social state, can offer a different and more attrac-
tive configuration: progressive economic views together with conserva-
tive social views versus conservative economic views together with pro-
gressive social views. That is, traditional values conservatism could be 
finally separated from its usual link with the neoliberal economy, which 
many conservatives reject, and attached to a more progressive economic 
program. 
The fragility of transnational value alliances. Do alliances between 
Russian and American conservatives have a future? On the one hand, the 
motivation to build such alliances is strong – both American and Russian 
actors face the same powerful and insidious enemy. As Rod Dreher says 
in this regard, referring to one of the key representatives of the Russian 
Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Hilarion: “the things that divided us in 
the past, they’re important, we can’t ignore them completely. But the 
challenge from post-Christianity and a hostile post-Christian culture is 
so great that we need to try to help each other” (p. 30). On the other hand, 
the history of previous conservative alliances show how short-lived these 
alliances are and how easily circumstances ruin ecumenism 2.0 in its dif-
ferent manifestations. For example, the Vatican, which was one of the first 
international leaders of the conservative camp, quickly became a great dis-
24 See Nadia Marzouki, Duncan McDonnell, and Olivier Roy, eds., Saving the People: How 
Populists Hijack Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
25 See Melinda Cooper, Family Values: Between Neoliberalism and the New Social 
Conservatism (New York: Zone Books, 2019).
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appointment for the Christian Right: against the backdrop of sexual scan-
dals, the new Pope Francis in 2013 replaced socially conservative rhetoric 
with a much more moderate stance, open to new progressive social and 
cultural trends. Another conservative alliance – that between American 
Evangelicals and Muslim actors (Clifford Bob called it the “Baptist-burqa” 
network 26) – turned out to be no less fragile: Allan Carlson describes in 
detail the collapse of this alliance at the moment of the terrorist attack 
on New York City on 11 September 2001 (p. 38–39). 
Actually, disappointment in former allies – Catholic and Muslim – 
was one of the crucial factors that pushed the American Christian Right 
to seek new allies in Russia. However, given the deterioration of relations 
between the two countries against the backdrop of the ongoing scandal 
over possible Russian interference in the US elections in 2016, as well as 
the instability of the conservative platform in Russia itself, one can assume 
with some certainty that collaboration between conservatives of the two 
countries might soon be put to a severe test. 
Though some American conservatives are more or less sure that the 
national culture war is over and that they have lost their battle for the 
soul of American society, global value conflicts are far from over. And the 
outcome of this struggle seems open-ended. Global culture wars in the 
transnational and global dimension have their own logic and their own 
line of development that may lead to unexpected consequences in differ-
ent national contexts – including, probably, the American one. So, as one 
of our interlocutors put it in his interview, “the great battles lie ahead. 
We’ll see how it turns out” (p. 52). 
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